Stewart v. Middlebrooks

• Decision Date: 12 August 2021
• Docket Number: 3:19CV55-GHD-JMV
• Parties: JERRY UNDRE STEWART PETITIONER v. WARDEN SCOTT MIDDLEBROOKS RESPONDENT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

JERRY UNDRE STEWART PETITIONER v. WARDEN SCOTT MIDDLEBROOKS RESPONDENT

No. 3:19CV55-GHD-JMV

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division

August 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of Jerry Undre Stewart for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. The State has responded to the petition; the petitioner has replied, and the matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev. 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, ” Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923) and it is equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion, public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. &Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeas corpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the

1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same, however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas corpus.

Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may issue the writ when a person is held in violation of the federal Constitution or laws, permitting a federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S.Ct. 582 588, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915).

Facts

1. the Mississippi Court of Appeals summarized the facts:

¶ 2. The prosecution was built on the testimony of two accomplices turned State's witnesses, Tresten Chatman and Christopher Anderson. There were some differences in their accounts, but both agreed that McKay and Chatman had arranged for Stewart to buy a kilogram of cocaine from an associate of McKay's in Memphis, and the cocaine turned out to be mostly baking soda. On the way back from the exchange Stewart summoned Anderson, Maggett, and Taylor for assistance. McKay's hands were bound, and he was given a phone and told to get the money back. After McKay could not do it, they took him to a remote location, where Chatman was ordered to shoot McKay or be killed himself. Chatman fired one or more shots, followed by Maggett, and depending on the account, Taylor.

¶ 3. Chatman testified that his family had been threatened if he talked. But Chatman was soon arrested, and after initial denials, he implicated Stewart, Taylor, and Anderson-and, eventually, Maggett. Anderson's account agreed in most respects, but he, like Chatman, appeared to minimize his own culpability.

¶ 4. Stewart testified in his own defense. He admitted to being involved in the drug deal, but according to him, his role was just to drive the vehicle. Anderson and Stewart's brother were the real purchasers of the cocaine. Stewart claimed that he parted ways with Chatman Anderson, and McKay after returning from the drug deal, with the implication that the State's witnesses had murdered McKay and were trying to pin it on him. Stewart and Maggett also produced alibi witnesses who claimed to have been with them at the time of the killing.

Maggett, 230 So.3d at 726.

Procedural Posture

Jerry Undre Stewart (“Stewart” or “Petitioner”) is currently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) and housed at the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility in Woodville, Mississippi. On November 12, 2014, a jury convicted Stewart of capital murder (Count I) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count II) in the Second Judicial District Circuit Court of Bolivar County Mississippi, Cause No. 2012-094-CR2. See State Court Record (“SCR”), Cause No. 2015-KA-00215-COA, Vol. 5, pp. 45-48.^[1] The trial court sentenced Stewart to serve a term of life without the possibility of parole in Count I and a term of ten (10) years in Count II, under the supervision and control of the MDOC. Id.

On December 19, 2015, Stewart appealed his convictions and sentences to the Mississippi Supreme Court, raising the following eight issues, as stated by appellate counsel:

I. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing appellants to impeach Christopher Anderson's testimony with two prior felony convictions.

II. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in overruling appellants' motion for severance of parties and severance of counts.

III. Whether the indictment charging appellants with capital murder violated appellants' rights not to be placed in jeopardy twice by not identifying the victim in the underlying felony of kidnapping.

IV. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in not allowing appellant to question Christopher Anderson with statements made by Tresten Chatman and to question Tresten Chatman with statements made by Christopher Anderson.

V. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the [S]tate of Mississippi[‘s] case in chief, and denial of motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or motion for new trial.

VI. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying the admission into evidence the cellphone records of Appellant Maggett, Christopher Anderson and the cellphone records of Henry Boyles, Sabrina Chatman and Donnis Chatman.

VII. Whether the conduct of the prosecutor lead to appellants not receiving a fair trial.

VIII. Whether the [S]tate of Mississippi knowingly allowed Christopher Anderson to testify falsely.

SCR, Cause No. 2015-KA-00215-COA, Brief of Appellants.^[2]

On January 19, 2016, Stewart filed a pro se “Supplemental Brief of the Appellant, ” raising the following additional issues:

IX. Whether Stewart was denied his fundamental and constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to a fair trial due to counsel's failure to object to numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

X. Whether the trial court erred in overruling Stewart's objection to the [S]tate crossexamining Charkita Primer about facts which were not in evidence.

XI. Whether Stewart was denied his fundamental and constitutional right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.

SCR, Cause No. 2015-KA-00215-COA, Supplemental Brief of Appellant. The State filed a brief in response to counsel's brief and Stewart's pro se supplemental brief. See SCR, Cause No. 2015-KA-00215-COA, Brief of Appellee.

On December 13, 2016, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed Stewart's convictions and sentences. Maggett v. State, 230 So.3d 722 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied, April 25, 2017, cert. denied, Nov. 16, 2017. In affirming, the Mississippi Court of Appeals first addressed the issues raised by appellate counsel, holding that Rule 609(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (“Miss. R. Evid.”) (regarding the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness' testimony) applies to convictions less than ten years old; therefore, since witness Christopher Anderson's convictions were more than ten years old and fell under the purview of Rule 609(b), the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Maggett, 230 So.3d at 727.

The appellate court further concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in overruling Stewart's motion for severances of parties and severance of counts. “This argument fails because the doctrine of retroactive misjoinder can only apply when one of the counts has been vacated or otherwise found to be invalid, and the appealing defendant was prejudiced by being tried on the supported and unsupported allegations together.” See Williams v. State, 37 So.3d 717, 725-26 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). This scenario did not occur in Mr. Stewart's case, as the court affirmed both counts for all of the defendants. Id.

With regard to Stewart's claim regarding whether the indictment charging him with capital murder placed him in double jeopardy by not identifying the victim in the underlying felony of kidnapping, the court noted that this objection was not raised before the trial court - and such nonjurisdictional defects may not be challenged for the first time on appeal without a showing of cause and actual prejudice. Id. at 728. As upholding the jury's verdict would not sanction an unconscionable injustice, the court found no merit to the issue. Id.

The state appellate court also discussed Stewart's claims that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing him to question co-defendant Christopher Anderson (“Anderson”) with statements made by co-defendant Tresten Chatman (“Chatman”) and vice versa under the “Opposing Party's Statement” exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 801(D)(2) of Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The appellate court found...