Stewart v. Relco Locomotives, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:95cv078-D-A (N.D. Miss. 4/__/1996)
| Decision Date | 01 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:95cv078-D-A. |
| Parties | MACK STEWART PLAINTIFF v. RELCO LOCOMOTIVES, INC. DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendant for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf. Finding the motion only partially well taken, the same shall be granted in part and denied in part.
On October 31, 1993, a railroad car rolled over Mack Stewart's foot, causing him serious injury. Stewart is an employee of the Bunge Corporation ("Bunge"), and part of his job duties include the uncoupling of railroad cars of grain from its locomotive. On the night in question, Stewart was in the process of uncoupling such a car, and lifted the lever of the coupler to release it from the locomotive.
After lifting the lever, Stewart called to the train engineer, Mr. Maeweather, to move the engine and separate it from the grain car. Maeweather moved the engine, but the car failed to uncouple. The engine pulled the car forward, knocking Stewart to the ground, and rolled over Stewart's foot. Because of this injury, Stewart permanently lost his great toe, and incurred medical bills and expenses in excess of $18,000.00. Stewart applied for, and later received, worker's compensation benefits from Bunge.
The locomotive engine used to move the grain car that night was leased by Bunge from Relco Locomotives, Inc. ("Relco"). The arrangement is governed by a lease agreement concerning the locomotive and Bunge has leased it from Relco since August of 1981.
The plaintiff initiated this cause by filing suit against Relco in the Circuit Court of Quitman County, Mississippi, on January 31, 1995. On May 24, 1995, the defendant removed the action to this court. In his second amended complaint, the plaintiff only asserts the following claims of negligence:
Plaintiff would show unto the Court that at the time and place of the subject accident that the Defendant was negligent, which negligence proximately caused or contributed to the accident and injuries of Plaintiff in the following respects, to-wit:
1. Failing to reasonably maintain the subject equipment which was leased to the Plaintiff's employer;
2. Failing to provide reasonably safe equipment to be leased;
3. By furnishing defective dangerous and extra hazardous equipment to be leased.
4. For violating the Federal Safety Appliance Act,2 (F.S.A.A.);
5. For other acts of negligence which will be shown at the trial herein or ascertained pursuant to discovery.3
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, ¶ V. The defendant has now moved this court for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf as against all of the plaintiff's claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russel Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994).
The defendant's initial argument to the court is that under Mississippi law, a lessor like itself "is not liable for injuries to a third party such as Stewart for personal injuries incurred while working with leased equipment in the absence of dangerous, hidden defects unknown to or concealed from the Lessee (Bunge), and which the Lessee (Bunge) could not have discovered by a voluntary inspection." The plaintiff argues that this standard is limited in application to cases involving the lease of real property. In response, the defendant points out that the Fifth Circuit has applied such a standard to leased equipment. Arledge v. Gulf Oil Corp., 571 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1978).
"A landlord is liable4 for latent defects which he knows about and conceals or being aware of the defect, he fails to inform the tenant." O'Cain v. Harvey Freeman and Sons, 603 So. 2d at 830 (emphasis in original); Loflin v. Thornton, 394 So. 2d 905, 906 (Miss. 1981). In Arledge, the Fifth Circuit applied this rule to the lease of a service station to find that the defendant in that case, Gulf Oil Company, was not liable for the defective condition of a hydraulic lift on the property under general landlord/tenant law. Arledge, 571 F.2d at 1390-91. It is important to note that under those facts, the lift in question was a fixture attached to the property itself. Id. at 1391. In this case, the locomotive was not a fixture of leased real property, and therefore this particular standard does not apply. Rather, a lessor of chattels has a somewhat different duty5 under Mississippi law:
One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to liability to whose whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by its use in a manner for which, and by a person for whose use, it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make it safe for such use or to disclose its actual condition to those who may be expected to use it.
Thompson v. Reily, 211 So. 2d 537, 540 (Miss. 1968) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 408 (1965)). Further, where a lessor is in the business of leasing chattels, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, it may be assumed that both the lessor and lessee understand that the article is leased as fit for immediate use. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §408 comment b. Therefore, under common law, the duty of Relco in this cause was to exercise reasonable care in making the locomotive safe for its intended use or to disclose any defect of which it knew or should have known to those who may have been expected to use the locomotive.
Whenever a party is bound by a contractual obligation, the law imposes upon them a certain standard of conduct to which they must conform. Couch v. D'Iberville, 656 So. 2d 146, 151 (Miss. 1995). "[A]ccompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill and reasonable experience, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract." Gilmore v. Garrett, 582 So. 2d 387, 391 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Davis v. Anderson, 501 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)).
In the lease agreement for the locomotive involved in this case, Relco, as the lessor, agreed to be bound by the following provision:
Maintenance by Lessor. Lessor shall, at its expense, supply all replacement parts, lubricants and filters, and shall perform all major maintenance repairs, and periodic inspections, lubrication, and filter changes. For purposes of this Lease, a major maintenance repair is a repair that requires more than two man-hours of work to complete.
Locomotive Lease, Exhibit "B" to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Considering this provision in light of the Gilmore and Couch decisions, the defendant owed two contractual obligations to perform "with care, skill and reasonable experience" which are relevant to the plaintiff's claims at bar. Those obligations were to 1) perform all major maintenance repairs, and 2) perform periodic inspections.
In his submissions to the court, the plaintiff also argues that Relco's lease of the subject locomotive was "equivalent to a sale," and therefore Mississippi's statutory enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code "warranty of fitness for a particular purpose" imposes an additional obligation upon the defendant Relco. David Nutt & Assoc. v. First Continental Leasing Corp., 599 So. 2d 576, 578 (Miss. 1992); J.L. Teel & Co., Inc. v. Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851, 855 (Miss. 1986). Upon considering the parties' submissions on this argument and the applicable law, the court will reserve ruling on the matter until it can hear all of the evidence concerning the lease contract at the trial of this matter.
In any event, this court is not certain that the plaintiff would even have a viable cause of action under Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-315 for breach of warranty. The applicable statute of limitations for an action based upon the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is six years after the cause of action accrues, and this time period in most every case runs from the date of delivery of the product:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-725(2); see al...
To continue reading
Request your trial