Stinson v. Oklahoma Ry. Co.

Decision Date26 May 1942
Docket Number30299.
Citation126 P.2d 260,190 Okla. 624,1942 OK 216
PartiesSTINSON et al. v. OKLAHOMA RY. CO. et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The law is opposed to forfeitures of estates; and conditions subsequent are not favored or to be raised by inference or implication.

2. A grant of real property for a particular use, without words of forfeiture, does not create a condition subsequent, but is a covenant.

3. The term or language of a conveyance will not be construed to create an estate on condition unless the language used, by its own force, imports a condition, or unless the intention of the grantor to create a condition subsequent is clearly expressed by the terms of the instrument itself. Priddy v. School District et al., 92 Okl. 254, 219 P. 141, 39 A.L.R. 1334.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Clarence Mills, Judge.

Action by M. E. Stinson and I. M. Putnam against the Oklahoma Railway Company and the Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful use and occupancy of realty, for ejectment, and to quiet title, wherein the Oklahoma Railway Company filed a cross-petition. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Chas H. Garnett, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.

John Embry, M. M. Gibbens, and Calvin Boxley, all of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church.

CORN Vice Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining the demurrer of the defendant, Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church, hereafter called the church, to plaintiffs' third amended petition and to the answer and cross-petition of the defendant Oklahoma Railway Company. Plaintiffs elected to stand upon their petition and the trial court entered judgment for the church, dismissing plaintiffs' petition with prejudice from which judgment they appeal.

June 9, 1904, I. M. Putnam conveyed a certain described parcel of land to the Metropolitan Railway Company by warranty deed, the pertinent portions of which recited as follows:

"That I, I. M. Putnam, a single man, party of the first part, of the City of Oklahoma City, County of Oklahoma and Territory of Oklahoma, in consideration of One ($1.00) Dollar in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the Metropolitan Railway Company of Oklahoma City the following described real property ***
This grant is made to the said Metropolitan Railway Company to be used as and for a trolley park, for a station and station grounds for its traffic and is accepted upon the agreement that the Metropolitan Railway Company will improve and beautify the same; ***
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said described premises unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns for ever, free, clear and discharged of and from all former grants, charges, taxes, judgments, mortgages and other liens and encumbrances of whatsoever nature; ***"

June 15, 1904, the Metropolitan Railway Company conveyed all of its holdings to the Oklahoma Railway Company, including that tract which is the subject of the deed and this litigation.

Thereafter, May 24, 1920, the Oklahoma Railway Company quitclaimed this parcel of land to the church. October 1, 1924, Putnam executed a quitclaim deed to the same tract to the plaintiff, Stinson. The church went into possession of the land upon receipt of its deed in 1920, and has held possession since that time.

In the original petition plaintiff Stinson sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful use and occupancy, ejectment, and to have the title quieted in herself. By amendment to the petition, Putnam, the original grantor, was joined as a necessary party plaintiff. The amended petition set up that neither the Metropolitan Railway Company nor the Oklahoma Railway Company, its successor, ever went into possession of the land.

The matter was heard upon plaintiffs' third amended petition and the separate demurrers of the church and the railway company, and the separate answer and cross-petition of the railway company. The church's demurrer was sustained as to the petition and the answer and cross-petition of the railway company. Plaintiffs' petition was dismissed, with prejudice, and the church was adjudged to hold fee title to the premises and title thereto was quieted in the church as against both the plaintiffs and the railway company.

From this judgment plaintiffs have appealed. As grounds for reversal of this judgment three propositions are set up. These propositions are:

1. This deed was a voluntary grant to the railway company for the specified use of a trolley park and a station and station grounds for its traffic, and was made to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of the railway, and when it ceased to be held and used for the purposes of the grant the title reverted to the grantor, or to those who claimed under him.
2. The deed to Stinson, given more than 4 years after the railway's deed to the church, conveyed to Putnam's grantee all right, title and interest of the grantor in the property and was a valid conveyance; if invalid as to the church claiming adverse possession, Putnam may still maintain this action to recover possession for the benefit of his grantee.
3. Plaintiffs' cause of action did not arise until execution and delivery of the deed from the railway company to the church, and this action in ejectment was begun less than 15 years thereafter, and is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs first contend, as the basis of the first proposition, that 66 O.S.1941 § 7, is the applicable statute. This section of our statute provides:

"Every corporation formed under this article and every railroad corporation, authorized to construct, operate, or maintain a railroad within this State, shall be a body corporate by the name designated in its articles, shall have perpetual succession, shall have the right to sue and be sued, may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure and shall also have power:
Second. [To hold real estate.] To take and hold such voluntary grants of real estate and other property *** as may be made to it; to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of its railroad; but the real estate received by voluntary grant shall be held and used for the purposes of such grant only.
Third. [Same.] To acquire under the provisions of this article, or by purchase, all such real estate and other property *** as may be necessary for the construction, maintenance and operation of its railroad, and the station, depot grounds, and other accommodations reasonably necessary to accomplish the objects of its incorporation; to hold
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