Stewart v. State
| Decision Date | 26 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21A0972 |
| Citation | 865 S.E.2d 237,361 Ga. App. 636 |
| Parties | STEWART v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Tyler Aaron Pope Carey, for Appellant.
Randal Matthew McGinley, Tara Elizabeth Latimer, for Appellee.
After representing himself at trial, Ronald Stewart was convicted of aggravated battery, felony obstruction of an officer, and simple battery. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as to each of these charges, and that the trial court erred in ruling that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Stewart's convictions. But we agree that the trial court erred in concluding that Stewart's waiver was knowing and voluntary.
In the months before trial, Stewart retained three different attorneys, and after the third one withdrew, he consistently maintained that he would retain counsel before trial. When he showed up for trial without counsel, the court did not hold a hearing under Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (V), 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), or even discuss with Stewart the dangers of proceeding without counsel. And even assuming the standard for waiver could be met without having a hearing or discussion at the time of the waiver decision, no substantive discussion of those dangers appears anywhere in the record of pretrial proceedings. Under these circumstances, and given the presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, the trial court erred in concluding that Stewart knowingly and voluntarily waived that fundamental right. So we reverse the trial court's order and remand for a new trial.
While in jail on charges of family violence battery and theft by taking, Ronald Stewart got into a fight with his cellmate.1
During the fight, Stewart punched his cellmate in the mouth. He then followed the cellmate out into the common room of the cell block and continued attacking him until an officer intervened. As a result of the attack, the cellmate suffered a broken jaw and substantial bleeding.
Three months later, Stewart attacked a corrections officer. The officer had asked Stewart to comply with the dress code by putting on the upper part of his jumpsuit and removing his headband. Stewart refused, cursed at the officer, and walked into his room. The officer followed him and Stewart tried to gouge out the officer's eyes. When the officer pushed Stewart out of his room, Stewart grabbed the officer's neck and continued to struggle until more officers arrived to help subdue him.
Stewart was charged in two separate indictments with aggravated battery (as to the cellmate) and felony obstruction of an officer and simple battery (as to the officer).
After his initial indictment in May 2017, Stewart declined the assistance of the public defender and instead hired an attorney. That attorney withdrew almost immediately, at which point Stewart hired a different one. In September 2017, Stewart asked that his second attorney be released and spoke to the trial court about hiring new counsel or proceeding to trial pro se. In October 2017, Stewart hired a third attorney. In February 2018, after a hearing, the trial court entered an order over Stewart's objections authorizing Stewart's third attorney to withdraw. In March 2018, Stewart filed a pro se speedy trial demand.
Stewart appeared pro se at a motions hearing on April 4, 2018. The trial court asked whether Stewart intended to hire counsel, and he told the trial court he intended to retain a new attorney but had not yet done so. The trial court commented to Stewart that "we talked about the pitfalls about representing yourself before," to which Stewart responded affirmatively. Stewart then confirmed that he planned to hire an attorney. The relevant portion of the colloquy is as follows:
Later in the same hearing, there was further discussion about Stewart's prior counsel. Stewart complained that the court had allowed his most recent attorney to "walk away from me," arguing that the attorney had "a legal obligation to me to represent me." Stewart then said again that he was going to "hire an attorney." The parties discussed pending motions, Stewart's status as a recidivist, and the factual basis of the charges. Then, "because of [Stewart's] being in a pro se situation," the prosecutor explained the maximum sentences he faced, as well as an upcoming hearing on a probation revocation petition. The trial court then repeated the charges and maximum sentences Stewart faced. Stewart said he understood. The hearing concluded with the following exchange:
Five days before trial, Stewart appeared pro se at a probation-revocation hearing. During the hearing (at which his probation was ultimately revoked), there was further discussion as to Stewart's record of firing or alienating counsel. During this discussion, Stewart accused the court of failing "to give me the paperwork I need to hire me an attorney," "tak[ing] my lawyer," and "let[ting] two attorneys withdraw from my case for no reason whatsoever." The trial court again asked Stewart whether he was "ready to go to trial on Monday."
Stewart said that he was, to which the trial court responded, "I am anticipating you are not going to have an attorney." Stewart responded, "I will have a lawyer at trial."
Stewart did not have a lawyer at trial. There were two trials: the first on his charges for the battery on his cellmate, and the second, immediately afterward, on his attack on the corrections officer. At the outset of the first trial, the court asked Stewart whether he was representing himself, to which Stewart responded, "Yes, sir." The trial court noted that "the last time you were in court[, you indicated] that you were going to have an attorney here today," and asked whether it should assume, "by you sitting by yourself, [that] you don't have one?" When Stewart confirmed that he did not, the trial court assigned counsel from the public defender's office to sit with Stewart at both trials and told him that counsel "can render you any advice you need in that regard." Stewart confirmed that he understood. The court engaged in no further discussion with Stewart about proceeding to trial pro se.
Both trials resulted in convictions. Stewart was found guilty of aggravated battery as to his cellmate, and obstruction and simple battery as to the corrections officer. For the aggravated battery of his cellmate, he was sentenced to 20 years with 10 to serve. For the simple battery and obstruction of the corrections officer, he was sentenced to five years to serve.
In December 2018, Stewart was found indigent, and appellate counsel was appointed. Appellate counsel filed amended motions for new trial, which were denied. In its order, the trial court expressly found that Stewart had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. This appeal followed.
1. Through counsel, Stewart argues on appeal that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but determine only "whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt." Chambers v. State , ––– Ga. App. –––– (1), 863 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2021) (quotation omitted). Applying that standard here, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Stewart's convictions. Stewart's "sucker punch" of his cellmate resulted in substantial bleeding and a jaw broken in "multiple places." A battery that causes "serious temporary disfigurement to the victim and loss of use of [his] jaw until it healed" is an aggravated battery. Baker v. State , 245 Ga. 657, 667 (6), 266 S.E.2d 477 (1980). Likewise, Stewart's attack on the corrections officer, which involved an attempt to gouge out his eyes and other forcible resistance, was sufficient to warrant his convictions for both felony obstruction and simple battery. See OCGA §§ 16-10-24 (b) (), 16-5-23 (a) (defining simple battery as including intentional "physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another"); Pearson v. State , 224 Ga. App. 467, 468 (1), 480 S.E.2d 911 (1997) ().
2. Stewart next contends that the trial court erred in finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. We review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Tariq-Madyun v. State , ––– Ga. App. –––– (2), ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2021 WL 4316028 (Case No. A21A1037, decided September 23, 2021). Based on the peculiar circumstances of this case, we agree with Stewart.
(a) Because Stewart was charged with crimes for which imprisonment is a penalty, he had a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for his criminal trial. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV. This right to counsel may be waived "only by voluntary and knowing action." Porter v. State , 358 Ga. App. 442, –––– (2) (a), 855 S.E.2d 657 (2021) (quotation omitted); see Burney v. State , 309 Ga....
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