Stiles v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

• Decision Date: 26 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-203.,00-203.
• Citation: 2000 MT 257,10 P.3d 819,301 Mont. 482
• Parties: John STILES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, State of Montana, Respondent and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

10 P.3d 819

301 Mont. 482

2000 MT 257

John STILES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, State of Montana, Respondent and Appellant.

No. 00-203.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs August 3, 2000.

Decided September 26, 2000.

Lonnie J. Olson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Child Support Enforcement Division, Helena, Montana, For Appellant.

John Hollow, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana, For Respondent.

Chief Justice J.A. TURNAGE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The First Judicial District Court of Montana, Lewis and Clark County, reversed the Financial Responsibility Decision and Order issued by the Child Support Enforcement Division of the State of Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, against John Stiles, and found that because Stiles' sister, the legal guardian of the child, had no right to receive support, no right to support could therefore pass to the State. We affirm the District Court's ruling.

¶ 2 The State raises the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it held that equitable estoppel and waiver applied prospectively to relieve John Stiles of current and future support obligations for his son?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court err when it held the statutory right of the State of Montana to be reimbursed for the payment of public benefits on behalf of the child was negated by the conduct of the child's custodian?

¶ 5 Neal Stiles was born to John and Renna Stiles on November 10, 1986, the youngest of three children. Within weeks after Neal's birth, the Stiles separated. The Stiles were living in California, with John serving in the U.S. Navy. John was given responsibility for Neal's care, and asked his sister in Montana, Cynthia Huffman, now Cynthia Golding, if she would care for Neal for a short time while he fulfilled his duties at sea. She and her then-husband, Brian Huffman, agreed.

¶ 6 Cynthia has sought legal custody of Neal since that time, availing herself of courts in both Montana and California on numerous occasions. Her efforts met with differing results, including an award of physical custody handed down by a California court. Cynthia often did not comply with court orders resulting from these efforts, including orders to allow visitation of Neal by John. John initially offered to pay the Huffmans for Neal's care, but the Huffmans refused to accept the money, saying it was not needed. At all times John has covered Neal under his health insurance plan.

¶ 7 Cynthia applied for and was granted public assistance beginning in November 1995 for a four-month period, assigning any right to child support she may have had to the State of Montana. A Notice of Financial Responsibility issued to John on May 3, 1996, establishing John's monthly obligation for Neal at $388. John requested a hearing to adjudicate this matter, which was held June 27, 1996. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lori Ballinger of the Child Support Enforcement Division then issued a Financial Responsibility Decision and Order to John in November of 1996 establishing his obligation to provide financial support for Neal in the amount of $511 per month. Stiles asked Cynthia to sign a waiver of this obligation, but she refused.

¶ 8 John petitioned for judicial review. The District Court remanded the matter back to ALJ Susan Schafer to make findings of fact regarding John's claim that Cynthia had waived her right to receive child support or that she was equitably estopped from asserting or assigning them. The District Court reserved responsibility for determining whether the facts found by the ALJ satisfied the elements of waiver and equitable estoppel. The ALJ found that the requisite elements of waiver and estoppel were present, and these findings were upheld by the District Court. In addition, the court found that because Cynthia had no right to receive support, she could not then convey to the State rights greater than those to which she was entitled. The State of Montana appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 This Court stands firmly behind the precedents and principles providing for the maintenance and welfare of children by those responsible. Along with these responsibilities, however, come rights. Here, the sister of John Stiles, Cynthia Huffman, now Cynthia Golding, has done everything within her power and under the color of law to deny John's parental rights. We have previously stated, "a natural parent's right to care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest, which must be protected by fundamentally fair procedures." In re R.B., Jr. (1985), 217 Mont. 99, 103, 703 P.2d 846, 848. It appears from the record that Cynthia has been entirely successful in that endeavor. She has stated her intent to make the child her own to her mother and sister, immediately after being asked as a favor under difficult circumstances to look after the newborn child for no more than a few months by her brother. She has on at least one occasion refused John's offer of financial support for Neal. She has flaunted court orders to allow John to see his child. She has admonished Neal to run and get the nearest police officer if John ever approaches him, with no legal or rational basis that appears in the record. We concur with the District Court that as long as Neal remains with Cynthia there will be no award of child support in this matter, but should that change this issue must be reconsidered. Because she has no right to support, she has no right to assign to the State.

