Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 15124

Citation662 A.2d 753,234 Conn. 597
Decision Date01 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 15124,15124
PartiesWalter A. STEWART, Administrator (Estate of Marion B. Javery) v. FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Michael A. Dowling, with whom were Kevin J. Gumpper and, on the brief, Shelagh M. Neary, Fairfield, for appellant (named defendant).

Richard A. Silver, with whom were John D. Josel and, on the brief, Jonathan L. Mannina, Stamford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and F.X. HENNESSY, JJ.

BERDON, Justice.

The defendant Federated Department Stores, Inc., appeals from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict against it awarding the plaintiff, Walter A. Stewart as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Marion B. Javery, damages for her wrongful death. Javery, a business invitee of the defendant, was murdered by a third party, Bernard Williams, in a parking garage in Stamford that was owned and operated by the defendant in connection with its retail store, Bloomingdale's.

The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $1,507,310 for the wrongful death of the decedent. 1 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and rendered judgment on the verdict. The defendant appealed 2 raising two issues: (1) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of proximate cause; and (2) whether the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that, as a matter of law, the death of Javery was the result of a superseding intervening cause. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 6, 1988, Javery was shopping in Bloomingdale's department store. After finishing shopping, Javery returned to her car, which was parked on the ground floor of Bloomingdale's garage. As she was placing her purchases in her trunk, Williams, an individual with no connection to the defendant, approached her from behind to rob her. When Javery resisted, Williams repeatedly stabbed her, leaving her to die on the garage floor. Before fleeing, Williams took Javery's purse and packages and her watch, which he ripped from her arm.

At the time of Javery's murder and robbery, no security guard was on duty in the garage. In fact, it was the defendant's practice to maintain minimal security in the garage. Bloomingdale's, with gross annual sales of forty million dollars, employed five security officers to guard its in-store property, while employing only one security officer to guard customer and employee safety in the garage. Moreover, the security guard assigned to the three story, 985 car facility was regularly reassigned to guard the loading dock and was not replaced while absent from his or her post. Consequently, the garage was frequently left unsecured, which was the case at the time of Javery's death.

Additionally, the garage was not constructed or maintained in a manner that provided security to the store's customers. Lighting was dim, with 300 fluorescent light fixtures inoperative on the day that Javery was murdered. Furthermore, there were no gates at either the vehicular or pedestrian entrances, nor was the facility fully fenced or enclosed on the ground level.

Geographically, the store and its garage are located in a neighborhood of Stamford that is reputed for its high crime rate. The crimes committed in the area spanned the spectrum of violence from larceny and robbery to rape and murder. Within the ten months prior to Javery's death, over 1000 serious crimes were committed within an area of two blocks from the garage. More specifically, Javery's murder was not the first crime to occur in Bloomingdale's garage. Prior to her attack, customers had been robbed at knifepoint and assaulted in the garage. Indeed, as in this case, several customers and employees had been robbed at knifepoint in the garage when there was no security guard on duty. Additionally, the garage was regularly the site of larcenies from parked cars, theft of cars and vandalism. In recognition of the criminal activity in and about the garage, the defendant's employees repeatedly requested the management to increase security in the garage. The defendant, however, took no steps to provide additional security.

Furthermore, the defendant, as informed by its own security personnel, was aware of the security problem in its garage and the remedial steps that were necessary to correct it. In 1982, Kevin Lash, the security manager for the Stamford Bloomingdale's, after reviewing the crime problem in and about the garage, recommended that an additional guard was required and that the garage should be fully enclosed with fencing. Management, however, rejected this proposal.

Neil A. Sullivan, an expert in the field of security, appeared as an expert for the plaintiff. He testified that the defendant had failed to assess the danger to which its customers and employees were exposed in the parking garage. After reviewing the history of crime in the garage and the surrounding area, as well as the garage's physical layout and lighting, Sullivan concluded that the garage required at least three guards to provide adequate security. In Sullivan's opinion, "[h]ad appropriate security coverage been in place, had access to the facility been controlled, had lighting been adequate, it is probable that criminal activity would have been deterred and the robbery which led to [Javery's] death would not have been attempted."

During deliberations, the jury was furnished with four interrogatories. 3 In response the jury specifically found the following: the defendant was negligent by failing to provide the requisite level of security in its garage; the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of, i.e., a substantial factor in causing the harm to Javery; the defendant's failure to use reasonable care in guarding the safety of its patrons within its garage created or increased the likelihood of injury to a customer as a result of a criminal act within the garage; and the harm caused by Williams was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligence. In accordance with the jury verdict, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

I

At the conclusion of the evidence and summations, the trial court furnished the jury with extensive instructions on all aspects of the law pertaining to the case, including instructions regarding proximate cause and intervening cause. The defendant focuses on the following three aspects of the initial and supplemental instructions as the basis for its claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury: (1) the court's failure to reinstruct on the issue of cause in fact; (2) the court's failure to instruct that the plaintiff had a heightened burden of proof regarding the "scope of the risk" caused by the defendant's negligence; and (3) the court's response to the jury's inquiry whether the nature of the crime should be considered when determining causation.

Our standard of review is well established. "The test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 240, 520 A.2d 1008 (1987). Thus, we must determine "whether the charge as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will be done." State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 170, 434 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S.Ct. 789, 66 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). Only when a specific request to charge is filed, or an exception is taken to the charge, may this court examine individual components of the charge. State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 268, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S.Ct. 1797, 90 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). Therefore, jury instructions "need not be exhaustive, perfect, or technically accurate." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Preston v. Keith, 217 Conn. 12, 17, 584 A.2d 439 (1991). Nonetheless, the trial court must correctly adapt the law to the case in question and must provide the jury with sufficient guidance in reaching a correct verdict. Id.

A

Other than on the issue of the burden of proof, 4 the defendant does not challenge the trial court's initial charge on causation. Rather, the defendant focuses its first claim on the supplemental instructions that were given in response to a note from the jury to the judge that read: "Please redefine causation as it pertains to this case."

In its initial instruction, the trial court charged that the plaintiff was required to establish that the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of Javery's harm and death. Legal cause was defined as having two components, both of which had to be satisfied: cause in fact and proximate cause. The court defined cause in fact as the purest application of legal cause. To determine whether cause in fact existed, the jurors were instructed to ask themselves: Would the injury have occurred were it not for Bloomingdale's negligent conduct? Addressing the second component, the court noted that there can be multiple proximate causes of an event, and that proximate cause is satisfied if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in the resulting harm.

In response to the jury's request for a redefinition of causation, the trial court reminded the jurors that the charge was to be understood as a whole, and that no individual point should be singled out. 5 The court then proceeded to repeat its definition of proximate cause as a "substantial factor," without explicitly redefining cause in fact....

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