Stine v. Shuttle
Decision Date | 20 November 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 19452,19452 |
Citation | 134 Ind.App. 67,186 N.E.2d 168 |
Parties | Charles W. STINE, Appellant, v. Allen SHUTTLE, Erman Hoover, Jr., Clarence McCoy, as City Clerk of the City of Evansville, Indiana, the City of Evansville, Indiana, Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Russell S. Armstrong, Evansville, for appellant.
Wilbur F. Dassel, Evansville, for appellees Allen Shuttle and Ermon Hoover, Jr.
Jerome L. Salm and Raymond P. Knoll, Evansville, for appellees Clarence McCoy, as City Clerk of City of Evansville, and City of Evansville.
This is appeal from the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County wherein the appellant filed a complaint in one paragraph to recover damages allegedly sustained by the appellant because of an alleged false arrest. It also appears from the record that the appellant herein filed an amended complaint to which the appellees filed a joint and several demurrer to the appellant's amended complaint, which was sustained by the trial court. It also appears that the appellant, failing and refusing to plead over, elected to abide by the ruling of the court on said demurrer for the purpose of appeal. Thereafter, the trial court accordingly entered judgment against the appellant and for each of the appellees on said demurrer.
The assigned error before us, in substance, is the court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the defendants below.
The pertinent part of the appellant's amended complaint reads as follows:
* * *'
It also appears that the pertinent parts of the demurrer and memorandum aver that the statutory grounds to the plaintiff's complaint fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants, and, in their memorandum attached thereto, state among other things that that City of Evansville, Indiana, in the absence of a special statute, which imposes liability, is not liable for the tortious acts of its officers and servants in connection with a governmental function; that Clarence McCoy as Clerk of the City of Evansville was performing a judicial function at the time he executed the warrant in question and as he was an executive officer of the City, he was not liable to individuals, either for a failure to perform or for a negligent performance of such duties, where no corruption or malice is imputable, and keeps strictly within the limits of his powers; and further avers that a police officer is protected in executing a warrant regular on its face and is not liable for false arrest or false imprisonment, even though in truth, the warrant was wrongful issued and without authority.
The only question before us is: Does the appellant's complaint state a cause of action against each or any of the defendants under the law applicable to the facts averred?
It is generally recognized that in the phrases 'false arrest' and 'false imprisonment', the word 'false' comes from the common law and is synonymous with unlawful. See 16 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition. We note that the appellant uses the phrase 'false arrest' throughout his complaint and in the Law of Arrest by Alexander, Vol. 2, p. 1543, we also find the following statement:
With the foregoing in mind, we will now turn our discussion to the sufficiency of the complaint under the averments thereof.
It is the general rule of law that a tort action for false arrest, or false imprisonment, is based upon deprivation of one's liberty without legal process that may arise when arrest or detention is without warrant or a warrant that charges no offense, or is void or the person arrested is not the person named in the warrant and all that must be averred or shown in the deprivation of one's liberty without legal process. See Cleveland v. Emerson (1912) 51 Ind.App. 339, 99 N.E. 796; Efroymson v. Smith (1902) (T.D.) 29 Ind.App. 451, 63 N.E. 328; Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d 276, 162 A.L.R. 793; George v. Leonard, D.C.S.C., 71 F.Supp. 662, 664. Therefore, it appears that the arrest in such actions must be based upon a void, erroneous or irregular process. We find the general statement of law well stated in Vol. 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 28, p. 665, distinguishing between void, erroneous and irregular process, which general statements read, as follows ...
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