Issue 1

¶ 10 Did the District Court err when it held that equitable estoppel and waiver applied to relieve John Stiles of an obligation to provide financial support for his son?

¶ 11 Neither John nor the State has cited legal authority to this Court that is truly reflective of the facts and legal and equitable issues present here. Although both have cited authority from other jurisdictions to support their positions, we find Montana's statutes and legal precedent adequate to address the relevant legal issues.

¶ 12 "In matters and proceedings of an equitable nature, this Court shall review all questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented in the record, whether the same be presented by specifications of particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient or not, and determine the same, as well as questions of law...." Section 3-2-204(5), MCA; Rase v. Castle Mtn. Ranch, Inc. (1981), 193 Mont. 209, 216, 631 P.2d 680, 684. We will not reverse the trial court in an equity case on questions of fact unless there is a decided preponderance of the evidence against the findings of the trial court. Lumby v. Doetch (1979), 183 Mont. 427, 431, 600 P.2d 200, 202 (stating further that we will presume the findings and judgment by the district court are correct, and when the evidence furnishes reasonable grounds for different conclusions, the findings of the district court will not be disturbed); Boz-Lew Builders v. Smith (1977), 174 Mont. 448, 452, 571 P.2d 389, 391. Findings of fact in matters of an equitable nature as well as at law are to be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. Finally, the Legislature contemplated instances where a court would not award child support. In such cases the court must state its reasons for not so doing. Section 40-4-204(3)(c), MCA.

¶ 13 The State observes in its initial brief that, "[i]n Montana, waiver and estoppel are not available to an obligor to use as a sword, to defeat a child's right to current or future support." Waiver and estoppel are, however, available as a legal shield, to prevent inequitable results when the best interests of the child are not in dispute. The case perhaps most parallel to the instant case is State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Horton (1986), 222 Mont. 351, 722 P.2d 1148. There, this Court used equitable estoppel to disallow a mother's claim for child support when both the mother and father had explicitly agreed that if the father stayed out of the mother and child's lives, they would stay out of his. The agreement was mutually observed over fourteen years. We stated then:

"[S]he can turn the clock backwards on the understanding which was entered into and became consummated by mutual observance over the years, and create a financial windfall situation-one that can be pursued through County prosecuting offices by filling out and signing forms in a local office without any personal expense to her. The father and child, on the other hand cannot turn the clock backwards to recapture the association which they should have had and could have had .... Equity cannot allow the mother to participate in nullification of the purpose of the law in fact and, at the same time, allow her to claim the benefit of it in theory, simply because there is a meter running which can total a dollar loss in child support, but nothing to total the loss of a father-son association."

Blakeslee, 222 Mont. at 354-55, 722 P.2d at 1150-51 (emphasis added). ¶ 14 No more prescient prose could have been written for the case sub judice, where the facts are even more egregious. Here, the record reveals a father who aggressively sought to fulfill his legal and moral responsibilities as a parent to his son, only to be thwarted by his sister who was entrusted with the child's care as a favor to her brother, ostensibly for a brief time. It was Cynthia's stated and uncontroverted intention to keep this child, in spite of both his father's and mother's wishes and intentions.

¶ 15 Just as in Blakeslee, no extenuating circumstances had been established to justify a fourteen-year delay in seeking child support (e.g., an unsatisfied material need of the child over the years, or that may have recently arisen), and neither have such circumstances been established here. Furthermore, Cynthia has been especially litigious, having initiated numerous court proceedings in both Montana and California, including adoption...