Stewart v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
| Decision Date | 28 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. H–13–1391. |
| Citation | 16 F.Supp.3d 783 |
| Parties | Terry STEWART, Plaintiff and Counter–Defendant, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District 19, Defendants and Counter–Plaintiffs, v. Don E. Hall, Counter–Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Paul Robert Harris, Katherine Louise Butler, Butler and Harris, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff and Counter–Defendant.
Jeffrey A. Bartos, Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., Guerrieri Edmond and Clayman, Washington, DC, for Defendants and Counter–Plaintiffs.
Thomas H. Padgett, Jr., The Law Offices of Thomas H. Padgett Jr., Houston, TX, for Counter–Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation dated April 10, 2014,1 the court is of the opinion that said Memorandum and Recommendation should be adopted by this court.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the Memorandum and Recommendation is hereby ADOPTED by this court.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Order to the respective parties.
Pending before the court1 are Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims (Doc. 18), Counter–Defendant Don E. Hall's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24), and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Title VII Retaliation Claim (Doc. 59). The court has considered the motions, the responses, all other relevant filings, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the court RECOMMENDS that the motions be DENIED.
Terry Stewart (“Stewart”) filed this employment action against his union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”), and District Lodge 19 (“District 19”) of the IAM2 alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Stewart, an African–American man, works as a machinist for the Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”) in Houston, Texas, and is represented for collective bargaining purposes by the IAM.4 In March 2005, Stewart was appointed to the position of Assistant Local Chairman of Local Lodge 2198 (“Lodge 2198”), a subordinate body of the IAM.5 Lodge 2198 is a subdivision of District 19.6 District 19 is not a district in a geographical sense; rather, its membership is comprised of IAM members employed in the rail industry.7
In December 2006, Stewart was elected to the position of Lodge 2198 Local Chairman, to which he was reelected in December 2009.8 As Local Chairman, Stewart's responsibilities included working with the District 19 General Chairman to enforce the collective bargaining agreement by filing claims and grievances, distributing overtime, and settling disputes.9 In July 2010, Stewart submitted a letter to Joe Duncan (“Duncan”), then District 19 President, expressing his interest in serving as General Chairman of the district.10 As President, Duncan was responsible for recommending a candidate for the General Chairman position to the District 19 Executive Board.11 Don Hall (“Hall”), the outgoing General Chairman, recommended to Duncan that Stewart be chosen as his replacement.12 In September 2011, Jim Davis (“Davis”), who is Caucasian, was selected for the position on Duncan's recommendation.13
On October 17, 2011, Stewart wrote a letter to the IAM President complaining that Duncan's selection of Davis was the result of racial discrimination.14 An investigation into the complaint found no evidence that Duncan's recommendation was racially motivated.15 Stewart was advised of the results of this investigation in early December 2011.16 On December 29, 2011, Stewart filed a charge of race discrimination against District 19 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).17
In November 2011, Duncan announced that he had received complaints against Stewart and called for an investigation into the allegations.18 At the conclusion of an initial investigation, two IAM officials found in Stewart's favor.19 In February 2012, Duncan assigned another IAM official, Jeff Doerr (“Doerr”), to investigate the complaints further.20 Doerr concluded that Stewart had maintained a patronage scheme in contravention of IAM's constitution.21 On April 4, 2012, internal union charges were filed against Stewart.22 On the basis of these charges, Duncan removed Stewart from his position as Local Chairman.23
The IAM appointed a Trial Committee, which, after conducting a preliminary hearing in July 2012, determined that sufficient evidence existed to warrant a formal trial.24 The IAM issued a decision on September 23, 2013, finding Stewart guilty of seven charges of misconduct and disqualifying him from office for five years.25
While Stewart's EEOC charge was pending, he informed the EEOC about IAM's charges against him, as he believed they were retaliatory.26 Later, on August 12, 2013, Stewart filed an amendment to his EEOC charge, alleging that Duncan had initiated the investigation against him in retaliation for complaining about Duncan's alleged racial motivations behind recommending Davis for the General Chairman position and that the subsequent trial was conducted unfairly.27
Stewart filed this lawsuit on May 13, 2013.28 On August 13, 2013, the Union filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of Section 501 of the Labor–Management and Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (“Section 501 ”), which establishes fiduciary duties owed by a labor organization's officers to the organization and its members, and civil conspiracy against Stewart and Hall, as well as state-law claims of breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, money had and received, tortious interference with the performance of an existing contractual relationship, and fraud against Stewart.29
On September 3, 2013, Stewart filed a motion to dismiss the Union's counterclaims.30 The Union responded on September 24, 2013, and Stewart filed a reply on October 15, 2013.31 On October 14, 2013, Hall filed a motion to dismiss the Union's counterclaims against him, to which the Union responded on November 4, 2013.32 On December 20, 2013, the Union filed a motion to dismiss Stewart's retaliation claim under Title VII, to which Stewart responded on January 9, 2014.33 The Union filed a reply on January 31, 2014, and Stewart filed a surreply on February 3, 2014.34
Stewart and Hall both move to dismiss the Union's claim under 29 U.S.C. § 501 (“Section 501 ”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) on the basis that unions do not have standing to sue under the statute. Standing is a threshold consideration which defines the limits of a federal court's power to hear and adjudicate cases. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ; McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir.2003). The doctrine has two components, one involving constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and the other involving prudential limitations on its exercise. McClure, 335 F.3d at 408 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) ); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 517–18, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
In order to have constitutional standing to bring suit, the plaintiff must have sustained an injury in fact “fairly traceable to the defendant's actions” and “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision” in court. Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.1999) ; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The prudential limitations include the general requirement that a plaintiff seek relief based on his own legal rights and interests and not those of third parties. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; Ensley, 171 F.3d at 319. This component requires that the court review the law on which a claim is based to determine whether it grants parties such as the plaintiff a right to relief. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
The Fifth Circuit has instructed that while a dismissal for lack of constitutional standing should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), dismissal for lack of prudential standing is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6), which provides for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Blanchard 1986, Ltd. v. Park Plantation, LLC, 553 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir.2008) ; Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n. 2 (5th Cir.2011). Because Stewart and Hall dispute the Union's right to relief under Section 501, their motions to dismiss on this basis are properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1), and the court considers them as such.
Stewart and Hall also argue that these claims must be dismissed because they fall outside the scope of Section 501. Hall additionally moves to dismiss the Union's claims against him under Section 501 and for civil conspiracy on the basis that the Union has failed to allege sufficient facts concerning Hall's alleged actions sufficient to state the claims. Finally, Stewart moves to dismiss the remainder of the Union's claims against him for failure to state a claim, contending that the Union's breach of fiduciary duty claim under state law is barred by the statute of limitations and that the Union's other claims must be dismissed pursuant to the anti-fracturing doctrine.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal of an action is appropriate whenever the pleading, on its face, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should construe the allegations in the complaint favorably to the pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc., ...
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