Stiggers v. State

• Decision Date: 27 September 1979
• Citation: 260 S.E.2d 413,151 Ga.App. 546
• Parties: STIGGERS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 413

260 S.E.2d 413

151 Ga.App. 546

STIGGERS v. The STATE.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Argued July 3, 1979.

Decided Sept. 27, 1979.

Al M. Horn, Reber F. Boult, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Benjamin H. Oehlert, III, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Police officers received a call from a "known confidential informant" who had given reliable information in the past on a "civic rather than paid" basis. The informant stated that an unknown black male, driving a 1978 gold Pontiac LeMans, was selling marijuana in "nickel" bags at a specified location. The officer receiving the call and a partner immediately departed for the location described and arrived within fifteen to twenty-five minutes. As the officers arrived, they saw appellant, who fit the description, entering the only 1978 gold LeMans in the area. He was carrying a shopping bag. The officers stopped the car as appellant tried to drive away and an officer approached the car. As he neared the automobile, the officer saw in plain view on the back seat three large brown bags. Inside the bags, again in plain view, was a clear plastic bag containing small manila bags, a set of scales and coin envelopes. The officer testified that from his experience he immediately recognized the paraphernalia as evidencing "a common method used to package and to weigh up the amount of marijuana to be packaged in a specific bag to be sold for $5.00." Appellant was arrested, the bags seized and marijuana discovered. Appellant was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana. After his motion to suppress was denied, appellant was tried and convicted. He appeals.

1. Appellant enumerates the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that "the officers did not have sufficient information to justify the detention of defendant, and the search and seizure of the envelopes." We do not agree. "Since acts of peace officers in detaining and questioning a citizen are necessarily a curtailment of his right to go about his business unmolested, and since also investigation and questioning are necessary elements of crime prevention and detection, the exigencies of the situation as they reasonably appear at the time must dictate the extent of intrusion into constitutionally protected areas. Momentary detention and questioning are permissible if based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, justify a reasonable course of inquiry not based on mere inclination, caprice, or harassment . . . 'We have repeatedly held that an authorized officer may stop an automobile and conduct a limited investigative inquiry of its occupants, without probable cause, if he has " reasonable grounds" for such action "a founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. " (Cit.)' . . . 'It is clear that the mere stoppage of a car by a police officer is not (per se) such an illegal act that would taint all evidence stemming therefrom . . .' " Brooks v. State, 129 Ga.App. 109, 111, 198 S.E.2d 892, 893-94 (1973).

"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889) recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response . . . A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). Here the officers received a tip which, admittedly, did not furnish probable cause to stop appellant and search. However, the officers went to the location specified and found appellant, who fit the description given, attempting to leave the area in the car described by the informant. Under these facts, the officers had an "articulable suspicion" warranting the stop of the vehicle so as to investigate the circumstances. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Radowick v. State, 145 Ga.App. 231, 232(1), 244 S.E.2d 346 (1978) and cits.

Two recent United States Supreme Court cases, cited by appellant, are clearly distinguishable. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, the defendant was, without the probable cause necessary for an arrest, taken into custody, transported to the police station, and detained for interrogation. "In contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions involved in (other) cases, the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room." Dunaway v. New York, supra at p. 212, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2256. In contrast, in the instant case, appellant's car was merely detained in order to investigate the officer's "articulable suspicions" an action which, as we have held, was warranted under the circumstances. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra.

In Brown v. Texas, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, officers detained the "suspicious" defendant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself though they had no reason to suspect him of any particular misconduct nor reason to believe he was armed. The court concluded that "none of the circumstances preceding the officers' detention of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal conduct . . . In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." Brown v. Texas, supra. In the case at bar, for the reasons discussed, the officers did have a "reasonable suspicion" that appellant was involved in criminal activity because their...