Stewart v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 1948
• Docket Number: 36675.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STEWART v. STATE.

33 So.2d 787

203 Miss. 295

STEWART v. STATE.

No. 36675.

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 9, 1948

E. B. Todd and Geo. S. Neal, Jr., both of Jackson for appellant.

Greek L. Rice, Atty. Gen., and Geo. H. Ethridge, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellee.

L. A SMITH, Sr., Justice.

Appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on an indictment charging him with the murder of Annie Mae Westerfield, in whose house he had been living. The overwhelming evidence in the case reveals a most cruel death of this woman at the hands of this appellant by repeated and savage stabbing of her, while she was held by him helpless and prone upon the bed in her home. It was deliberate murder beyond all reasonable doubt and the jury properly so found by its verdict. The Court sentenced appellant to be electrocuted.

We have also examined most carefully the instructions granted the State, and refused the defendant, and no error was committed in that regard in the trial court.

During the trial on the indictment the State introduced a witness by the name of Proctor, who had entered the room where the killing took place, during its progress, in response to the victim's screams. On cross-examination, he was asked by appellant's attorney, referring to appellant, 'What was his condition? Did he seem to be himself, know what he was doing?' The answer was, 'I don't know, sir. I ain't been knowing him long enough to know his ways.' This same witness was further interrogated along this same line on further cross-examination, as well as to whether or not appellant had been drinking that day.

Another State's witness, Alma Pridgen, on cross-examination, was asked, 'Did he (the appellant) seem to know what he was doing?' The answer was, 'I guess he did, I just glanced up.' 'Did he talk all right?' She replied, 'I didn't talk any with him.'

The daughter of the murdered woman was put on the stand by the State, and on cross-examination for defendant his attorney asked her, 'Did he seem to be at himself then? She answered, 'Yes, sir.' 'Q. He seemed to be all right?' 'A. Yes, sir.'

Dr. R. E. Williams, the surgeon, who sought by his skill, to save the life of the slain woman, also testified for the State, and after stating 'I have seen some bad cases and cases usually appear to be the same. You always look for something different in medicine,' he was asked on cross-examination, 'It appeared to be the work of a maniac?' The Court sustained an objection to the question.

In a confession admitted into the evidence, appellant claimed that his mind went blank, and he remembered nothing of the stabbing. He also stated, 'Well I just tell you I had been drinking beer and my mind wavers and when I get angry I lose my head and I just don't know what took place.' In the direct examination of appellant, at the trial, by his attorney, a great many questions were prefaced by 'if you remember'. One question was, 'What was the matter with you, you remember?' He replied, 'I couldn't tell; everything was blank to me.' And another time he answered, 'I couldn't say why, unless by the fight going on, the uprising of the pressure blood caused it, or what caused it, I couldn't tell. All I know they told me I did stab her.' He also on cross-examination told the District Attorney, 'I don't understand things at all times, no way.' 'What is the matter with you?' 'I don't know, sir.'

The above excerpts from the evidence are inserted here, as bearing upon the question of diligence in the matter of the defense on the basis of appellant's mental condition, and as disclosing that appellant and other witnesses were actually interrogated as to same on the original trial, resulting in his conviction of murder. There was enough suggestion in the questions and answers in the trial on the merits, in our judgment, to justify a motion for continuance, or stay of the trial, long enough to allow investigation of appellant's criminal responsibility more thoroughly. Even though the motion were overruled, the record would have reflected this step as an act of diligence, now absent therefrom. Counsel were appointed by the Court, and made a hard fight for their client, but we believe that insufficient diligence was shown to sustain the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered testimony.

After the trial, the attorneys for the appellant filed an unsworn motion for a new trial, alleging therein over their signatures, that 'The attorneys for this defendant, have since the trial discovered evidence of the insanity of the defendant which existed prior to trial and at this time, which insanity was unknown to attorneys for the defendant until after the trial.' This motion was not sworn to by the attorneys or appellant. Accompanying this motion was an affidavit signed by several persons, 'That each of affiants have reason to believe, and do believe, that in March, 1947, and for many months prior thereto, and at the present time, the said William Stewart is insane, * * * incapable of forming any criminal intent and totally irresponsible for his wrongdoing; that we affiants, did not disclose this information to the attorneys representing said Stewart until after the trial of the said Stewart for the murder of the said Annie Mae Westerfield.' This affidavit was dated June 17th, and filed June 18th, 1947. The jury verdict of guilty and the court's judgment of sentence were entered June 13th, 1947, and about one month later the Circuit Judge heard the witnesses on the motion for a new trial, which motion he overruled.

The witnesses were heard on the issue of insanity, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the inquiry having been addressed to the question whether or not appellant knew right from wrong at the time he slew the deceased woman. No complaint was made that appellant's mind was impaired at the time of the trial, and hence that he could not assist his attorneys to prepare and present his defense. Some of the witnesses testified he did not know the different between right and wrong, some that he did, and some did not commit themselves. All of the witnesses for appellant, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, testified to acts of his incorrigibility as a child, his previous acts of violence, (one such act being shooting at his own father for adenial to him of money by the parent), recklessness, and eccentricities in behaviour and matters of religion. Some of the acts which he produced as evidence to support his claim of criminal incapacity were merely antics fo showmanship whereby he strutted his stuff before his fellows. It is criminal responsibility which concerns us here not mere mental abberations or quixotics of personality. He was shown to have been spoiled in childhood,...