Stewart v. United States
Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 26555.,26555. |
Citation | 412 F.2d 818 |
Parties | Robert Frank STEWART, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
J. Paul Lowery, Montgomery, Ala. (Ct. Appt.), for appellant.
Ben Hardeman, U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., Kirby W. Patterson, Atty., Criminal Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Beatrice Rosenberg, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before RIVES, BELL and DYER, Circuit Judges.
Robert Frank Stewart appeals from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 661 by asserting three issues, all of which we find unpersuasive.
Appellant first argues that the Government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to warrant the jury verdict. More specifically, he contends that the direct evidence against him is valueless because it is the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice and that the circumstantial evidence against him does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We view the properly-introduced evidence in a "manner most favorable to the government." Thurmond v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 448, 450. Cf. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680.1 We need only note that the Government introduced testimony of identification from the property owner, O. B. Walston, testimony of the act of stealth from an accomplice, Joseph Davis, and supporting testimony from F.B.I. agent G. Robert Martz and floral shop owner Hugh C. Gray. Moreover, the defendant himself identified the stolen property and admitted that he had had some recent business dealings with witness Gray. Such testimony constitutes a wholly substantial basis on which the jury could find Stewart guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. SeeGlasser,supra.
Stewart contends secondly that the district judge's charge to the jury conveyed the impression that mere presence at the scene of the crime is a sufficient basis for an inference of guilt. An examination of the charge reveals, however, that the district judge made clear that participation in the offense had to be conscious and that the participant must have specifically intended to do what the law forbids. The "aiding and abetting" instruction was used merely to clarify the jury's ability to infer guilt from the mass of circumstantial evidence. This practice has been specifically approved by the Supreme Court in Pereira v. United States, 1954, 347 U.S. 1, 10-11, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435.
Finally appellant contends that the district judge unlawfully terminated the cross examination of Government witness Davis. The colloquy between defense counsel and district judge follows:
Since Davis' statement...
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United States v. Green, 30042.
...See also a long line of Fifth Circuit cases, including Patterson v. United States, 1969, 413 F.2d 1001, 1003, and Stewart v. United States, 1969, 412 F.2d 818, 819, n. 1, cited on page 3 of appellee's II. Appellant's second issue reads: "II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT\......
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Patterson v. United States
...be the basis for a conviction. Caminetti v. United States, 1917, 242 U.S. 470, 495, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442; Stewart v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 818 at note 1; United States v. Marpes, 3 Cir. 1952, 198 F.2d 186, 188. After carefully reading the transcript of evidence, we are ......
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U.S. v. Soundingsides, 86-1239
...for the trial judge to exclude these statements once they had been produced and inspected." Id. at 420; see also Stewart v. United States, 412 F.2d 818, 820 n. 2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 379, 24 L.Ed.2d 244 (1969) (Gordon "dealt only with production of prior inconsis......