Still v. Commissioner of Dept. of Employment and Training

Decision Date01 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 94-P-339,94-P-339
Citation657 N.E.2d 1288,39 Mass.App.Ct. 502
PartiesAnnie K. STILL v. COMMISSIONER OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING.
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Peter Benjamin, Springfield, for plaintiff.

Macy Lee, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

Before PORADA, IRELAND and LAURENCE, JJ.

LAURENCE, Justice.

In January, 1993, Annie K. Still was a nurse's aide at the Heritage Hall South Nursing Home in Agawam when she was fired for violating a nursing home policy by cursing a splenetic patient who had insulted her. She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the Department of Employment and Training (DET). After a hearing, a DET review examiner determined that she was disqualified from receiving any benefits because, the review examiner concluded, her conduct, while not "deliberate," nonetheless constituted a "knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer." 1 The DET board of review adopted the review examiner's findings and conclusion denying Still benefits as its final decision. A judge of the Springfield District Court affirmed the board's decision on Still's action for review pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 42. This appeal followed.

The parties propound differing interpretations of the statutory words "knowing violation," 2 which is the sole issue in controversy. Still contends that an employee cannot be deemed in "knowing violation" of an employer's rule or policy 3 unless the offending conduct is found to have been intentional, i.e., the employee not only must be aware of the existence of the rule or policy but must also be aware at the time she acted that she was violating it. DET submits that the employee's intent is irrelevant; all that is necessary for disqualification is, as the review examiner found here, that the employee had been informed of the existence of the policy and that its violation could result in discharge. We adopt Still's construction of § 25(e )(2) and reverse the decision of the District Court judge upholding the board's decision. 4 The review examiner committed error of law, see G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(c ); G.L. c. 151A, § 42, because, on the facts as found and under applicable legal principles, Still was not, when she uttered the offending words, sufficiently aware of her act or of its culpable character to be considered in "knowing violation."

The pertinent facts, based upon the review examiner's findings and uncontroverted testimony credited by the review examiner, are not in dispute. 5 Still, an African-American woman, was employed as a senior nurse's aide at the Agawam nursing home from January, 1989, to January 12, 1993. The nursing home's employee handbook, a copy of which Still was given at the time of employment, set forth the facility's patient care policies and the rules for employee conduct. The handbook stressed that patients were "at all times [to] be treated with consideration [and] respect" so as to allow them "to retain their dignity and self-respect." Patients were to be free from "mental and physical abuse" (neither of which term was defined). Employees were warned that "negligence and inconsiderate treatment" of patients "may result in ... termination;" while "rude, discourteous or uncivil behavior" or "fighting" with anyone at the facility "may result in disciplinary action and/or termination." Still received early in-house instruction and education regarding these rules and avoidance of their violation (including sessions on "How to handle a combative patient" and "Dealing with the demanding resident"). She was aware that employees had been discharged for unspecified "patient abuse."

Prior to her discharge on January 12, 1993, Still had enjoyed an unblemished record of service, and no disciplinary actions or warnings had ever been lodged against her. Her problems began on the morning of January 9, 1993, while she was working a double shift because the facility was short staffed. One of the residents she was caring for was an irascible elderly man who regularly uttered abusive, racially offensive remarks. That morning the patient made particularly rude remarks to Still. She had earlier been instructed "just to walk away if he got to her." Still was so upset by the choleric comments uttered on January 9, 1993, that she arranged to be relieved from working with the fractious resident at all.

Later that day, however, well into her tenth straight hour of work, Still had to attend to the roommate of the snappish resident. While she was doing so behind a partially drawn curtain, the resident called her "a fat lazy black bitch." Instead of ignoring the comment, Still was, the review examiner found, immediately "provoked" into a loud "outburst," consisting of the words "mother fucker." 6 She continued caring for the roommate without further comment. Still's outburst was reported by a fellow employee to her employer, who investigated the incident (without confronting Still) and determined that Still had verbally abused the patient "after being provoked." She was discharged as of January 12, 1993, for "swearing at a resident."

The review examiner found that the employer's policy against "patient abuse" had, to Still's knowledge, been uniformly enforced by terminating all employees "involved" in such conduct. (No factual details were presented as to the nature of the previously punished "abuse" or of the "involvement" of the penalized employees.) The review examiner accepted Still's testimony that her outburst "was not done with forethought." Consequently, he concluded that it could "not be considered to have been deliberate." Further he agreed (as did the employer) that Still's reaction "was provoked by the patient."

