Stewart v. Stange
| Decision Date | 29 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-CV-255 SRW |
| Parties | ROBERT STEWART, Petitioner, v. BILL STANGE, Respondent(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the Petition of Robert Stewart for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). The State has filed a response. Petitioner did not file a reply, and the time for doing so has passed. Both parties consented to the exercise of plenary authority by a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
In 2016, a jury convicted Petitioner of unlawful use of a weapon, first-degree burglary, armed criminal action, and third-degree domestic assault. The Circuit Court of St. Francois County sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for unlawful use of a weapon, five years for first-degree burglary, three years for armed criminal action, and one day for third-degree domestic assault. The court ordered all of the sentences to run concurrently for a total sentence of fifteen years in prison. Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief ("PCR") motion pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. The PCR motion court denied Petitioner's claims without an evidentiary hearing, and the appellate court affirmed the motion court's decision. Petitioner now seeks habeas relief before this Court.
The Supreme Court of Missouri described the facts of Petitioner's conviction as follows:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[I]n a § 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow." Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995).
Federal courts may not grant habeas relief on a claim that has been decided on the merits in State court unless that adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). "A state court's decision is contrary to . . . clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision . . . and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)). A state court "unreasonably applies" federal law when it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A state court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination "only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790-791 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
A state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). Clear and convincing evidence that state court factual findings lack evidentiary support is required to grant habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood, 558 U.S. at 293.
Petitioner asserts two claims for relief in his Petition: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his assault and burglary convictions, and (2) the motion court and the Missouri Court of Appeals erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by erroneously finding he did not plead sufficient facts that, if proven true, would entitle him to relief.
In his first claim for relief, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his third-degree domestic assault and first-degree burglary convictions. Petitioner alleges T.S.'s testimony that the gunshot "startled" her, was insufficient to find that she was in immediate apprehension of physical injury. (ECF No. 1, at 12). Petitioner believes the State did not prove T.S. was placed in immediate apprehension of physical injury. Id. at 12-13. As a result, Petitioner believes there was insufficient evidence to support his assault and burglary convictions. Id.
When a habeas petitioner challenges his conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether, "'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. This narrow standard of review only allows a court to grant relief if itfinds the state court's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient both incorrect and unreasonable. See Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2015). When deciding a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, a federal habeas court is not permitted to make its own determination of witness credibility, for that determination is for the state court trier of fact. Robinson v. LaFleur, 225 F.3d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 2000). The jury, as the finder of fact, is under no obligation to believe any particular evidence, including victim testimony. State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 399 (Mo. banc 2014).
While the threshold of proof in this analysis "is purely a matter of federal law," a federal habeas court looks to state law for the substantive elements of the offense. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012). Importantly, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68. Missouri Revised Statute § 565.074(3) (2012) describes the elements of domestic assault in the third degree as follows:
Missouri Revised Statute § 455.010(7) defines "family or household member" as:
A "family" or "household member," [includes] spouses, former spouses, any person related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing together or have resided together in the past, any person who is or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, and anyone who has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or resided together at any time.
Finding there was sufficient evidence for each of the elements under § 565.074(3), the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld Petitioner's conviction, concluding:
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