Stewart v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 September 1916
• Docket Number: 4440-4443.
• Citation: 236 F. 838
• Parties: STEWART v. UNITED STATES. [a1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

236 F. 838

STEWART v. UNITED STATES. ^[a1]

Nos. 4440-4443.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

September 4, 1916

Covington & Grant, of Ft. Smith, Ark., for plaintiffs in error.

J. V Bourland, U.S. Atty., of Ft. Smith, Ark.

Before CARLAND, Circuit Judge, and AMIDON and VAN VALKENBURGH District Judges.

VAN VALKENBURGH, District Judge.

April 7, 1914, the Mammoth Vein Coal Mining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of West Virginia, filed in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas its bill of complaint against one M. Hunter and other defendants, charging that they, with others, had conspired and confederated together to injure and destroy the mines and property of complainant, located in Sebastian county, Ark and to prevent complainant from caring for said property, and using the necessary means to pump the water from its said mine, so that the same might not be destroyed by an accumulation of water therein, and to prevent complainant from operating said mines, or conducting its business by producing coal therefrom and selling or disposing of the same. Some of the defendants named were said to represent the United Mine Workers of America, still others were alleged to be officials of Sebastian county, Ark., and the remaining defendants were understood to be union mine workers in this district. All were charged with interfering by threats and intimidation with the operation of said mines by complainant through the employment of nonunion miners. April 8, 1914, a temporary restraining order was issued, and, May 9th following, a decree of injunction dismissing the cause as to defendants Hunter, Bumpas, and McMulland, but as to others granting the relief prayed in the following language:

'And it was further considered, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that as to all the other defendants named in the caption hereof, and each of them, and all other persons acting or co-operating with defendants, or conspiring or combining with them, or any person having notice of this order, be and the same are hereby perpetually restrained individually and collectively from interfering with injuring, obstructing, or stopping by force, threats, or intimidation any of the business of complainant, and from in any manner interfering with the property of complainant, or trespassing upon the same, whether the same is specifically described in this decree or not, which property is generally described in such complaint as Prairie Creek Coal Company mine No. 4, and Mammoth Vein Coal Company mine No. 1, near the town of Midland, in the county of Sebastian, State of Arkansas, and from entering upon any of the grounds or premises occupied by the complainant as aforesaid for the purpose of interfering with the business of complainant, or with the property or employes of complainant, and from compelling by threats and force and violence, or by direct or indirect coercion, any of the present or future employes of complainant from performing their duties as such employes, or in doing any act whatever in furtherance of a design to restrain or prevent, by unlawful conduct, complainant from operating its said mines, and that said defendants, and each of them, and such persons unlawfully associating or conspiring with them, or having knowledge of this order, be further restrained from in any manner unlawfully interfering with any person or persons that the complainant may hereafter bring or cause to be brought to its said mines heretofore referred to, or from encouraging or abetting any person or persons to threaten or coerce, directly or indirectly, any person or persons that may enter or continue in the employment of complainant, and that they and each of them, their confederates, or associates, or persons having knowledge of this order, be enjoined from assembling in or upon the premises of complainant, for the purpose of holding disorderly or riotous meetings, or for the purpose of effecting unlawful interference with employes of complainant, or with its property, and from in any manner damaging or destroying the property of complainant.'

None of the defendants herein were named parties to the bill of complaint. June 13, 1914, complainant, through its attorneys, moved the court for an attachment for contempt against seven individuals, including defendants P. R. Stewart and Frank Gripando, charging them with violating the injunction orders of the court and with conspiring with others so to do. On the same day the court issued its order, the material part of which is in the following language:

'The court being well and sufficiently advised in the premises, it is considered and ordered that a case in the name of the United States against each of said defendants be docketed, and that the marshal of the Western district of Arkansas forthwith apprehend the said Morro Colo, Foster Bean, Sandy Robinson, Blue Johnson, James Slankard, Pete Stewart, and Frank Gripando, and bring them before the court July 1, 1914, at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, then and there to answer the charge of contempt of court for the violation of its decree aforesaid, as it is alleged, for which writs of attachment shall issue.'

Motions and orders affecting parties other than those now before the court followed shortly after. Hearings upon these original attachments were held in due course, and on July 14, 1914, the causes were submitted, and by the court taken under advisement. July 17th, an armed mob appeared in the woods near one of complainant's mines, fired at the employes working therein, finally drove them away, and then burned the tipples, houses, office, and other property of complainant, and damaged the mines themselves with dynamite. On the 18th of July thereafter, complainant filed a further motion for attachment for contempt against the defendants Pink Dunn and George Burnett, charging them with aiding and abetting a mob in destroying the property of complainant by acting as guards or pickets for the purpose of preventing aid being taken to the employes of complainant who were besieged in mine No. 4 on the 17th of July, 1914, all in violation of the order of court of May 9, 1914, hereinabove set forth. The court, by its order issued on the same day, directed that a case in the name of the United States be docketed against each of said defendants, and the marshal was directed to bring them before the court forthwith to answer the charge of contempt of court for the violation of its said decree. On July 27th a motion was filed to reopen the contempt proceedings against the defendants Stewart, Gripando, and others, to which objection was lodged. The court, however, sustained this motion as to the defendant Stewart herein, and thereafter further hearings were held; the final submission being made August 25, 1914. September 1st, thereafter, judgment was pronounced, and each of the plaintiffs in error were sentenced to be imprisoned in the Sebastian county jail at Ft. Smith, Ark., for a period of four months, and to pay to the United States the costs of prosecution.

The cases were submitted together upon a single printed record. The main contentions for the defense are: (1) That the proceedings were, in fact, in the original cause in equity brought by the Mammoth Vein Coal Company and prosecuted by it; that it was not a proceeding for the benefit of the public, nor one in which the public, the government, or the court were concerned. (2) That, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 Sup.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874, the Supreme Court makes clear the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. It is there said:

'Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And 'it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both.' Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U.S. 329 (24 Sup.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997). But in either event, and whether the proceedings be civil or criminal, there must be an allegation that in contempt of court the defendant has disobeyed the order, and a prayer that he be attached and punished therefor. It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. * * * But imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form or substance, was mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial, by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do. The decree in such cases is that the defendant stand committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's order. * * * On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done, nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the disobedience. * * * Such imprisonment operates, not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience. It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect; for if the case is civil, and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal contempt, and the imprisonment is

...