Stewart v. Wilkie
| Decision Date | 22 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:18-cv-01887-ODW (SKx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | MARVIN L. STEWART, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Marvin L. Stewart, proceeding pro se, brings this age discrimination action against Defendant Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA"). (Third Am. Compl. ("TAC") ¶¶ 66-77, ECF No. 17.) Both parties move for summary judgment. (Stewart Mot. Summ J. ("Stewart Mot."), ECF No. 43; VA Mot. Summ J. ("VA Mot."), ECF No. 60.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS the VA's Motion for Summary Judgment.1
The following undisputed facts find support in the record.2
Stewart worked for the VA as a Contracting Officer from June 1985 to April 1986. (VA Statement of Genuine Issues ("VA SGI") 5, ECF No. 52.) He returned to the VA in 2001 as a Program Support Assistant. (VA SGI 6.) By 2012, Stewart had been promoted to Accounts Technician. (VA SGI 7.) In 2012, Stewart applied for two Contract Specialist positions: Job Listing No. 615995, which sought candidates to support Network Contracting Offices in Long Beach and Las Vegas, and Job Listing No. 616390, which sought candidates to support the Prosthetics Program within the Veterans Integrated Services Network. (VA SGI 8, 10, 13; Stewart Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("Stewart SUF") 1, ECF No. 45.)
Stewart was 61 years old when he applied for the positions. (Stewart SUF 1.) His 2012 application indicated eleven months of formal contracting work experience in 1985 and an Associate of Arts degree in Telecommunications in 1984. (VA SGI 15, 16.) His application indicated other ongoing coursework but no completed degrees. (VA SGI 17-18.) His application listed no active contracting certifications, no healthcare or prosthetics work experience, and no experience with the Federal or VA Acquisition Regulations. (VA SGI 19-22.)
The VA used a four-step process to review applications and fill the Contract Specialist positions. (VA SGI 23.) First, Derek Norman, a Human Resources Specialist, reviewed all applications to determine whether a candidate was minimally eligible for the position. (VA SGI 24.) A total of 287 applicants applied for JobNo. 615995, and 127 applicants including Stewart were deemed minimally eligible at all grade levels and advanced to the second step. (VA SGI 25.) For Job No. 616390, a total of 137 applicants applied, and 28 applicants including Stewart were deemed minimally eligible at the GS 9 level and advanced. (VA SGI 26.)
At the second step, a ranking panel reviewed application materials and assigned points to all minimally eligible applicants based on their education, experience, and associated qualifications relevant to the positions. (VA SGI 27.) All information regarding age was removed from the application materials that the ranking panel received. (VA SGI 29.) After the ranking panel assigned points, the top five highest ranked applicants for each grade level (GS 7/9/11) advanced to the third stage for interview. (VA SGI 28.) Stewart did not rank in the top five for either position and therefore did not advance to the interview stage. (VA SGI 28.)
At the third step, three independent panel members interviewed the applicants who advanced, asked the same questions of each, and assigned a point value based on responses. (VA SGI 30.) The fourth step was the final selection, when the selecting official offered the positions to the interviewees with the highest average interview point value. (VA SGI 31-32.) Five of the nine selectees for the Contract Specialist positions were over forty at the time of their application, but all selectees were at least five years younger than Stewart. (VA SGI 45; Stewart SUF 3.)
Stewart was informed in October 2012 that he had not been selected for the positions. (Stewart SUF 2; VA SGI 9.) He filed a formal EEOC complaint alleging age discrimination and reprisal for prior EEOC activity. (VA SGI 47-48.) The VA Office of Resolution Management investigated his claims. (VA SGI 49.) Stewart moved for summary judgment on his EEOC complaint. (VA SGI 50.) On February 6, 2018, the Administrative Judge ("AJ") denied Stewart's motion for summary judgment and instead granted summary judgment to the VA. (VA SGI 51.) The AJ found that, "[o]ther than [Stewart's] own opinion and speculation, there is no evidence . . . that age . . . [was] involved in any way in the selection processes at issue,or had anything, whatsoever, to do with these adverse recommendation and selection decisions." (Decl. of Joseph Briones ("Briones Decl.") ¶ 7, Ex. 22 ("EEOC Decision") at 6, ECF No. 51-5.) The AJ therefore found that Stewart was unable to establish that he was not selected because of his age. (EEOC Decision 6, 11.)
On March 7, 2019, Stewart filed the initial complaint in this matter alleging retaliation and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) He subsequently amended his complaint three times. (See ECF Nos. 10, 14, 17.) On March 11, 2019, the Court granted the VA's motion to dismiss Stewart's Third Amended Complaint as to all claims except Stewart's first claim for Age Discrimination under the ADEA. (Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss 10, ECF No. 29.) On June 26, 2019, Stewart moved for summary judgment. (See Stewart Mot.) On December 30, 2019, the VA also moved for summary judgment. (See VA Mot.) Both motions are fully briefed. (See ECF Nos. 43, 51, 53 (Stewart Mot., VA Opp'n, & Stewart Reply); ECF Nos. 60, 62, 65 (VA Mot., Stewart Opp'n, & VA Reply).)
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). A disputed fact is "material" where the resolution of that fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is "genuine" where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting evidence ormake credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu, 198 F.3d 1134.
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or "metaphysical doubt" about a material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). A "non-moving party must show that there are 'genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., 818 F.2d at 1468 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). "[I]f the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586-87). "[U]ncorroborated and self-serving" testimony will not create a genuine issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). The court should grant summary judgment against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to establish an element essential to his case when that party will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a proposed "Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law" that should set out "the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine dispute." C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a "Statement of Genuine Disputes" setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. "The moving party, in its reply, shall respond to the additional facts in the same manner . . . ." (Scheduling and Case Management Order 7, ECF No. 49.) "[T]he Court may assume that the material facts as claimed and adequately supported . . . are admitted to exist without controversy except to theextent that such material facts are (a) included in the 'Statement of Genuine Disputes' and (b) controverted by declaration or other written evidence filed in opposition to the motion." C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3.
Stewart, proceeding pro se, is held to the same standards as a lawyer as far as complying with the court procedures and the rules and regulations of the court system. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 1-3, 83-2.2.3. First, Stewart's Reply in support of his Motion is twenty-one pages, nine pages longer than permitted. (See Stewart Reply, ECF No. 53); see Honorable Otis D. Wright II, Standing Orders, https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-otis-d-wright-ii ("Replies shall not exceed 12 pages."). Nevertheless, the Court considers Stewart's Reply in full.
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