Stiles v. National Airlines, 2509

• Decision Date: 27 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 2509,2688,2697.,2509
• Citation: 161 F. Supp. 125
• Parties: Beryl Whiteman STILES v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc. N. H. CONDER, duly qualified Administrator of the Estate of W. B. Schnorbus, and duly qualified legal guardian for and on behalf of Vicky Ann Schnorbus, and next friend, and as a personal representative and next friend on behalf of Mrs. Joe Schnorbus and Mrs. Lula Conder v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc. and N. H. CONDER, duly qualified Administrator of the Estate of Mrs. Clara Conder Schnorbus, wife of Walter B. Schnorbus, and duly qualified legal guardian for and on behalf of Vicky Ann Schnorbus and next friend, and as personal representative and next friend on behalf of Mrs. Lula Conder v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

161 F. Supp. 125

Beryl Whiteman STILES v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc.

N. H. CONDER, duly qualified Administrator of the Estate of W. B. Schnorbus, and duly qualified legal guardian for and on behalf of Vicky Ann Schnorbus, and next friend, and as a personal representative and next friend on behalf of Mrs. Joe Schnorbus and Mrs. Lula Conder v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc. and N. H. CONDER, duly qualified Administrator of the Estate of Mrs. Clara Conder Schnorbus, wife of Walter B. Schnorbus, and duly qualified legal guardian for and on behalf of Vicky Ann Schnorbus and next friend, and as personal representative and next friend on behalf of Mrs. Lula Conder v. NATIONAL AIRLINES, Inc.

Nos. 2509, 2688, 2697.

United States District Court E. D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

March 27, 1958.

Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Rene H. Himel, Jr., Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr., William S. Stone, New Orleans, La., for libellant Stiles.

Liddell, Austin, Dawson & Huggins, Dwight Austin, Houston, Tex., and Byrnes & Wallace, New Orleans, La., for libellant Conder.

Porteous & Johnson, F. Carter Johnson, Jr., New Orleans, La., and Dixon, DeJarnette, Bradford & Williams, H. Reid DeJarnette, Miami, Fla., for respondent.

CHRISTENBERRY, Chief Judge.

The foregoing matters having been consolidated for trial, and having been tried to the Court without a jury, the Court having heard evidence and the arguments of proctors, and having taken time to consider the matters, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings Of Fact

1—Beryl Whiteman Stiles, Libelant in No. 2509, is the surviving spouse of Harry F. Stiles, Jr., intestate deceased, who left no surviving parents, children or other dependent relatives.

2—N. H. Conder, Libelant in No. 2688 and No. 2697, is the duly qualified Administrator of the Estates of Walter B. Schnorbus and Mrs. Clara C. Schnorbus, wife of Walter B. Schnorbus, respectively, and legal guardian for and on behalf of Vicky Ann Schnorbus, and next friend, and as a personal representative and next friend on behalf of Mrs. Joe Schnorbus and Mrs. Lula Conder.

3—At all material times, respondent, a Florida corporation, was a common carrier of passengers for hire by air between the cities, among others, of Miami, Tampa and New Orleans.

3a—On the afternoon of February 14, 1953, libelants' intestates were traveling on one of respondent's airplanes (Flight 470), under a regular contract of passage, from Miami via Tampa across the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans. Said airplane, while en route from Tampa to New Orleans, encountered a storm, and, at about 6:12 PM, crashed in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Alabama, beyond a marine league from shore, killing libelants' intestates and all other persons aboard. (All times are stated herein as Eastern Standard Time.)

4—Respondent, unlike certain other airlines, does not maintain its own meteorological department. Instead, the dispatchers stationed in respondent's Flight-Control office in Miami are charged with responsibility for keeping respondent's flights advised of weather conditions. These dispatchers are not trained in meteorology, although such training is customary in the case of other commercial airlines.

5—The United States Weather Bureau officially defines "severe turbulence" as: "Rare. Usually impossible to control aircraft. May cause structual damage." Volume III, Service Operations, Chapter B-20, Aviation Forecasts.

6—Of the two dispatchers who were responsible for the safety of respondent's Flight 470 on February 14, one was of the opinion that turbulent weather on a projected flight route was unimportant in respect of the safety of the flight; and the other was unfamiliar with the official United States Weather Bureau definition of severe turbulence, was also of the opinion that the existence of low-pressure areas and turbulence on a projected flight route was unimportant, and was unaware of respondent's established rule against dispatching flights into areas of known severe turbulence.

