Stewart v. Vill. of Innsbrook
| Decision Date | 28 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16-CV-1748 JAR,4:16-CV-1748 JAR |
| Parties | MICHAEL P. STEWART and SANDRA L. STEWART, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF INNSBROOK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: Defendant Village of Innsbrook's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14); Defendants Innsbrook Owners Association and Innsbrook Corporation's Motion to Quash for Insufficient Service of Process (Doc. No. 16); Defendant Charles Boyce's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 19); and Defendant Kevin Kuhlmann's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24). The motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.1
On November 9, 2016, Plaintiffs Michael and Sandra Stewart ("Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint against Defendants Village of Innsbrook ("Village"), Innsbrook Owners Association, Inc. ("Association"), The Innsbrook Corporation ("Corporation"), Charles Boyce ("Boyce"), and Kevin Kuhlmann ("Kuhlmann"), alleging violations of their constitutionally protected property rights, inverse condemnation, and interference with a contractual relationship. Plaintiffs allege that on May 20, 2004, they purchased Lot No. 897 of Innsbrook Estates from the Corporation(Complaint ("Compl."), Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1) and then contracted with various entities (not parties to this action) to purchase a modular home for their lot (Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 25). Plaintiffs allege that the Village issued Construction Permit No. 2104 for Lot No. 897 on May 23, 2007 (Compl. at ¶ 23). The first of the four sections of the home was delivered to Plaintiffs' Lot on or about October 2, 2007. (Compl. at ¶ 26) Plaintiffs further allege that Boyce, Kuhlmann, and one Rick Schmitt, refused to permit delivery of the remaining three sections of the home to their Lot on October 2, 2007, based on Village Ordinance No. 69 prohibiting modular homes. (Compl. at ¶¶ 18, 27)
On or about October 15, 2007, Plaintiffs applied for a conditional use permit from the Village in an effort to resolve the delivery and installation issues. (Compl. at ¶ 32) They allege that on December 18, 2007, they were granted a conditional use permit that required them to satisfy various conditions before the other three sections of the modular home could be delivered to Lot No. 897. (Compl. at ¶ 37) On April 21, 2008, the remaining three sections of the modular home were delivered to Lot No. 897. (Compl. at ¶ 40) After the exterior and interior of the modular home was finished, an occupancy permit was issued on October 29, 2008. (Compl. at ¶ 41) Plaintiffs allege that the sections of the modular home were damaged due to the delay allegedly caused by Defendants and, therefore, the sections of the modular home could not be joined together properly during assembly. (Compl. at ¶¶ 42-44) They claim they eventually "lost the home" and were forced to file for bankruptcy due to additional financing costs, legal fees and construction costs, as well as a significant reduction in the value of the home. (Compl. at ¶ 44)
The Complaint asserts causes of action against: (1) Defendants Village of Innsbrook and Village Administrator Kuhlmann for the alleged violation of their constitutionally protected property rights under § 1983 (Count I); (2) Defendants Charles Boyce and InnsbrookCorporation for the alleged violation of their constitutionally protected property rights under § 1983 (Count II); (3) Defendant Village of Innsbrook for inverse condemnation (Count III); and (4) all Defendants for tortious interference with a contractual relationship (Count IV).
In their motions to dismiss, Defendants Boyce, Kuhlmann and the Village argue that based on Plaintiffs' complaint, all of the alleged actions taken by Defendants occurred in 2007 and 2008, more than five years before they filed this action on November 9, 2016, and thus are time-barred. Defendant Kuhlmann argues in the alternative that Plaintiffs' claim against him as the Village Administrator for tortious interference with a contractual relationship in Count IV is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for causes of action against government officials. The Association and the Corporation move to quash service of process.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all the facts alleged in the complaint are true, and liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the running of a statute of limitations, the Court may only grant the motion if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the cause of action is time-barred. Joyce v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, 635 F.3d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 2011); Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2008); Smith v. UPS Freight, No. 4:15-CV-382 JAR, 2015 WL 4274594, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015).
The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims accruing within a particular state should be governed by that state's statute of limitations governing personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985). Recognizing Wilson, the Eighth Circuit has held the statute of limitations for general personal injury actions sounding in tort applies to suits for violation of civil rights under § 1983. Kitchen v. Miller, 343 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821-22 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (collecting cases). Missouri imposes a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. RSMo. § 516.120.4 (); see also Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 2011) (); D'Arcy & Associates, Inc. v. K.P.M.G. Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 129 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) ().
Under Missouri law, the statutory limitations period for an inverse condemnation claim is ten years. RSMo. § 516.010; Wyper v. Camden Cty., 160 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Shade v. Missouri Hwy. and Transp. Comm'n, 69 S.W.3d 503, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
Under section 516.130.1, the statute of limitations for "[a]n action against a sheriff, coroner or other officer, upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty," is three years. The Missouri Supreme Court defines a public office as the "right, authority, and duty created and conferred bylaw, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or during enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign function of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." State ex rel. School Dist. of Sedalia v. Harter, 87 S.W. 941, 943 (Mo. 1905). The individual who is invested with the authority and required to perform the duty is an officer for purposes of § 516.130. Id. In plainer language, Black's Law Dictionary defines an "officer" in relevant part as:
A person who holds an office of trust, authority, or command. In public affairs, the term refers esp[ecially] to a person holding public office under a national, state, or local government, and authorized by that government to exercise some specific function.
Carman v. Wieland, 406 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). "Public office" means "[a] position whose occupant has legal authority to exercise a government's sovereign powers for a fixed period." Id. A "public official" is "[a] person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government's sovereign powers." Id. "The power to make and enforce laws" constitutes the sovereign power. Id.
Thus, Missouri courts have found section 516.130(1) applicable to a county recorder of deeds, Investors Title Co., Inc. v. Hammonds, 217 S.W.3d 288 (Mo. banc 2007); a county collector of revenue, State ex rel. School Dist. of St. Joseph v. Wells, 270 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1954); the treasurer of a state hospital, State ex rel. Bell v. Yates, 132 S.W. 672 (1910); a school-district treasurer, Harter, 87 S.W. at 945; the county commissioner, Cox v. Ripley County, 233 S.W.3d 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); the Missouri director of revenue, City of Ellisville v. Lohman, 972 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); and a circuit clerk, State ex rel. Buchanan County v. Roach, 548 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). The phrase "act in an official capacity" is used to "delineate between an action performed for work purposes rather than for personal ones" and means that "a public servant is acting within the scope of what he or she is employed to do ratherthan being engaged in a personal frolic." Kinder v. Mo. Dep't of Corrections, 43 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Village is a "municipal corporation, established on or about July 23, 1998, under provisions of applicable Missouri State Law..." (Compl. at ¶ 2), and that Kuhlmann was "employed by the Village, pursuant to its ordinances, as the Administrator ... with one of his duties being the preparation of Village ordinances for review and approval by the Village Board, including Ordinance 69, and was operating within the course and scope of his employment as such Administrator, and thus was operating under color of the laws of the State of Missouri, which authorized and permitted the creation, organization, and continued operation of such Village" (Compl. at ¶ 12). Plaintiffs further allege Kuhlmann was "operating and acting as a state actor in his official capacity under color of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial