Stiefel v. Maryland Inst. for Instruction of Blind

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
• Citation: Stiefel v. Maryland Inst. for Instruction of Blind, 61 Md. 144 (Md. 1884)
• Decision Date: 09 January 1884
• Parties: EDWARD W. STIEFEL and Others, County Commissioners of Baltimore County, and George H. Carman, Examiner v. THE MARYLAND INSTITUTION FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF THE BLIND.

61 Md. 144

EDWARD W. STIEFEL and Others, County Commissioners of Baltimore County, and George H. Carman, Examiner v. THE MARYLAND INSTITUTION FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF THE BLIND.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 9, 1884

The cause was argued before Alvey, C.J., Stone, Robinson, Irving Ritchie, and Bryan, JJ.

D G. McIntosh, and Arthur W. Machen, for the appellants.

Upon the question, whether the Act of 1880, ch. 403, violates the clause of the Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 29, which provides that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title," the following authorities were quoted: Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176; McPherson v Leonard, 29 Md. 377; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; Parkinson v State, 14 Md. 192; Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 117; County Commissioners v. R. R. Co. 34 Md. 159; McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 631; County Commissioners v. Meekins, 50 Md. 41; Build. Asso. v. Newman, 50 Md. 62; County Commissioners v. County Commissioners, 50 Md. 245; Balto. v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574; State v. Fox, 51 Md. 412; Balto. v. Stoll, 52 Md. 435, 436; Md. Agricult. College v. Keating, 58 Md. 580.

Bernard Carter, for the appellee.

Stone J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The only matter presented to us for consideration in this case, is the constitutionality of the Act of 1880, ch. 403. The title of this Act is, "An Act to repeal an Act passed at the January Session, 1872, ch. 363, entitled 'An Act to allow the Trustees of the Maryland Institution for the Instruction of the Blind to locate the bed of North street, if extended into Baltimore County, from North avenue to Denmead street.' " Several objections have been urged against the constitutionality of this Act. One of these objections is that the subject of the law is not described in its title, and therefore it is in contravention of the Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 29. This objection is urged against the second section only of the Act of 1880, ch. 403, as it is conceded that it does not apply to the first section. As we think this objection is decisive of this case, we deem it unnecessary to consider the others. The Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 29, says: "Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title."

The one and only thing which, according to its title, was the subject of the body of the Act of 1880, ch. 403, was the repeal of the Act of 1872, ch. 363. There is not one word in the title of the Act before us which discloses, or even intimates, that a new law was to be enacted in the body of the Act instead of the law of 1872, ch. 363. The subject of the second section, certainly is not described in its title, because nothing is described in its title except the repeal of the Act of 1872.

Read by its title alone, the bill declares that nothing was to be done except the repeal of the Act of 1872; but the second section does attempt something more than the repeal of the Act of 1872. It goes on to enact a new law, the subject of which the title does not in any way indicate. Unless we mean to say that so much of the Constitution as relates to this subject is a mere unmeaning declaration, a sort of threat held out, but never meant to be carried into effect, we must decide that the subject of the second section of the Act of 1880, ch. 403, is not described in the title, and is therefore null and void. This section of the Constitution has many times been before this court, and we deem it unnecessary to review all the cases on that subject, even admitting that they were all well decided, further than to say that no case has yet been brought before this court, until the present, where affirmative legislation was attempted under a title which disclosed absolutely nothing except the repeal of a former Act.

We are not unmindful of the fact that the power of the Legislature over the making of our laws is supreme, except where restrained by the Constitution, and that it is our duty to make every fair presumption in favor of the legitimate exercise of their powers. But we should be derelict to our highest duty, the duty of carrying out the will of the people of the State, as expressed in their organic law, if we, by our acquiescence, sanctioned a constructive repeal of a plain constitutional provision.

It is obligatory on this court, to carry out,...