Stim v. Simon

Decision Date04 November 1960
Docket NumberNo. 60,Docket 26304.,60
Citation284 F.2d 58
PartiesJoseph D. STIM, Trustee, Appellant, v. Max SIMON, Bankrupt, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Joseph D. Stim, Farmingdale, N. Y., pro se.

Samuel B. Weingrad, New York City, for appellee.

Before CLARK, MAGRUDER and FRIENDLY, Circuit Judges.

MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.

A trustee in bankruptcy filed before the referee ten specifications on the basis of which he contended that the bankrupt should be denied a discharge. Some of these specifications were withdrawn, and others were dismissed by the referee after trial. But of course one specification is enough, under the Bankruptcy Act, and the referee, concluding that the protesting trustee had made out the allegations of specification 5, entered an order denying a discharge to the bankrupt. Upon review of the referee's order, the district court concluded that it should be reversed and the bankrupt granted his discharge. This the district court accomplished in the order we now have under review, on appeal by the trustee. 182 F.Supp. 377.

Section 14, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32, sub. c, contains this provision:

"The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under title 18, United States Code, section 152 * * *: Provided, That if, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge the objector shall show to the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which, under this subdivision c, would prevent his discharge in bankruptcy, then the burden of proving that he has not committed any of such acts shall be upon the bankrupt."

18 U.S.C. § 152 is as follows:

"Concealment of Assets; false oaths and claims; bribery. * * * Whoever knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any bankruptcy proceeding * * *
"Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

Specification 5 alleged as follows:

"The Bankrupt committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under Title 18, United States Code, Section 152 in that on or about February 7th, 1958, the Bankrupt did knowingly and fraudulently make a false oath and account in the above entitled bankruptcy proceeding in that he did state that Schedule A submitted by the Bankrupt with his bankruptcy petition contained a statement of all his debts according to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, when the said Schedule A listed as creditors only Sarah Levine as an unsecured creditor in the amount of $8,231.04; Dora Latsky, an unsecured creditor in the amount of $2,000.00; Nathan Nelson a secured creditor in the amount of $28,327.83 and Clement J. Lipman, a secured creditor in the amount of $6,000.00; when in truth and fact * * * the Bankrupt is indebted to the Manufacturers Trust Co., New York, New York, in an amount of approximately $1,000.00 on a secured loan made by Manufacturers Trust Co. to Joan Holding Corp. on which the Bankrupt was co-maker on or about June 14th, 1957 in the original amount of $1848.00."

The making of findings of fact on disputed testimony is the primary function of the referee, and under General Order in Bankruptcy No. 47, 11 U.S. C.A. following section 53, the judge is required to accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous."

It seems to us that the district court violated the requirement of General Order No. 47 in his purely abstract reasoning in explaining why the referee should be reversed. The district court in its opinion said:

"Where a bankrupt omits an asset of substantial value from his schedules, the inference that the omission was fraudulent is not hard to draw; one\'s immediate reaction is that the omission was deliberate, in the hope of concealing the asset. Where a bankrupt fails to list a liability, it is not so easy to
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8 cases
  • In re Cox
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
    • August 25, 1965
    ...all creditors, if knowingly and fraudulently done, is grounds for denying a discharge under Sec. 14, sub. c(1), supra. Stim v. Simon, (2 Cir., 1960) 284 F.2d 58; In re Schnabel, (D.C.Minn.1945) 61 F.Supp. 386; see also Jackson v. Menick, (9 Cir. 1959) 271 F.2d 806; In re Haydu, (D.C.N.Y.195......
  • In re Gibraltor Amusements Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • March 15, 1963
    ...in the forum in which was vested the prime responsibility for determination of the facts and the exercise of discretion. Stim v. Simon, 2 Cir., 1960, 284 F.2d 58, 60; In re Rosenberg, 2 Cir., 1944, 145 F. 2d 896, 898; Sloan's Furriers, Inc. v. Bradley, 6 Cir., 1945, 146 F.2d 757, 759. See U......
  • In re Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 24, 1961
    ...as they must be to warrant reversal. Margolis v. Nazareth Fair Grounds & Farmers Market, Inc., 2 Cir., 1957, 249 F.2d 221; Stim v. Simon, 2 Cir., 1960, 284 F.2d 58; In re Tabibian, 2 Cir., 289 F.2d 793. The only substantial question raised is the standing of WAC as a separate petitioning Wu......
  • In re Melnick
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 5, 1966
    ...the facts "who saw and heard the witness." In re Slocum, supra, 22 F.2d at 286; In re Steinberg, 143 F.2d 942 (2 Cir. 1944); Stim v. Simon, 284 F.2d 58 (2 Cir. 1960). ...
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