Stewart v. Wohlgemuth
| Decision Date | 21 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 72-714. |
| Citation | 355 F. Supp. 1212 |
| Parties | Correne STEWART, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, v. Helene WOHLGEMUTH, Individually and as Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Michael A. Nemec, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
Louis Kwall, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.
Before ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, and WEBER and KNOX, District Judges.
Correne Stewart, a full-time student at the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, complains that her general public assistance allotted her by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare has been unconstitutionally terminated as the result of a change in departmental regulations effective June 1, 1972, denying assistance to full-time college students. Claiming that this action resulted in a deprivation of her federal constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of laws, she brought suit in this court on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, for declaratory and injunctive relief and requested a three-judge statutory court.
The member of the court (primary judge) to whom the case was at once assigned, recognizing that a substantial question had been raised as to the validity of these regulations under the constitution and laws of the United States which question did not appear to have been clearly adjudicated, and that the regulations were of statewide application, granted a Temporary Restraining Order after notice to the Department and requested the empanelling of a three-judge court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284. Such a court was thereupon duly constituted by the Chief Judge of the Circuit. The court has met, considered the oral arguments and briefs of the parties, the agreed upon facts and the testimony taken at the hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order and now proceeds to a decision of the case on the merits. It was stipulated that all procedures for a preliminary as well as a permanent injunction be combined in one hearing.
The primary judge, however, refused to order the case to be maintained as a class action, but deferred the decision of this question to the three-judge court. After due consideration, the court determines that the action shall not be maintained as a class action, that the myriad of differing circumstances existing in each individual case of a college student deriving support from public welfare grants, would unnecessarily complicate this action and a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not be a superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of these controversies. See Tindall v. Hardin, 337 F.Supp. 563 (W.D.Pa. 1972—appeal presently pending.) In view of the fact that the court is holding the regulation in question unconstitutional as a deprivation of due process of law in this, a clear cut case and we are confident that the defendants will respect the final order of this court, we see no need to become involved in the complexities of a class action. If the defendants continue to enforce this regulation against other students, we would expect plaintiff's counsel to bring another suit which may then be disposed of by a single judge since the question of constitutionality will have been clearly adjudicated. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); Turner v. Colonial Finance Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972). The court therefore directs that the case not be maintained as a class action.
Turning now to the merits, we find that plaintiff is a resident of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and as heretofore stated a full-time student at the University of Pittsburgh. In August 1970, she applied for and began receiving a general assistance grant of $68.00 every two weeks and at that time registered for employment at the Bureau of Employment Security and has continued to be registered with this Bureau since then. She has been unable to find fulltime employment but is employed at the University under a work study program and also is working as a waitress at a restaurant earning $15.00 per week plus whatever tips she may receive. She is dependent for her income for her daily living expenses, including food, clothing and shelter, upon her income from employment plus her public assistance benefits. Without the latter, her income is insufficient for her maintenance. Her educational expenses including tuition are paid through the University under the above mentioned program. She is an emancipated minor who does not qualify as an ADC child.
On July 19, 1972, she received notice that her welfare benefits were terminated as of July 5, 1972, because of the change in regulations above referred to. She at once pursued her procedural remedies by filing an appeal and requested a "fair hearing appeal" which was heard August 7, 1972, before departmental hearing officer, Theodore H. Schmidt, a copy of whose ajudication dated August 21, 1972, is attached hereto at Appendix I. The hearing officer held that she was ineligible for general public assistance because of the language of departmental Regulation 3185 which was adopted effective June 1, 1972, which states: "Full-time college students not specifically exempt by 3183(e) do not meet the employment requirements unless they are receiving such education as a result of WIN placement. Plaintiff was not under the WIN program1 nor was she exempt from this regulation under 3183(e) relating to students who are dependent, unemancipated minors qualifying as ADC children and also "full-time vocational school students if there is reasonable expectation of employment when the education or skills are acquired".
The text of the regulations 3180 through 3186 insofar as relevant here is set forth in Appendix II. No findings were published indicating the basis for the promulgation of this new regulation.
It will be observed that these regulations were adopted by the Department pursuant to the provisions of the Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code, Sections 401 et seq., 62 Purdon's Pa.Stat. 401 et seq.
Plaintiff levels a double-barrelled attack upon the recently promulgated regulation embodied in Section 3185 which has been held to deprive her of the right to public assistance. It is her position first that the regulation in question sets up a conclusive presumption by administrative fiat that full-time college students do not meet the employment requirements of the regulations and is in violation of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; secondly, that denial of public assistance solely on the basis of enrollment as a full-time college student is invidious discrimination resulting in denial of equal protection of the laws and that such discrimination against full-time college students while allowing students enrolled full time in vocational schools to receive public assistance, is likewise invidiously discriminatory and a denial of equal protections of the laws.
We hold unanimously that plaintiff's first point is well taken and that this regulation does set up such a conclusive presumption which is constitutionally impermissible and cannot stand.
We should first observe that this is not a case where we have a program Federally funded in whole or in part and it is claimed that the state regulations are in violation of Federal law or regulations. Thus, cases dealing with the question of violation of the Social Security Act with respect to aid to families with dependent children such as Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) () are not controlling insofar as they are based upon violation of the federal statute. For the same reasons, Townsend v. Swank (Ill.), 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971) and Carleson v. Remillard (Calif.) 406 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972) dealing with state statutes inconsistent with the Social Security Act and hence invalid under the supremacy clause are likewise inapposite. They do, however, cast light upon our problem here with respect to the alleged denial of equal protection of the laws.
The court is unanimously of the opinion that the regulation in question by its plain language and as administered by the Department of Public Welfare sets up a conclusive presumption without rational basis and cannot stand.
The state has argued that regardless of the wording of the regulation the hearing officer has the power to disregard it and has the power to invalidate a regulation. If he has such power, we do not read the decision in this case as indicating that the hearing officer himself ever considered he had such authority. His decision in both discussion and conclusion is clear that he arrived at his determination simply because of the revision of regulation Section 3185 stating flatly that a full-time college student is not eligible for assistance because she does not meet the employability eligibility requirement. The full language of Mr. Schmidt's discussion and conclusion of law is as follows:
This was recognized by ...
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