7—On the morning of February 13, 1953, a low-pressure area had developed in conjunction with a warm front over northern Mexico and southwest Texas, and had begun an eastward movement over the Gulf. Meanwhile, a high-pressure area was developing over the Texas Panhandle in the form of a deep trough, in warm air at an altitude of 10,000 feet, filling with colder air from a cold front approaching from Montana. By 7:00 AM on February 14, the cold front and high-pressure area had begun moving rapidly down over central Texas, in the direction of the low-pressure area and warm front to the south. The conjunction of the two fronts caused the low-pressure area to develop and intensify.

8—The 10:33-AM regional forecast issued by the United States Weather Bureau at Miami on February 14, indicated that the center of the low-pressure area was in the northwest Gulf, moving rapidly toward northwest Florida. The terminal forecast issued at New Orleans at the same time also showed the low-pressure area in the northwest Gulf, and indicated the presence of "moderate to severe" turbulence in thunderstorms. Respondent received these forecasts promptly over electronic Weather Bureau circuits.

9—Respondent's Flight 917 preceded its Flight 470 by 2½ hours on the Tampa-New Orleans run across the Gulf. Flight 917 left Tampa at 2:11 PM and encountered thickening weather at 3:24 PM. Thereafter, the flight proceeded on instruments through solid clouds. Turbulence was encountered, seat belts were ordered fastened, the "No Smoking" sign was turned on, and all other precautions for turbulent-weather flying were taken. The pilot, Captain Abel, turned over to his co-pilot all supervision of power settings, so that he could keep both hands on the flight controls. Speed was reduced to minimize the effects of the severe turbulence; and terrific head- and cross-winds, and heavy rain and hail were encountered. The plane was buffeted, and pitched, rose and fell sharply in up- and down-drafts. Captain Abel, pilot of Flight 917, testified that he "was able to hold within 1,000 feet of assigned altitude with some difficulty, and it required constant changes on the power to keep airspeed under control. Turbulence was causing the ship to shake and twist around considerably. The rudder at times was forced back and forth without changing the direction of the flight. The instrument panel shook considerably * * * (and) the airplane seemed to jolt and twist from side to side." He stated further that conditions were such that at times the instruments were unreadable, and that it was "a twisting-turning type of turbulence * * * although we did have vertical turbulence at times along with it". Many passengers became ill, all were badly frightened, and many of them prayed. The stewardesses were unable to leave their seats to aid the passengers in distress. Various objects were thrown about the interior of the plane. It was discovered that although a 12-degree bearing had been allowed for a northerly set, the aircraft had nevertheless been blown miles north of its prescribed course.

10 — Flight 917 reached New Orleans at 5:12 PM. Attendants had to assist passengers in disembarking because of the force of the wind. Captain Abel, who described the weather encountered as "some of the worst turbulence he had ever experienced in flights across the Gulf", ordered a structural check of his aircraft.

11—The storm, described above, encountered by respondent's Flight 917 increased in intensity from the time that flight passed through it, until Flight 470 reached the area in the height of the storm, and crashed in the Gulf.

12—Respondent's standing regulations required its flights to make position and weather reports to the Miami Flight-Control office at each of three check points on the Tampa-New Orleans route. Respondent's rules, as well as the Civil Air Regulations (14 CFR 41.113), also required all flights to report all unanticipated weather encountered en route, so that such weather could be reported by Flight Control to other flights which might be affected. Further, respondent's rules required all pilots to report severe weather directly to other affected flights. Nevertheless, although Flight 917 was in constant radio contact with respondent, it made no direct report at all to Flight 470 of the extreme weather conditions encountered, and no report thereof whatever until 5:24 PM, after it had landed in New Orleans, and fully two hours after turbulence was first encountered. This report was made only to Miami Flight Control, and was simply a brief message of "extreme turbulence all altitudes just east of New Orleans". At 5:35 PM, another such report was sent to Miami Flight Control, of "severe turbulence No. 1 check to New Orleans". No other reports were made, and no details of the exceptionally turbulent voyage were ever reported. Further, the reports which were made were never relayed by Flight Control to Flight 470 (then already over the Gulf) until that flight asked for weather advices from Flight 917 at 5:49 PM (23 minutes before the crash), by which time Flight 470 was already surrounded by severe thunderstorms, and effective evasive action was no longer possible.

13—At 4:24 PM, some twenty minutes before Flight 470 left Tampa, respondent's Flight-Control office had requested its radio operator at New Orleans to ask Flight 917 for a weather report, and to pass on to Flight 470 any unusual details. Although the New Orleans operator contacted Flight 917 three times within the next seven minutes, this request was never relayed to the Flight, and accordingly no such information was ever given to Flight 470; and the Miami Flight-Control office made no effort whatever to follow up on the request, or to check on compliance therewith.

14—Flight 470 left Miami for Tampa at 3:15 PM. Its crew consisted of Captain Springer as pilot, Co-Pilot Stettner, a flight engineer and two stewardesses. Captain Springer...