Nonetheless, the review examiner determined that by her conduct Still had "knowingly violated" the employer's reasonable and uniformly enforced rule. He particularly emphasized as the basis for his determination the fact that Still "knew of the rule or policy by having been issued a copy of them [sic ] and having been instructed regarding them and avoidance of violations thereof." In so concluding, the review examiner acquiesced in the employer's position that, if it is found that an employee with the prior knowledge and information attributable to Still violates a patient's rights, the employee is to be penalized with maximum severity even if the conduct constituting the violation was "an involuntary act."

We agree with Still that the 1992 amendment to § 25(e )(2) was not intended to deny benefits in such a situation. Prior to the amendment, the only ground for disqualification from receiving unemployment compensation benefits (other than by voluntary leave or on account of incompetence) was for "deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest." Several paramount principles emerge from the authorities that have applied this provision. First, it is construed in light of "[t]he purpose of unemployment compensation ... to provide compensation for those who are thrown out of work through no fault of their own." Leone v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 397 Mass. 728, 733, 493 N.E.2d 493 (1986). Second, "the critical issue in determining whether disqualification [from receiving unemployment benefits] is warranted is the claimant's state of mind in performing the acts that cause his discharge." Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 94, 97, 384 N.E.2d 642 (1979).

Third, in making the critical determination regarding the employee's state of mind, the review examiner "must ... take into account ... the presence of any mitigating factors," ibid., including disease, such as alcoholism, Shepherd v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 399 Mass. 737, 740, 506 N.E.2d 874 (1987), as well as stress, "serious personal problems" or other factors "causing an employee to be unusually fatigued at a particular period." Wedgewood v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 30, 31-33, 514 N.E.2d 680 (1987). Because of the critical nature of the employee's state of mind and surrounding mitigating circumstances, mere violation of an employer's rule does not "automatically justif[y] a disqualification from unemployment benefits, the general principle being that '[w]hile the violation of a work rule may well justify the discharge of an employee, such a violation does not necessarily amount to misconduct for unemployment compensation purposes.' " Torres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 387 Mass. 776, 780 n. 3, 443 N.E.2d 1297 (1982), quoting from Smith v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 376 Mass. 563, 566-567, 382 N.E.2d 199 (1978).

Fourth, in the absence of sufficient specific, subsidiary findings on the issue of the claimant's state of mind, see Lycurgus v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 391 Mass. 623, 626-627, 462 N.E.2d 326 (1984); Starks v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 391 Mass. 640, 641, 462 N.E.2d 1360 (1984); Coulouras v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 394 Mass. 817, 820, 477 N.E.2d 592 (1985), which findings are supported by substantial evidence, Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978), an agency decision disqualifying the claimant "cannot stand." Torres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 387 Mass. at 779, 443 N.E.2d 1297. Fifth, the employer has the burden of proving all of the facts required to establish disqualification. Cantres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 226, 231, 484 N.E.2d 1336 (1985). Finally, the entire compensation scheme must be "construed liberally" in favor of the employee, given the overriding purpose of c. 151A "to lighten the burden which ... falls on the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. c. 151A, § 74; Garfield v. Director of the Div. of...

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12 cases
  • Still v. Commissioner of Employment and Training
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 20 November 1996
    ...District Court's judgment and held that Still's conduct did not, as matter of law, disqualify her from receiving benefits. 39 Mass.App.Ct. 502, 657 N.E.2d 1288 (1995). We granted the application of the commissioner of the department (commissioner) for further appellate review. We conclude t......
  • In re R.C.P., No. M2003-01143-COA-R3-PT (TN 7/13/2004)
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    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 13 July 2004
    ...depending on the context in which they are used or the character of the conduct at issue. Still v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Employment & Training, 657 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 672 N.E.2d 105 (Mass. 1996); State v. Contreras, 253 A.2d 612, 620 (R.I. 1969). Because th......
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    ...in which they are used or the character of the conduct at issue." Id. at *7 (citing Still v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Employment & Training, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 502, 657 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 n.7 (1995), aff'd, 423 Mass. 805, 672 N.E.2d 105 (1996); State v. Contreras, 105 R.I. 523, 253 A.2d 612, 620 ......
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    ...depending on the context in which they are used or the character of the conduct at issue. Still v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Employment & Training, 657 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct.1995), aff'd, 672 N.E.2d 105 (Mass. 1996); State v. Contreras, 253 A.2d 612, 620 (R.I. 1969). Because the......
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