Stewart v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1919
• Citation: 123 N.E. 382,226 N.Y. 302
• Parties: STEWART v. KNICKERBOCKER ICE CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

226 N.Y. 302

123 N.E. 382

STEWART

v.KNICKERBOCKER ICE CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 29, 1919.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

In the matter of the claim of Lillian E. Stewart, for compensation for the death of William M. Stewart under the Workmen's Compensation Law, against the Knickerbocker Ice Company, employer. An award of the State Industrial Commission was affirmed by the Appellate Division (173 N. Y. Supp. 924), and the employer appeals. Affirmed.

Frank R. Savidge, of New York City, for appellant.

Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, of Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

HISCOCK, C. J.

This is an appeal from an affirmance of an award made under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Consol. Laws, c. 67) for injuries received by one Stewart, while engaged in helping to unrig a derrick on one of the defendant's barges. It is conceded that the work in which the injured man was engaged was of a maritime nature, and upon that conceded fact the argument is made that our Workmen's Compensation Act is not applicable, because it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and with the federal statute passed thereunder. The attempt is made to support this argument almost exclusively by reference to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900.

The Jensen Case was one involving the applicability of our Workmen's Compensation Act to injuries received by a stevedore while engaged in helping to unload a vessel belonging to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. The two questions which were considered by Judge Miller in his opinion (215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, L. R. A. 1916A, 403, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 276) were the ones whether our act was unconstitutional, as depriving employers of property without due process of law; and, second, whether it was in conflict with the federal Constitution, because attempting directly to regulate or impose a tax or burden on interstate or foreign commerce-the Southern Pacific Company, owner of the vessel, being concededly engaged in such commerce. He reached the conclusion, concurred in by all members of the court voting, that the act was not vulnerable in either of those respects. When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, a new question was argued, and it was held by a closely divided vote that, inasmuch as the injured man was engaged in maritime work, our Compensation Act was violative of the United States Constitution as embodied in the federal statutes adopted thereunder conferring jurisdiction in such a case upon the federal courts.

In the prevailing opinion it was, amongst other things, in substance, written that the Constitution extended the judicial power of the United States ‘to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction’ and conferred upon the Congress power ‘to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof’ (244 U. S. 214, 37 Sup. Ct. 528, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900); that under these provisions of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 77) the District Courts of the United States had been given ‘exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, * * * saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it’ (244 U. S. 215, 37 Sup. Ct. 529, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900), and that this grant had been continued under Judicial Code, §§ 24 and 256 (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1091-1094, 1160 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 991 (1) to 991 (25), 1233]); that the remedy given by our compensation statute was of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any co...