Stifflemire v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 08 April 1948 |
| Docket Number | 2 Div. 235. |
| Parties | STIFFLEMIRE v. WILLIAMSON. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Wilkinson & Wilkinson, of Selma, for appellant.
T G. Gayle, of Selma, for appellee.
The appeal challenges a decree of modification of an original divorce decree, rendered July 30, 1943, wherein the custody of the two minor children of the parties was awarded to the father, Leslie Stifflemire, appellant here.
The decree of modification, entered February 19, 1947, revoked the original award committed to the father, with the right of reasonable visitation, etc., of the mother, and gave custody to the mother, appellee here, during the school months of September, October, November, December, January, February March, April, and May of each year, and to the father for the vacation months of June, July, and August of each year, with the right respectively of the two parents for reasonable visitation when the children should be residing with the other parent.
This court, in consultation, has given serious consideration to the recorded facts and the decree of the learned trial judge thereon, but is unable to discern a meritorious basis on which such a drastic modification decree can be rested. The original award of custody in the divorce decree was at the request of appellee and acquiesced in by her for more than three years and until the children had reached the approximate age of six and nine years. The appellee had so acquiesced in this status that the children finally did not recognize her as their mother, but spoke of the second Mrs. Stifflemire as their real mother. It is true that both parties have since remarried and that appellee is now better situated to undertake the custody of her children than when the divorce decree was granted. Nevertheless, we are not reasonably persuaded that the conditions have so changed as to warrant such a radical modification of the custody award. It is clear enough to our minds that the father's home to which the children were committed by agreement of the parties as expressed in the divorce decree, was and is the best arrangement for the children during the school months and, indeed, there is nothing in this record to indicate that the modification decree giving the custody to appellee for this period could possibly redound to their better welfare. We think the proven facts and the inferences reasonably arising therefrom support a contrary conclusion. A mere recitation of the respective situations of the parties, we think, will suffice to sustain our view. There is nothing against the character of the parties or the reputations of the two homes. The father's home is in a respectable residential section of Montgomery, in near proximity to one of the city grammar schools, which the older child had been attending while living with him and which, presumably, the younger child could now attend should their custody be committed to appellant during the school terms. The father's home is a five-room house, with modern conveniences, consisting of three bedrooms, kitchen and bathroom, and is now occupied only by his mother, his wife, and himself. He is employed by a railroad company at a salary of $300 a month. As against this status, the appellee is residing with her husband in a five-room home of his mother, where another son is also living. There are only three bedrooms in this home too, which is presently occupied also by the appellee's two children. This house apparently has no modern conveniences, such as toilet and plumbing facilities, and if the children attend school they must attend one in Linden, about seven miles distant, and be transported there by school bus. The husband is employed by Lone Star Cement Company at a salary of $150 a month. No question is raised about the contentment of the children in staying in either home. The second Mrs. Stifflemire loves them and wants them in her home, as is the expressed attitude of Mr. Williamson also. The whole case considered, it appears rather conclusively to us that the best interests of the children would require their custody during the school period to be vested in the father, where their health, general welfare, and educational advantages would be better served by living with him in Montgomery, where the available facilities are shown to be better for their comfort and education during this period of the year than in the home occupied by their mother.
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Wambles v. Coppage
...which justify the court in disturbing the child's custody, Clarke v. Clarke, 47 Ala.App. 558, 258 So.2d 902; Stifflemire v. Williamson, 250 Ala. 409, 34 So.2d 685; it is not appellee's burden to disprove such circumstances. This rule of law is a rule of repose, protecting the child from fre......
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Easterling v. Caton, 5 Div. 543
...and approve the principle that "courts disfavor oft-repeated, harassing litigation over the custody of infants", Stifflemire v. Williamson, 250 Ala. 409, 411, 34 So.2d 685, 686; Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157, 30 So.2d 444; Sparkman v. Sparkman, 217 Ala. 41, 43, 114 So. 580; and, furth......
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Hodge v. Hodge
...The environment and surroundings in which the child is to be reared also are important considerations. Stifflemire v. Williamson, 250 Ala. 409, 34 So.2d 685 (1958). The parties have agreed thatwhoever is granted custody of the children shall be allowed to reside with them in the present mar......
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Winter v. Crowley
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