Stewart v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 November 1962
• Docket Number: No. 17974.,17974.
• Citation: 311 F.2d 109
• Parties: Aaron STEWART, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

311 F.2d 109 (1962)

Aaron STEWART, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17974.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

November 29, 1962.

Edward M. Lane, Tacoma, Wash., for appellant.

Brockman Adams, U. S. Atty., and John S. Obenour, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.

Before ORR, JERTBERG and MERRILL, Circuit Judges.

JERTBERG, Circuit Judge.

Following trial to a jury, appellant, Aaron Stewart, was convicted of knowingly transporting Diane Schneider from Portland, Oregon to Tacoma, Washington for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421.

Included in the same indictment as co-defendant is one Wayne Matterson who was convicted of the same offense on his plea of Guilty.

Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years but execution of the sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of five years on condition, among others, that he serve six months in a jail type institution.

Appellant's assignments of error may be summarized as follows:

1. That the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction;

2. That the district court erred: (a) in the admission into evidence of a statement typed by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation following an interview with appellant, which statement bears the signature of appellant; and (b) in the giving of two instructions to which appellant had objected; and

3. That Government counsel was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in his closing argument to the jury.

We will consider the assignments seriatim.

In considering the assignment as to the insufficiency of the evidence, we must bear in mind that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the judgment. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir., 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951, 80 S.Ct. 862, 4 L.Ed. 2d 868; Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460 (9th Cir., 1961). It is also to be noted that the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. We see no useful purpose to be served in recounting in detail the sordid relationship which existed between appellant, co-defendant Matterson and Diane Schneider. Suffice it to say, that the record shows, without serious conflict, the following facts:

"That Diane Schneider practiced prostitution in Portland where she became acquainted with appellant; that the two lived together at a hotel under registration as husband and wife; that co-defendant Matterson engaged himself as a procurer for Diane Schneider and all three knowingly lived on her earnings as a prostitute; that because Diane Schneider\'s earnings as a prostitute in Portland were insufficient to support the trio, Diane Schneider and Matterson decided to go to Tacoma, Washington where a nearby Army Camp might prove a more lucrative field for the activities of Diane Schneider; that Diane Schneider refused to leave Portland unless appellant accompanied her; that appellant testified that he accompanied the other two in an automobile driven by Matterson to Tacoma with the intent of continuing on to Seattle to visit friends and that he knew when the trio left Portland that the purpose of the trip was to enable Diane Schneider to practice prostitution at Tacoma; that on the automobile journey from Portland, appellant was aware that it was a serious offense to transport a woman across State lines for the purpose of prostitution; that after arrival in the State of Washington, the persons named concocted a story to be used, in case of apprehension by law enforcement officers, that Diane Schneider was picked up by the other two in the State of Washington; that after arrival at Tacoma and until arrests were made several days later, appellant and Diane Schneider lived together and the trio were supported by the earnings of Diane Schneider derived from prostitution; that appellant did not, upon arrival at Tacoma, proceed to Seattle; and that serious inconsistencies exist between appellant\'s testimony and the statement which he signed."

It is appellant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant participated in the offense or had the intent to have Diane Schneider engage in prostitution at or before crossing the boundary line between the States of Oregon and Washington. We disagree. "The intent which must be proved as an essential element of the crime defined in 18 U.S.C., § 2421, is an intent that the female transported by the accused in interstate commerce shall, after such transportation, engage in the charged immoral conduct. Dunn v. United States, 10 Cir. 1951, 190 F.2d 496." Baker v. United States, 310 F.2d 924 (9th Cir., 1962). Where, as here, the intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact for the jury. See Baker v. United States, supra. This intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Hardie v. United States, 208 F.2d 694 (5th Cir., 1953). Clearly there is in the record abundant evidence from which the jury might reasonably infer that appellant entertained the requisite intent and knowingly participated and aided and abetted in the commission of the offense.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for acquittal or in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.

We now consider appellant's assignment that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the statement typed by the Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and signed by appellant. This statement was typed by the Agent following an interview with appellant. Except in minor and inconsequential details, appellant...