Stidham v. Bos. Scientific Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-06759 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | ANNE STIDHAM and MIKE STIDHAM, Plaintiffs, v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP., Defendant. |
(Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment)
Pending before the court is Boston Scientific Corp.'s ("BSC") Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs Anne and Mike Stidham ("Motion") [Docket 48]. As set forth below, BSC's Motion is GRANTED IN PART with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of strict liability for manufacturing defect, negligent manufacturing, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and fraudulent concealment. BSC's Motion is DENIED IN PART with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of strict liability for design defect, strict liability for failure to warn, negligent design, negligent failure to warn, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and loss of consortium.
This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse ("POP") and stress urinary incontinence ("SUI"). In the seven MDLs, there are more than 72,000 cases currently pending, approximately 16,000 of which are in the Boston Scientific Corp.MDL, MDL 2326. In an effort to efficiently and effectively manage this massive MDL, I decided to conduct pretrial discovery and motions practice on an individualized basis so that once a case is trial-ready (that is, after the court has ruled on all Daubert motions and summary judgment motions, among other things), it can then be promptly transferred or remanded to the appropriate district for trial. To this end, I ordered the plaintiffs and defendant to each select 50 cases, which would then become part of a "wave" of cases to be prepared for trial and, if necessary, remanded. (See Pretrial Order # 65, In re Boston Scientific Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-002326, entered Dec. 19, 2013, available at http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/boston/orders.html). This selection process was completed twice, creating two waves of 100 cases, Wave 1 and Wave 2. The Stidhams' case was selected as a Wave 2 case by the plaintiffs.
Ms. Stidham was surgically implanted with the Uphold Vaginal Support System (the "Uphold") and the Solyx SIS System (the "Solyx") on December 20, 2010. (Short Form Compl. [Docket 1] ¶¶ 8, 10). She received the surgery at a hospital in Towson, Maryland. (Id. ¶ 11). Her implanting surgeon was Dr. Adelmo Marana. (Id. ¶ 12). Ms. Stidham claims that as a result of implantation of the Uphold and the Solyx, she has experienced multiple complications, including pain, mesh extrusion, recurrence of prolapse, dyspareunia, neuromuscular problems, and vaginal scarring. (Second Am. Pl. Fact Sheet [Docket 60-3], at 6). She brings the following claims against BSC: strict liability for manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn; negligence; breaches of express and implied warranties; and punitive damages. (Short Form Compl. [Docket 1] ¶ 13). Mr. Stidham brings a claim for loss of consortium. (Id.).
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict" in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1997).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, this court has authority to rule on pretrial motions in MDL cases. The choice of law for these pretrial motions depends on whether they concern federal or state law:
When analyzing questions of federal law, the transferee court should apply the law of the circuit in which it is located. When considering questions of state law, however, the transferee court must apply the state law that would have applied to the individual cases had they not been transferred for consolidation.
In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). To determine the applicable state law for a dispositive motion,I generally refer to the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction where the plaintiff first filed her claim. See In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger., 81 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1996) (); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill., 644 F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-01968, 2010 WL 2102330, at *7 .
If a plaintiff files her claim directly into the MDL in the Southern District of West Virginia, however, as the Stidhams did in this case, I consult the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the plaintiff was implanted with the product. See Sanchez v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 202787, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 17, 2014) (). Ms. Stidham received the Uphold and the Solyx implantation surgery in Maryland. Thus, the choice-of-law principles of Maryland guide this court's choice-of-law analysis.
These principles compel application of Maryland law to the plaintiffs' claims. In tort actions, Maryland "adheres to the lex loci delicti rule in analyzing choice of law problems." Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 230 (Md. 2000). Under this rule, a court must apply "the law of the state in which the alleged tort took place," id., or, said differently, "the place where the last event required to give rise to the tort occurred," Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 911 A.2d 841, 844 (Md. 2006). Federal courts have expounded on this view, finding that under Maryland's choice-of-law jurisprudence, "the law of the place of injury applies," which "is the place where the injurywas suffered, not where the wrongful act took place." Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 511 (4th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted). Here, the implantation surgery that allegedly resulted in Ms. Stidham's injuries took place in Maryland. (See Short Form Compl. [Docket 1] ¶¶ 11, 13). Thus, I apply Maryland's substantive law to this case.
Maryland has adopted the doctrine of strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976). Section 402A provides:
To prevail on a strict liability claim, the plaintiff must establish that (1) the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition. Phipps, 363 A.2d at 958. For purposes of strict products liability, a product may be defective in one of three ways: (1) a flaw exists in the product at the time the defendant sold it, making the product more dangerous than was intended, (2) a producer of a product fails to warnadequately of a risk or hazard related to the way a product was designed, or (3) a product is defectively designed. Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337, 1339-40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
The plaintiffs "do not intend to pursue an independent cause of action for strict liability based on ...
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