Stiff v. Keith
| Decision Date | 06 January 1887 |
| Citation | 9 N.E. 577,143 Mass. 224 |
| Parties | STIFF v. KEITH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Hosea
Kingman, for plaintiff.
The whole of the auditor's report was properly permitted by the court to be read to the jury. Fair v. Manhattan Ins Co., 112 Mass. 329.
The questions, "Had you known that Freddie L. Stiff was the party interested in the goods, should you have entered into a contract with him?" and "Should you have made a contract with a minor for the storage of these goods?" and the offer to prove by the answer to said questions that the defendant would not have made the contract declared upon with a minor, were properly excluded, as it was entirely immaterial what the defendant would have done; the real issue being what he did in fact do.
The court properly refused to give the third ruling asked for. No rule of law is better established than that an undisclosed principal may bring an action on the contract made by his agent, (Ilsley v. Merriam, 7 Cush. 243; Cutter v. Demmon, 111 Mass. 474; Barry v. Page, 10 Gray, 398,) and this rule holds good, even though at the time of making the contract the agent gives a receipt in his own name for part of the purchase money, (Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 371.)
The fourth ruling asked for was given with a proper qualification. As appears from the bill of exceptions, there was evidence tending to show that the defendant knew he was contracting with an agent of some person, and who that person was he did not care to inquire.
The fifth ruling asked for, the court properly refused to give.
The sixth and ninth ruling asked for, the court properly refused to give, for the reason that the defendant, having the means and opportunity of knowing who the principal was, was willing to make this contract without making any inquiry to ascertain that fact.
The instruction asked for, after the court had charged the jury, the court properly refused to give. McDonough v. Miller, 114 Mass. 94.
The jury, by their verdict, have found that the contract declared on was made with the plaintiff, through his agent, and, upon the evidence stated, must have found that the defendant knew he was making a contract with an agent acting for a principal whose name was not disclosed.
J.M. & T.C. Day, for defendant.
The principal question in this case is whether a contract entered into by the agent of an undisclosed minor principal (said contract not being for necessaries) can be enforced in the name of and at the suit of the minor, after a repudiation thereof by the defendant. Until modified by considerations of public policy, the rule of law was that only the actual parties to a contract could sue upon it. Story, Ag. § 161; Chit.Cont. 225. Agreements by minors, which are not contracts if the minor chooses so to declare, cannot be considered as having any connection with a public policy relating to actual business interests and obligations. The defendant had the right to elect with what party he would enter into a contract, without regard to any qualifications whatever. Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray, 536; Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 304; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 30. It seems clear that a person should have the right to decide whether or not he will enter into a contract with a person not sui juris, and that an infant is not sui juris. Cassier's Case, 139 Mass. 458; S.C. 1 N.E. 920. The statement by the court "that the defendant might, if he cared to know the fact, have inquired who the principal was, and whether he was a minor or of full age," might have led the jury to suppose it was his duty to do so. But it is submitted such was not his duty. Chit.Cont. *225. The defendant was not bound to make inquiries as to the minority of the plaintiff, unless the facts brought to his attention ought to have excited his suspicion and put him upon inquiry as to this question. Ridgeway Stove Co. v. Way, 141 Mass. 560, 561; S.C. 6 N.E. 714. The defendant had the right to show the fact that he would not have made the contract with the plaintiff, and he was a competent witness in his own behalf. Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 304. As soon as the defendant had knowledge that the plaintiff was interested in the contract, he refused to recognize him, and this he had a right to do, provided he had accepted and retained no benefits under the contract, although the alleged breach of the contract had already taken place. Winchester v. Howard, Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, Orcutt v. Nelson, all before cited. There was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury to find in defendant's favor upon these points, to-wit: Plaintiff's age, his right to repudiate contract, the fact defendant could not enforce it, and the fact that the agent designedly concealed the relation of the minor principal to the contract.
OPINION
This is an action of contract alleging a bailment by the plaintiff to the defendant, and a refusal to deliver. There was evidence tending to show that the defendant made such a contract with the plaintiff's father, and that the father was acting as the plaintiff's agent, and stated that he was acting for another, but did not disclose the name of the plaintiff, who was his son, and only 15 years old. There was also evidence of a refusal to deliver.
The defendant's counsel states the main question raised by the bill of exceptions to be whether a contract not for necessaries, made by an agent on behalf of an undisclosed principal, who is a minor, can be enforced by the minor in his own name after the defendant has repudiated it. The...
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