Still v. Firm
| Decision Date | 27 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10–948.,10–948. |
| Citation | 385 S.W.3d 182,2011 Ark. 447 |
| Parties | Ben STILL, Appellant v. The PERRONI LAW FIRM, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael Lipscomb & Associates, by: Michael R. Lipscomb, Hot Springs, for appellant.
Raymond A. Harrill, Little Rock, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, The Perroni Law Firm (hereinafter Perroni).1 Because of a violation of the statute of limitations regarding oral contracts, we reverse the order of the circuit court and dismiss.
In December 1998, appellant, Ben Still, and his wife, Allison Still, hired Samuel Perroni of the Perroni and James Law Firm 2 to provide legal services in connection with an investigation being conducted by the United States Department of Transportation and the United States Attorney's Office pertaining to allegations involving the sale and titling of crash-testvehicles. On December 2, 1998, a contract for legal services was signed by Still 3 and Perroni, wherein Still agreed to pay Perroni $25,000 for work done prior to an indictment being filed. Additionally, a provision was included in the contract that would require a new and separate contract, if legal proceedings in the nature of defending an indictment occurred.
On December 15, 1999, the United States Attorney filed a twelve-count indictment against the Stills for wire fraud, conspiracy, and mail fraud. The government alleged that the Stills obtained unrestricted titles for crash-test vehicles, which had been sold for salvage only, by means of false documents and representations and that these vehicles were then resold to consumers. Perroni and Still met at Perroni's office on December 16, 1999, to discuss Perroni's representation of Still subsequent to the indictment. Perroni sent a letter to Still on December 21, 1999, confirming his representation in the matter. In his letter, Perroni agreed to represent Still for a fee of $65,000.00 and to give Still “credit for the $25,000.00 retainer,” leaving Still with a “balance due of $40,000.00.” Perroni added that he “would appreciate it if [Still] would pay that fee as expeditiously as possible.” The letter also informed Still that he would be responsible for any out-of-pocket expenses, which Perroni estimated at about $35,000.00. He stated that he would bill Still on a monthly basis for those expenses.
In the months following the indictment, Perroni proceeded to file several motions on behalf of Still. Perroni's client-ledger report and monthly billing statements reflected that Still made the following payments on the account: (1) $10,000.00 payment on March 6, 2000; (2) $1,542.37 payment on March 13, 2000; (3) $10,000.00 payment on May 31, 2000; and (4) $1,500.00 payment on October 13, 2000.
On May 19, 2000, a security agreement was executed and signed by Still and Perroni to secure payment of the legal fees. The security agreement contained the following language:
The security interest granted hereby is to secure payment of any and all present and future unpaid legal fees and unknown expenses in an amount not to exceed $100,000 and also any and all other liabilities of Debtor [Ben Still] to Secured Party [Perroni], direct or indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising, especially including all rents and advances of every kind (all hereinafter called the “Obligations”).
The Stills' trial was set for January 29, 2001, in the federal district court. Perroni filed two motions to dismiss the indictment, and the government also moved to dismiss it on the basis that new information had surfaced concerning a crash-test vehicle that had been sold to Perroni and that was similar to those charged in the indictment. On January 23, 2001, the federal district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the indictment against the Stills without prejudice.
On July 12, 2001, a second indictment was filed against the Stills. Perroni did not represent Still in this case, and Still was appointed a public defender for representation. Perroni continued to send Still monthly billing statements for the legal fees due on the representation relating to the first indictment. Perroni's client-ledger report and monthly billing statements reflected that interest was being charged on the account on a monthly basis.
On May 18, 2005, Perroni filed a complaint against the Stills 4 to recover unpaid legal fees in connection with his representation of the Stills in connection with the first indictment. Still and Perroni both filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Still's motion, filed on February 16, 2010, 5 raised the argument that Perroni's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–56–105. Perroni's motion for summary judgment, filed on March 24, 2010, contended that there was no material issue of fact remaining, because it was clear that a contract for legal services was entered into by the parties, consideration was agreed upon, performance on the part of Perroni was delivered, and Still failed to pay.
On April 19, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing to consider the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. On June 4, 2010, the court entered an order denying Still's motion for summary judgment and granting Perroni's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court found that The court also concluded in its order that after considering the arguments of counsel, pleadings, and exhibits, Still “failed to meet proof with proof, and therefore there is no remaining issue of fact in dispute.”
This court's standard of review for summary judgment is well settled:
Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.
Jackson v. Sparks Reg'l Medical Center, 375 Ark. 533, 539, 294 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2009).
Still claimed in his motion for summary judgment, in his response to Perroni's motion for summary judgment, and on appeal that Perroni's action for recovery of unpaid legal fees was barred by the three-year statute of limitations governing contracts or obligations not in writing. On appeal, he continues to maintain that to the extent that there was a contract for legal services with Perroni, the security agreement signed by him on May 18, 2000, did not convert his oral obligation into a written one so as to bring it within the five-year statute of limitations for written agreements.
Initially, we note that the Arkansas Code regarding limitations of actions provides that “[a]ll actions founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability not under seal and not in writing” shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–105 (1987). The Code further provides that “[a]ctions to enforce written obligations, duties, or rights ... shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action shall accrue.” Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–111 (1987).
Still emphasizes that the only written agreement between the parties was the December 2, 1998 contract for legal services, which related to Perroni's representation pre-indictment. He further urges that to the extent that there was an agreement between the parties concerning Perroni's representation of Still post-indictment, it was an oral agreement, making the three-year statute of limitations applicable. Perroni counters, and the circuit court clearly found, that the written security agreement signed by Still on May 18, 2000, was a written acknowledgment of the debt that transformed the contract into one in writing and was sufficient to bring his cause of action within the five-year statute of limitations for written obligations. Still asserts in response that the security agreement was merely an acknowledgment of an oral agreement and that it in no way removed the underlying oral agreement from the three-year statute of limitations.
Perroni admits in his brief on appeal that his December 21, 1999 letter “is evidence of an oral agreement concerning Perroni's representation of Mr. Still.” He further admits that absent the subsequent written acknowledgment of the debt by Still, the three-year statute of limitations would have applied. Accordingly, it is undisputed that the December 1999 agreement concerning post-indictment representation was oral and was governed at the outset by section 16–56–105.
To repeat in part, the security agreement signed and executed on May 19, 2000, contained the following language:
The security interest granted hereby is to secure payment of any and all present and future unpaid legal fees and unknown expenses in an amount not to exceed $100,000 and also any and all other liabilities of Debtor [Still] to Secured Party [Perroni], direct or indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising, especially including all rents and advances of every kind (all hereinafter called the “Obligations”).
Under the terms of the security agreement, Still granted Perroni a security interest in the following property:
All tangible property, wherever located and whether presently existing or to be acquired, including but not limited to consumer goods, inventory, and equipment.
All intangible property, wherever located and whether presently existing or to be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Bridges v. Shields
-
Griffin v. Cutler
...difference, if any, between a written obligation and a written acknowledgement of a prior oral obligation, see Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, 385 S.W.3d 182, 189 (2011) (holding that for purposes of the statute of limitations, a written acknowledgment of a debt does not convert a......
-
Singleton v. Williams
...limitations defense to the contract claim. Williams invoked the debt-acknowledgment tolling doctrine. See Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, at 8, 385 S.W.3d 182, 186. The essence of this argument is that Singleton acknowledged his debt to Williams after Williams provided the last ca......