Stirling v. Cnty. of Leelanau
Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
Docket Number | 353117 |
Citation | 970 N.W.2d 910,336 Mich.App. 575 |
Parties | Mack C. STIRLING, Petitioner-Appellee, v. COUNTY OF LEELANAU, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Karla Stirling and Wallace H. Tuttle & Associates PC, Traverse City, (by Wallace H. Tuttle ) for Mack C. Stirling.
Clark Hill PLC, Lansing, (by Zachary C. Larsen and Charles A. Lawler ) for the County of Leelanau.
Before: Murray, C.J., and M. J. Kelly and Rick, JJ.
Murray, C.J. Respondent, Leelanau County, appeals as of right the final opinion and order of the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT) granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of petitioner, Mack C. Stirling. In granting petitioner's motion, the MTT held that petitioner was entitled to utilize the Michigan principal-residence exemption (PRE) for his home in Leelanau County because the primary-residence exemption claimed by petitioner's wife for a residence in Utah was not based upon an exemption "substantially similar" to the PRE. We conclude otherwise and thus reverse the final opinion and order of the MTT and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The material facts are not in dispute. Petitioner has lived in his Leelanau County home since 1990. Petitioner's wife owned two rental properties in Utah, but she sold one of the properties in 2018. Petitioner and his wife filed joint tax returns for the pertinent tax years of 2016 to 2019. Neither petitioner nor his wife ever resided at either Utah property; however, the Utah tenants (petitioner's family members) used the properties as their principal residences. As a result, under Utah law, petitioner's wife claimed tax exemptions during the relevant tax years for these properties and disclosed that fact on petitioner's application for a PRE. Respondent denied petitioner's application, concluding that use of the Utah exemption rendered petitioner ineligible for a PRE because the Utah exemption was "substantially similar" to the PRE.
Petitioner then filed this matter in the Small Claims Division of the MTT and subsequently sought summary disposition on the undisputed facts. The MTT granted the motion, concluding that the Utah exemption received by petitioner was not "substantially similar" to the PRE, primarily because to be eligible for the PRE a person had to be both an owner and occupier of the residence, while under Utah law a person was eligible if she owned and occupied the residence, or owned the residence and had tenants occupying the home as a primary residence. After the MTT denied respondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent filed this claim of appeal.
Our judicial task is to determine whether what is required under a Utah residential-property-tax-exemption statute is "substantially similar" to that provided by the Michigan residential-property-tax-exemption statute. "Absent fraud, our review of MTT decisions is limited to determining whether the MTT erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong legal principle." VanderWerp v. Plainfield Charter Twp. , 278 Mich. App. 624, 627, 752 N.W.2d 479 (2008). We review de novo the MTT's interpretation and application of statutes. Id. Although appellate courts SBC Health Midwest, Inc. v. Kentwood , 500 Mich. 65, 71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (2017) (some quotation marks and citations omitted).1 In other words, "respectful consideration" is given to the MTT's construction of a statute, but ultimately the meaning of a statute is a legal question to which we owe no deference.2 As we said just late last year:
Because these claims of error involve whether the Tax Tribunal properly interpreted and applied the statutes governing its jurisdiction, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Tax Tribunal committed an error of law in its interpretation and application of the statutes. Mich. Props., LLC v. Meridian Twp. , 491 Mich. 518, 527-528, 817 N.W.2d 548 (2012). This Court reviews de novo whether the Tax Tribunal erred as a matter of law when interpreting and applying statutes. Makowski v. Governor , 317 Mich. App. 434, 441, 894 N.W.2d 753 (2016). Agency interpretations of a statute are entitled to "respectful consideration, but they are not binding on courts and cannot conflict with the plain meaning of the statute." In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich. , 482 Mich. 90, 117-118, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008). [ New Covert Generating Co., LLC v. Covert Twp. , 334 Mich. App. 24, 45, 964 N.W.2d 378 (2020).]
"It is well established that the primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." VanderWerp , 278 Mich. App. at 627, 752 N.W.2d 479. "The words used by the Legislature in writing a statute provide us with the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent." Drew v. Cass Co , 299 Mich. App. 495, 499, 830 N.W.2d 832 (2013). "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must apply the statute as written, and no further judicial construction is necessary or permitted." VanderWerp , 278 Mich. App. at 627, 752 N.W.2d 479. "Moreover, statutes exempting persons or property from taxation must be narrowly construed in favor of the taxing authority." Drew , 299 Mich. App. at 499-500, 830 N.W.2d 832 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The PRE is part of the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et seq. , and it allows taxpayers to exempt their domicile from the local school district's property tax. Schubert v. Dep't of Treasury , 322 Mich. App. 439, 448, 912 N.W.2d 569 (2017). The PRE is governed by MCL 211.7cc, which provides in relevant part:
Thus, under Michigan law, a qualifying person is entitled to the PRE so long as they do not own a home in another state for which they claimed an exemption that is "substantially similar to" the PRE. See generally, Campbell v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury , 331 Mich. App. 312, 320-321, 952 N.W.2d 568 (2020).
Utah's residential-property exemption is governed by Utah Code § 59-2-1033 , which provides in relevant part:
In Dennis v. Summit Co , 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah, 1997), the court indicated that the purpose of this statute was to grant an exemption for residential property being used as a primary residence, which can occur in two ways:
The crucial qualification for the exemption is the use to which the property is put, not the residency of the owner. A resident of Utah who owns residential property in Utah but does not use that property as a primary residence is taxed in the same manner as a nonresident who likewise owns residential property that he does not use as a primary residence. Such properties are valued at 100% of fair market value for purposes of calculating the property taxes owed. The tax exemption treats resident and nonresident taxpayers alike. Likewise, the Taxing Authorities point out that an individual, whether resident or nonresident, who owns residential property in Utah and rents it to someone who uses the property as a...
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