Stewart v. Town of Watertown

• Decision Date: 21 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18499.,18499.
• Citation: 38 A.3d 72,303 Conn. 699
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Virginia STEWART v. TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al.

303 Conn. 699

38 A.3d 72

Virginia STEWART

v.TOWN OF WATERTOWN et al.

No. 18499.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 19, 2011.Decided Feb. 21, 2012.

Joseph B. Summa, with whom was Mary Jane Ryan, Waterbury, for the appellants-appellees(defendants).

William T. Blake, Jr., for the appellee-appellant(plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether a town clerk is entitled to receive continued salary payments as a matter of law while he or she is not performing his or her statutory duties as town clerk, but has not been removed from office pursuant to statute.The defendants, the town of Watertown(town), and certain of its duly elected or appointed officials, ¹ appeal ² from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a hearing in damages, awarding damages to the plaintiff, Virginia Stewart, the former town clerk of the town.The plaintiff cross appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, denying her claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court, Upson, J., improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment because the town's duty to pay the plaintiff's salary is not limited solely to circumstances in which the town successfully has pursued recourse under the removal provision, General Statutes § 7–22.³The defendants contend that our common law and those statutes that govern the office of town clerk and the powers of municipalities with respect to their employees and public officers do not compel the conclusion that the town clerk's salary must be paid under any and all circumstances, regardless of whether she attends to and performs the established duties of her office, unless and until her term expires or she is removed under § 7–22.The defendants additionally contend that genuine issues of material fact exist as to, inter alia, the plaintiff's claims that the town hall was an environmentally unhealthy place for her to work and that her medical condition arising from her exposure to this unhealthy environment prevented her from performing her duties at the town hall or at any other alternative worksite that had been proposed to her.Further, the defendants argue that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was required to follow the procedures for short-term or long-term disability that had been established pursuant to statute for the position by the town.The plaintiff responds that, as a public officer, she has a clear legal right to payment of compensation during her term of office, unless and until she is removed under § 7–22.We agree with the defendants' principal claim and conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact.In her cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, Sheedy, J., improperly refused to charge the jury as to the existence of facts already found by a previous trial court, Upson, J., thereby allowing the jury to improperly consider and reach a contrary conclusion in its deliberations.The defendants contend that the requested jury instructions were extraneous and contained irrelevant facts and erroneous dicta.We agree with the defendants.Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings on counts one and three of the plaintiff's complaint.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.The plaintiff was elected to the position of town clerk of the town in the general election held in November, 2001.The town clerk's office is located in the town hall.Thereafter, the plaintiff was reelected town clerk in the November, 2005 election, to a term of office that expired in January, 2010.On October 18, 2005, indoor air quality testing was performed in the town hall in response to concerns about the work environment raised by the plaintiff at a meeting held on April 6, 2005.Subsequently, on January 20, 2006, in response to a complaint filed by the plaintiff, an inspection of the town hall was performed by the state department of labor's division of occupational safety and health.On February 22, 2006, the plaintiff did not report for work.She wrote to the defendantJoseph Pawlak, chairman of the town council, on March 1, 2006, to inform the town council that she was suffering health problems that she attributed to environmental conditions in the town hall, and to demand action to protect town employees, the public and public records.

The plaintiff did not thereafter return to work at the town hall, or agree to alternative worksite arrangements offered by the defendants.The defendants notified the plaintiff of the procedures involved for requesting an unpaid leave.On April 17, 2006, the plaintiff, through her attorney, notified the defendants of her belief that the town clerk was exempt from time record requirements and that the defendants' handling of the situation raised concerns of retaliation and disparate treatment.On May 17, 2006, the defendants, through their attorney, notified the plaintiff that she would be paid until she exhausted her accumulated sick days, and that her compensation is controlled by town ordinance.The plaintiff was paid her salary through June 19, 2006, after which payments ceased.Subsequently, multiple indoor air quality and surface tests were performed at the town hall, as well as two occupational safety and health inspections.On or about June 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.

On November 20, 2006, the town council unanimously adopted a resolution authorizing the town manager to initiate removal of the plaintiff from the office of town clerk pursuant to § 7–22.Thereafter, the defendant town manager, Charles Frigon, wrote to the state's attorney for the judicial district of Waterbury requesting action pursuant to § 7–22.On January 31, 2007, the state's attorney notified the town council that he had determined that good cause did not exist to file an action against the plaintiff under § 7–22.

Subsequently, on November 28, 2006, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants.In the first count of her complaint, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus ordering the defendants to restore all her salary and benefits from June 19, 2006, and to continue such payments for the duration of her term as the town clerk.In support of this claim, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants illegally had terminated without cause payment of the salary to which she had a clear legal right.The plaintiff claimed in the second count of the complaint that the town, town council and Frigon had violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,⁴ alleging that the defendants had denied her constitutional due process right to a hearing.Finally, in the third count of the complaint the plaintiff sought recovery of her lost salary.

On July 30, 2007, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to her nonconstitutional claims advanced in counts one and three of her complaint.She asserted that, as a public officer, she was entitled to receive her salary as an incident to her office, without regard to any services she performed.She further asserted that the town's sole alternative to payment of her salary was to resort to the statutory removal procedure set forth in § 7–22 that requires a complaint alleging good cause and an investigation by the state's attorney determining that there is evidence that such cause exists.The plaintiff argued that, as she was not removed from office by the procedure set forth in § 7–22, she must be paid as the holder of the public office of town clerk.The defendants objected to the motion on the basis of three grounds: (1) there were material facts in dispute; (2)the plaintiff was not entitled, as a matter of law, to salary during the period in which she refused to perform the duties of her office; and (3) to the extent that the plaintiff may be entitled to any compensation during her absence from performing the duties of her office, the defendants provided the plaintiff with all the compensation due to her.

The trial court, Upson, J., granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on December 6, 2007, concluding that: (1)“[a]s to count one in the present case, mandamus is warranted because the plaintiff has met the burden required for the issuance of mandamus.The town's duty to pay this salary is clear, because the plaintiff, still functioning as the current town clerk, is a public official and as such her salary is incident to her office and does not depend upon services performed by her”; ⁵ and (2)“[a]s to count three in the present case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid salary until the payment of salary resumes.Because the town may only act within the scope of express grants ... the defendants in the present case did not have the discretion to suspend or terminate the plaintiff's salary.Suspending or terminating salary falls outside of the scope of § 7–22, which is the only apparent legislative remedy available to the town in the event of the town clerk's failure to properly fulfill the duties incident to her position.The defendants, therefore, acted improperly in terminating the plaintiff's clear legal right to salary by treating her as a regular employee as opposed to an elected official and the plaintiff is entitled to payment of her salary.”(Citation omitted.)

Therefore, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on the writ of mandamus.In light of this conclusion, that court rejected the defendants' claim that the plaintiff was limited to the leave benefits provided by the town to its officials.Subsequently, after a hearing in damages before a jury that resulted in a verdict...