Stillson v. Gibbs

Decision Date09 April 1884
Citation18 N.W. 815,53 Mich. 280
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesSTILLSON v. GIBBS. [*]

In judging of the exemption of goods as provisions, the actual family of the party is to be considered as the family to be provided for, even though some of the children living at home be of age, and there is no legal liability for their support.

Where a judgment debtor has property, of which a certain amount is exempt, the officer is required to levy on all of such property, and let the debtor select to the amount exempt. If the officer levy upon and sell certain of such property giving the debtor no opportunity to select before sale, he may elect to take the property sold and sue for its value.

In such a case it is not error to exclude evidence that the debtor had other property besides that which was sold, which he might hold as exempt.

The object of even exemplary or punitive damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the tort, according to the circumstances of its commission; and an instruction which is calculated to lead the jury to suppose that, besides compensating the plaintiff, they may punish the defendant is erroneous. Under the circumstances of this case the error will not, however work reversal of the judgment.

Error to Kalamazoo.

Edwards & Stewart, for plaintiff.

Arthur Brown and Howard & Roos, for defendant and appellant.

COOLEY, C.J.

This case has twice before been in this court, and is reported in 40 Mich. 42, and 46 Mich. 215, S.C. 9 N.W. 254. On the first two trials the defendant had judgments which were reversed on the third the plaintiff recovered, and the defendant is now the appellant.

The facts are that the plaintiff, in August, 1876, was occupant of a farm in the county of Kalamazoo, owned by his wife, and had harvested and stored in the barn a crop of wheat. He had living with him at the time eleven children, two of whom were over the age of twenty-one, and worked away from home a part of the time. Plaintiff had prepared for seeding to wheat about 40 acres in the fall and relied for seed wheat, and also for bread, upon the crop in the barn. Defendant was sheriff of Kalamazoo county, and as such had for collection an execution against the plaintiff. One of his deputies, by virtue of this execution, made a levy upon the wheat August 25, 1876, and another went five days later with a threshing-machine to the barn, and there, against the protest of the plaintiff, proceeded to thresh it. The entrance upon the premises was forbidden, but was persisted in, and the plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the deputy said it was hard and wrong, and he ought not to do it, but he did it because the defendant's attorney told him to do it.

It also tended to show that the machine threshed the grain imperfectly, and much was wasted. When the threshing was completed the grain was taken to a railroad station several miles distant, and there advertised and sold. The plaintiff then sued in trover. He claimed a part of the wheat under the statutory exemption of six months provision for a householder and his family, and another part for seeding, under the provision exempting, to the amount of $250, the tools implements, stock, etc., necessary to enable him to carry on his business. The defendant gave evidence tending to show that he left in the barn sufficient wheat for plaintiff's family for six months, and he claimed that the plaintiff's children who were over the age of 21 were not to be reckoned as part of his family. Defendant also offered to show that plaintiff had other property to the value of more than $250, which would be exempt to him as tools, implements, stock, etc., and therefore was not entitled to recover for seed wheat.

The circuit judge held that in judging of the exemption of wheat for provisions, the actual family of the plaintiff was to be considered as the family to provide for, even though there might be members for whom the plaintiff would not be legally bound to provide. As applied to the circumstances of this case, we think the instruction was correct. The persons as to whom the question was made were the children of the plaintiff, and were properly with him if they had no home elsewhere. Besides, there is always a contingent liability for the support of children who are over age, in case they become a public charge.

It is not error to exclude evidence that the plaintiff had other property which the plaintiff might hold as exempt, as being tools, implements, stock, etc., necessary in his business. The statute requires that the officer shall levy upon all the debtor has of such property, and then permit him to select to the amount exempt. When the officer fails to obey the law, and thereby deprives the debtor of the opportunity to make selection before sale, he may elect to take the property sold and sue for its value. Wychoff v. Wyllis, 8 Mich. 48; Town v. Elmore, 38 Mich. 305.

The circuit judge instructed the jury that the defendant should be held responsible for all the wheat taken by him, including any that might have been wasted by him in the threshing. This was entirely correct.

In giving to the jury the rule of damages, the circuit judge further instructed them that if the defendant took the exempt property knowing that he had no legal right to take it, he might be considered as acting in bad faith; and that when the wrongful act is shown to have been committed willfully maliciously, and wantonly, or with a view of obtaining unlawfully or with a fraudulent intent a benefit to the defendant, or those for whom he acts, by means of the wrongful acts with...

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