Stewart v. Lone Star Exteriors, LLC
| Decision Date | 30 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:18-CV-131-JDK |
| Citation | 447 F.Supp.3d 548 |
| Parties | John STEWART, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. LONE STAR EXTERIORS, LLC, and Chris Smith Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
William S. Hommel, Jr., Hommel Law Firm, Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff.
Eric J. Kolder, Ramey & Flock, PC, Tyler, TX, for Defendants.
This case arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) () ("FLSA"). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Docket Nos. 44 & 48. As explained below, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendant Lone Star Exteriors, LLC is a construction company that provides roofing, gutter, and window installation services. Docket No. 44 at 2; Docket No. 49, Ex. C at 6:11–16. Defendant Chris Smith is the owner and manager of Lone Star. Docket No. 48, Ex. A at 6:3–5; Docket No. 58 (oral argument). Plaintiffs formerly worked for Lone Star—John Stewart and John Hopkins as foremen, and Jacob Mullins and TJ Timmons as laborers. Docket No. 44 at 2; Docket No. 48, Ex. A at 12:17–19; Docket No. 49, Ex. C at 7:11–14.
Lone Star classified all Plaintiffs as independent contractors, not employees, for purposes of the FLSA. Docket No. 48, Ex. A at 8:13–18. It is undisputed that Lone Star paid Plaintiffs Hopkins, Mullins, and Timmons a "day rate" that varied for each Plaintiff, was "not subject to any negotiation," and did not account for any overtime. Docket No. 48, Ex. A at 12:4–6; id. at 16:12–18; id. , Ex. B at 3, 5, 7, 9. The pay arrangement for Plaintiff Stewart is disputed. Smith testified that Stewart received fifteen percent of "the job total for his services," id. at 19:23–20:16, but Stewart testified that he was paid a day rate of $160, regardless of how long he worked that day. Docket No. 54, Ex. 2 at 4.
The Parties agree that Plaintiffs were generally expected to begin work at 6:30 AM each morning, when Smith would assign the work for the day. Id. at 10:14–19, 10:20–22. Smith testified that Plaintiffs determined when they were finished each day based "on how quick they got their assigned tasks done[.] [They] could have been done in four hours, could have been done in ten hours, just depending on the pace they want to work and how much they got at it." Id. at 17:10–16. Plaintiffs uniformly testified that they generally worked longer than eight-hour days: Stewart said he averaged twelve-fourteen hours per day, id. at 4; Hopkins worked a total of seventy-eighty hours per week, twelve-fourteen hours per day, and six-seven days per week, id. at 12, 14; Mullins averaged twelve-fourteen hours per day and worked six-seven days per week, id. at 20–21; and Timmons stated that he averaged twelve hours per day and worked five-six days per week, id. at 27–28. In their declarations, each Plaintiff swore that he "generally worked at least 10 hours each workday" and that he "worked between 60 and 70 hours per week." Docket No. 49, Ex. B at 2–9.
Plaintiff Stewart brought this case on March 19, 2018, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, and alleged that Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime wages. Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs Hopkins, Mullins, and Timmons later filed consents to join the case. Docket Nos. 19, 34, 35. Plaintiff Cody Thurlkill consented to join the case after the motions for summary judgment were fully briefed. Docket No. 57. The Court granted conditional certification of the collective action on December 18, 2018. Docket No. 26.
At the conclusion of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs could not present sufficient evidence showing the amount and extent of their work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. Docket No. 44. Plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of their employee status, Defendants' good faith defense to liquidated damages, and Smith's liability as a manager. Docket No. 48. The Court held oral argument on both motions on October 16, 2019.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. , 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A fact is material only if will affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court views all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here the Plaintiffs. Id. ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
After the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claim, the nonmoving party must assert competent summary judgment evidence to create a genuine fact issue. Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Mere conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Eason v. Thaler , 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996) ; Forsyth v. Barr , 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must identify evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports his claim. Ragas , 136 F.3d at 458. Summary judgment must be granted if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 after finding "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P. , 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) ). The statute covers "employees" and defines an "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). "Given the remedial purposes of the legislation, an expansive definition of ‘employee’ has been adopted by the courts." Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co. , 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976).
The FLSA prohibits employers from failing to provide employees with overtime pay when they work more than forty hours in a week:
[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). "If an employer violates the overtime-compensation requirement, it is ‘liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.’ " Parrish , 917 F.3d at 379 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ).
In bringing an FLSA action, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case by proving four elements:: "(1) that there existed an employer-employee relationship during the unpaid overtime periods claimed; (2) that the employee engaged in activities within the coverage of the FLSA; (3) that the employer violated the FLSA's overtime wage requirements; and (4) the amount of overtime compensation due." Johnson v. Heckmann Water Res. (CVR), Inc. , 758 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs must prove each element by "a preponderance of the evidence." Parrish , 917 F.3d at 379. "If ‘the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to "come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence." ’ " Id. (quoting Johnson , 758 F.3d at 630 ).
Both sides filed summary judgment motions. Docket Nos. 44 & 48. The Court addresses each motion in turn.
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Plaintiffs' employee status, (2) Defendants' good faith defense to liquidated damages, and (3) Smith's liability as a manager. Docket No. 48. As an initial matter, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion regarding Defendants' good faith defense to liquidated damages and Smith's liability as a manager because Defendants concede summary judgment is appropriate on these grounds. See Docket No. 58, Tr. at 30:18–31:1. The Court denies the motion with respect to Plaintiffs' employee status because Defendants have presented genuine disputes of material fact.1
The wage and hour provisions in the FLSA apply only to "employee[s]." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) ; see Usery , 527 F.2d 1308, 1310–11. Thus, as part of their prima facie case, Plaintiffs must show "that there existed an employer-employee relationship during the unpaid overtime periods claimed" by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson , 758 F.3d at 630. "In the present setting, a relevant question is whether the alleged employee so economically depends upon the business to which he renders his services, such that the individual, as a matter of economic reality, is...
To continue reading
Request your trial