Stewart v. Myrick

• Decision Date: 23 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-1658-K.,88-1658-K.
• Citation: 731 F. Supp. 433
• Parties: Joyce STEWART, Individually, as an Heir, and On Behalf of All Heirs of George E. Stewart, Deceased; and Joyce Stewart, Administrator of the Estate of George E. Stewart, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Mickey MYRICK, M.D.; and Hadley Regional Medical Center, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

731 F. Supp. 433

Joyce STEWART, Individually, as an Heir, and On Behalf of All Heirs of George E. Stewart, Deceased; and Joyce Stewart, Administrator of the Estate of George E. Stewart, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Mickey MYRICK, M.D.; and Hadley Regional Medical Center, Defendants.

No. 88-1658-K.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

February 23, 1990.

David P. Calvert, Focht, Hughey, Hund & Calvert, Wichita, Kan., for plaintiff.

William Tinker, Jr., McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, and Brian Wright, Wichita, Kan., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge.

The present case is a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff Joyce Stewart, the widow and administrator of the estate of George E. Stewart. The defendants are Hadley Regional Medical Center of Hays, Kansas, and Dr. Mickey Myrick.

Defendant Hadley has moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff's claim made under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. A hearing on the matter was held on February 13, 1990, at which time the court announced its findings. Consistent with the statements of the court at that time, and for the reasons discussed herein, the defendant's motion is granted.

Summary judgment is proper, where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

On December 2, 1986, George Stewart went to the emergency room at Hadley Medical Center. At the hospital, Stewart saw Dr. Myrick, a physician with admitting privileges at Hadley. The parties do not agree on the nature of Stewart's complaints. The plaintiff and Hadley Hospital contend that Stewart complained to Dr. Myrick of severe chest pain, loss of color, and shortness of breath. Dr. Myrick contends that these complaints were made neither to him nor to his nurse. The plaintiff also makes the factual assertion that Stewart was experiencing a medical emergency on December 2. The parties agree that Stewart was instructed to return to the hospital for tests on December 3.

Stewart returned to the hospital on December 4. An upper gastrointestinal test series had been scheduled, but Dr. Myrick was unable to obtain conclusive test results because Stewart had eaten prior to the tests. The plaintiff contends that Stewart was in a condition of medical emergency on December 4.

Stewart left the hospital. He telephoned Dr. Myrick's office twice on December 8. Otherwise, he did not seek further medical attention until December 12. On that date, Stewart suffered extreme chest pain, which caused him to vomit and collapse. Stewart died shortly after his arrival by ambulance at the hospital.

In the present motion for summary judgment by Hadley, and the plaintiff's response, both parties rely on opinions stated by the opposing party's expert witnesses. Hadley stresses that in its deposition of the plaintiff's two experts, Drs. Timothy Scanlon and James Davia, neither attributed any fault in the death of George Stewart to Hadley. Davia stated in his deposition that Hadley was not at fault in any way.

The plaintiff stresses that her witnesses were deposed prior to the deposition of Dr. Myrick, and as a result, they were not presented with the information obtained from Dr. Myrick. Dr. Myrick testified at his deposition that he had not read the nurses' notes prepared at the hospital on December 2, since they were filled out after he and Stewart had left the hospital. The notes indicate that Stewart's pain was easily provoked by any activity, that he had cut down on his smoking, that he had to take deep breaths to control the pain, and that 35 minutes prior to the examination he had taken an Isordil tablet to alleviate the pain. The plaintiff cites the testimony of Hadley's expert, Dr. Gregory Boxberger, who testified that this information suggests coronary atherosclerotic heart disease with unstable angina pectoris, an emergency medical condition. Dr. Boxberger testified that the patient's health would be in serious jeopardy, and that Stewart should have been admitted to the hospital.

It is uncontroverted that George Stewart was never denied treatment or discharged from Hadley due to a lack of insurance.

The plaintiff asserts a claim for relief against the hospital under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("the Act"). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the requirement of appropriate screening of subsection (a), and the transfer and screening requirements of paragraph (b)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) provides:

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment of a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists or to determine if the individual is in active labor (within the meaning of subsection (e)(2) of this section).

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) provides:

If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition or is in active labor, the hospital must provide either—

(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition or to provide for treatment of the labor, or

(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

The Act was signed into law on April 7, 1986 as an addition to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), P.L. 99-272. The Act was passed in order to help prevent the growing problem of "patient dumping." Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1186 (1986). Legislators speaking on the subject stressed that the...