Stewart v. Evans, 02-5391.
| Decision Date | 19 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-5391.,02-5391. |
| Citation | 351 F.3d 1239 |
| Parties | Sonya G. STEWART, Appellant, v. Donald L. EVANS, Secretary of Commerce, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 00cv01241).
Dale L. Wilcox argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Larry Klayman and Paul J. Orfanedes.
Richard Montague, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Barbara L. Herwig, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice. Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr. and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorneys, entered appearances.
Before: RANDOLPH and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Sonya Stewart, a Department of Commerce employee, sued two Department of Commerce attorneys in their personal capacities for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Stewart asserts that the attorneys violated her Fourth Amendment rights by reviewing certain documents she had compiled and kept at work. Stewart had turned the documents over to other agency officials who needed to determine their responsiveness to Freedom of Information Act and congressional requests, but had done so subject to an agreement that the documents not be provided to the attorneys. The district court granted the attorneys' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case. We affirm.
Appellant Sonya Stewart, at the pertinent time an employee at the Department of Commerce, alleges that then-Inspector General Frank DeGeorge subjected her to a profanity-laced tirade of verbal abuse and threats during a telephone conversation on May 3, 1996. After her reports to high-level Department officials about DeGeorge's abusive conduct failed to generate any response, Stewart filed a formal complaint with the Department's Office of Civil Rights (OCR), alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation. In that complaint, she alleged that DeGeorge's abusive conduct had created a hostile work environment, and that employees in the Department's Office of General Counsel (OGC) had participated in a scheme to stonewall her charges against DeGeorge and to retaliate against her.
The Department referred the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for investigation. The EEOC completed its investigation and prepared a Report of Investigation (ROI). An ROI contains the investigator's summary of the evidence, as well as the complaint, testimony, affidavits, and any pertinent correspondence and documents. One copy of the ROI was given to Stewart, one to the Department. Stewart kept her copy in a locked drawer in her office, along with what she described as "voluminous notes and other documents regarding the May 3, 1996 incident, the Commerce Department's stonewalling and obstruction, and the subsequent acts of retaliation against her." Compl. ¶ 26. The Department ultimately rejected Stewart's claims of gender-based discrimination and retaliation.
The documents compiled by Stewart first became an issue in January 1998, when the Department received a Freedom of Information Act request from the Washington Post. The request sought any documents "involving or related to Frank DeGeorge," Letter from Stephen Barr, Washington Post Staff Writer, to Brenda Dolan, Department of Commerce FOIA Officer (Jan. 12, 1998), specifically naming documents made or compiled by Stewart. Although believing her documents might be responsive, Stewart balked at allowing them to be reviewed by the Department in response to the FOIA request. She feared that during such a review OGC attorneys would gain access to her documents, which contained accusations of wrongdoing by OGC staff, and to her work product relating to her complaint against the Department. Pursuant to an agreement with the Assistant Secretary for Administration, Scott Gould, Stewart turned the documents over to Brenda Dolan, the Department's FOIA officer, for review, on the condition that no personnel from OGC have access to them. The documents were ultimately not provided to the Washington Post.
The Department received another request for documents pertaining to DeGeorge in February 1998, this time from Senator Charles Grassley. Again, believing that her documents might be responsive, but concerned about possible OGC access, Stewart brokered another agreement to permit review of her documents. Pursuant to this agreement, Stewart transferred her documents to John Sopko — head of the Special Matters Unit (SMU), a component of OGC that handled requests for information from Congress — on the conditions that no other personnel from OGC would have access to them, and that they would be secured in a locked safe within the SMU. But when both Sopko and Stewart were on sick leave, appellee Kathleen Taylor, Chief of the Employment Law Division (allegedly acting under the direction of her supervisor, appellee Barbara Fredericks, Assistant General Counsel for Administration) gained access to the safe and reviewed the documents. After subsequent review by SMU staff found the documents to be responsive to Senator Grassley's request, the Department provided all the documents to Congress.
In February 2000, Stewart sued the Secretary of Commerce in his official capacity for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and sued Fredericks and Taylor in their personal capacities for Fourth Amendment violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The basis for the latter claim was Taylor's unauthorized review of Stewart's documents in the SMU. After transfer from the Eastern District of Virginia, the district court dismissed the entire action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the allegations did not state a violation of Title VII, and that the administrative remedies provided by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2303, precluded Stewart's Fourth Amendment claims against Fredericks and Taylor.
Stewart appealed to this court. We affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII claims but reversed the dismissal of the Bivens action, holding that the CSRA did not bar Stewart's Fourth Amendment claims. Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126 (D.C.Cir. 2002). This court declined to consider defendants' arguments that "Stewart lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the places they searched — or at least that such an expectation was not clearly established — and that the defendants are therefore shielded from liability by a qualified immunity," noting that the record was inadequate in the case, "which did not even get to the summary judgment stage." Id. at 1130-31. As the court explained, "[w]ithout knowing more about the circumstances surrounding the search, a court simply cannot assess whether it was reasonable." Id. at 1131.
On remand, Fredericks and Taylor moved for summary judgment. Stewart opposed the motion on two grounds: (1) the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and (2) the need to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f) in order to oppose the motion. The parties submitted affidavits, with exhibits, in support of their respective positions concerning the motion. After hearing oral argument, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fredericks and Taylor. The court ruled that Stewart had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the documents she had turned over to the other Department officials, and therefore no protected Fourth Amendment interest. The court went on to rule that Fredericks and Taylor were in any event entitled to qualified immunity, because no clearly established Fourth Amendment right had been violated. The court declined to permit discovery. Stewart again appeals.
Stewart asserts that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her documents, and that Taylor's examination of those documents in contravention of the non-disclosure agreement violated the Fourth Amendment. In addition, she argues that her Fourth Amendment right was clearly established — defeating any claim of qualified immunity — because O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), had confirmed that government employees enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal documents kept at the workplace.
"A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of violation." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The constitutional question generally should be decided first to "promote[] clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Id. We accordingly must first determine, applying the usual summary judgment standards, whether Stewart has shown a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated...." The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a `constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'" California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McDonald v. Salazar
...search and seizure of McDonald. See, e.g., O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (search of employee's office); Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243–44 (D.C.Cir.2003) (search of safe to which employee had access); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624–633, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (search of employe......
-
Allen v. Brown
...94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). Under the plurality opinion in O'Connor , which has been adopted by the D.C. Circuit, see Stewart v. Evans , 351 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003), when a government as employer conducts a search or seizure for "noninvestigatory, work-related purposes" or for "investig......
-
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress
...faith in the First Amendment sense—does not implicate the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."); Stewart v. Evans , 351 F.3d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (no Fourth Amendment violation). Those cases are wholly inapposite to the facts here.96 The record shows that the staff o......
-
Fc Inv. Group Lc v. Ifx Markets, Ltd.
...jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 410 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1245 (D.C.Cir. 2003)). The plaintiffs have the burden of establishing the court's personal jurisdiction over IFX. See Reuber v. United States,......
-
Table of Cases
...530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000), 1277 Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), 1211 Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2003), Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998), 1043 Page 1711 Stewart v. North Carolina......
-
Safe for Work? Analyzing the Supreme Court's Standard of Privacy for Government Employees in Light of City of Ontario v. Quon
...375 F.3d 679, 683–85 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated , 543 U.S. 1112, judgment reinstated , 413 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2005); Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 72–77 (2d Cir. 2001); Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 489–93 (7th Cir. 1997); 129......