Stillwell v. Cohen

Decision Date22 May 1969
Docket NumberNo. 26724.,26724.
Citation411 F.2d 574
PartiesJames D. STILLWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wilbur J. COHEN, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Walter Gemeinhardt, New Orleans, La., Jesse M. Williams, III, Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, Ala., for appellant.

Ben Hardeman, U. S. Atty., Ralph O. Howard, D. Broward Segrest, Asst. U. S. Attys., Montgomery, Ala., for appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, GODBOLD, Circuit Judge, and CABOT, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In February, 1966, appellant filed an application with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging that he had become disabled "about 1961." After considering all the evidence, the hearing examiner found that appellant was not under a disability on or before December 31, 1964.1 This determination was affirmed by the Appeals Council, and the hearing examiner's decision became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

On March 8, 1968, appellant brought this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act2 to obtain judicial review of the Secretary's decision. On June 12, 1968, the district court entered an order affirming the Secretary's determination, and this appeal followed.

Appellant, a retired building contractor, alleged back trouble as a result of a 1950 tractor accident and gout as the principal impairments causing him to be disabled within the terms of § 223(d) of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) and (3). These statutes read in relevant part as follows:

(d) (1) The term "disability" means —
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; * * *.
(d) (2) (A) An individual * * * shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy * * *.
(d) (3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

Appellant presented medical evidence from a general practitioner and an orthopedic specialist who had treated him at irregular intervals since the 1950 accident. The examiner, however, also received reports from an internist at Ochsner Clinic, New Orleans, consulted by one of appellant's physicians, and another Ochsner Clinic internist who examined appellant at the request of the hearing examiner. These later reports indicated that appellant did not suffer from gout and that most of his lower back pains resulted from obesity and fibrositis.3 In addition, the later reports indicated that much of appellant's physical problem was related to an adverse psychological reaction brought about by his relatively early retirement at age 49.4 The hearing examiner concluded that appellant was not disabled prior to December 31, 1964, and that his condition would be greatly eased by a reduction in weight and a return to some form of gainful activity.

At the outset, we bear in mind that the scope of judicial review of the Secretary's decision is narrowly limited to the issue of whether or not the Secretary's fact determinations are supported by substantial evidence. Hayes v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 648 (5 Cir. 1963). Moreover, credibility findings as to conflicts in the evidence are to be made by the Secretary and not the trial court. Celebrezze v. Zimmerman, 339 F.2d 496 (5 Cir. 1964).

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  • Bonilla v. Richardson, SA-71-CA-64.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • March 20, 1972
    ...is not entitled to receive disability benefits." Knox v. Finch, 427 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1970) diabetes; Stillwell v. Cohen, 411 F.2d 574, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1969) There is no clinical or medical evidence in the record that the degenerative osteoarthritis, anterior lipping, or spondylolysi......
  • Hall v. Richardson, Civ. A. No. 71-H-1342.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • August 16, 1973
    ...of the Secretary. Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1971); Martin v. Finch, 415 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1969); Stillwell v. Cohen, 411 F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1969). The review by the Court is not a trial de novo, and the function of the Court is not to reweigh the evidence or to subst......
  • Jackson v. Heckler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • February 6, 1984
    ...impairment reasonably can be remedied by medication or treatment, it is not disabling under the Social Security Act. Stillwell v. Cohen, 411 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.1969); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993, 88 S.Ct. 492, 19 L.Ed.2d 487 (1967), Purdham v. Celebr......
  • Locklear v. Mathews, Civ. A. No. N-76-358.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • November 1, 1976
    ...in refusing to consider her obesity because it was remediable. This assertion is unsupported by the case law. In Stillwell v. Cohen, 411 F.2d 574, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1969), the court stated that "if an impairment reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it can not serve as a basis for a findi......
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