Stewart v. State
Decision Date | 25 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 1178S264,1178S264 |
Citation | 390 N.E.2d 1018,271 Ind. 169 |
Parties | Alonzo B. STEWART, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Joseph D. Bradley, South Bend, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. White, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The defendant, Alonzo B. Stewart, was convicted at a bench trial of delivery of a controlled substance, Ind.Code § 35-24.1-4.1-1 (Burns 1975). He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and now raises the following four issues in this direct appeal.
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions for continuance upon the failure of the confidential informant to appear for trial;
2. Whether the court erred in failing to require the state to stipulate to the testimony of the confidential informant;
3. Whether the court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment on the evidence based upon the defense of entrapment; and
4. Whether the court erred in admitting evidence concerning defendant's prior criminal record.
A summary of the facts from the record reveals that Robert Anderson was working as an undercover narcotics officer for the Indiana State Police. In November and December of 1976, he was assigned to work with a confidential informant, Sue Johnson, who was operating a business in Mishawaka, Indiana. During the time he was working with Johnson, he made several drug purchases from different individuals in the South Bend area. Johnson would arrange for him to meet these individuals in her shop, and then Anderson himself would make further arrangements for the drug purchases. The defendant was mentioned by one of these individuals as being a possible source for the purchase of drugs.
On December 14, the informant, Johnson, talked to the defendant on the telephone and arranged for him to come over to her shop. When the defendant arrived at the shop, Johnson introduced him to Anderson. They talked for a few minutes and Anderson mentioned that he knew one of defendant's friends. Anderson had, in fact, purchased drugs from this friend and had seen him using defendant's car at the time he made these purchases.
During the conversation, Anderson told the defendant that he wanted to "get a bag for this week." The defendant responded that he would check it out. Later that same evening, Anderson called the defendant and asked him if he had been able to arrange anything. Defendant said he was waiting for his people to come in and he might be able to furnish "20 caps" later that evening. However, in a later call, Anderson found out there was nothing available that night.
Anderson left town for a week, and when he returned he met the defendant at his hotel and was told that "Memphis had the boy in." The officer later explained at the trial that the term "boy" was a common street expression for heroin. At the hotel, the defendant said that he could get whatever Anderson wanted. Anderson said he was still interested in the 20 caps, so defendant left the hotel for approximately an hour and a half and then returned with the drugs. Anderson paid defendant $160 for the 20 caps. The defendant said that if Anderson ever needed any more he would be glad to go get it for him. Anderson made tape recordings of the telephone conversations he had with the defendant, and the conversations were monitored by another officer. The laboratory tests revealed that the capsules did contain heroin.
On the day of the trial, the defendant made an oral motion for continuance in order to locate the police informant, Sue Johnson. The defendant had filed a written Motion for Discovery several months prior to trial. He had also filed a Motion to Compel Disclosure of Identity and Whereabouts of Witness. In response to the latter motion, the state gave the defendant Sue Johnson's name and said that she was supposed to be living somewhere in Minnesota but they had been unable to locate her exact address.
Subsequently, on the morning of the trial the defendant moved for a continuance, contending that the state had failed to comply fully with the discovery order and that the informant was a critical witness to his defense of entrapment. He argued that the witness could offer substantial testimony concerning his lack of predisposition to sell drugs. His motion was denied by the court. After the state rested its case, the defendant called as his first and only witness, the informant, Sue Johnson. When she failed to appear, the defendant renewed his motion for a continuance for the purpose of locating and producing Sue Johnson to testify on his behalf. This motion was also denied by the court.
It is clear that the defendant's motions for continuance were not based on statutory grounds and that he did not submit an affidavit concerning Johnson's testimony. The rulings on the motions, therefore, were within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only on a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Works v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144; King v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 422, 296 N.E.2d 113; Ind.Code § 35-1-26-1 (Burns 1975). Although the defendant argues that he was severely prejudiced by the absence of the informant, we can find no abuse of discretion in denying defendant's motions for continuance in this case. Most of the part the informant played was tape-recorded and the tapes were furnished to the defendant. Her testimony would not bear on any actual dealing, since she did not take part in any sale. There was other, independent evidence of defendant's predisposition to sell drugs. Furthermore, the defendant had ample time prior to trial to attempt to locate the witness himself but presented no evidence that he had done so.
After the trial court's denial of his motions for continuance, the defendant requested that the state be directed to stipulate to the proposed testimony of the informant. The court denied this motion. We find no error here, since there is no authority for requiring a court to force either party to stipulate to the testimony of an absent witness. The case defendant cites, Blume v. State, (1963) 244 Ind. 121, 189 N.E.2d 568, is inapplicable since it refers only to circumstances where a defendant's motion for continuance because of an absent witness should be granted. We have found no such circumstances in the instant case.
At the close of the state's case, the defendant moved for judgment on the evidence on the ground that the state had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome his defense of entrapment. This motion was denied. The defendant now contends that this was error since there was no evidence of any predisposition on his part to sell the...
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