Stitz v. The State

• Decision Date: 31 December 1885
• Docket Number: 12,379
• Citation: 4 N.E. 145,104 Ind. 359
• Parties: Stitz v. The State
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

4 N.E. 145

104 Ind. 359

Stitz v. The State

No. 12,379

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 31, 1885

From the Jasper Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed.

S. P Thompson and R. P. DeHart, for appellant.

M. H Walker, Prosecuting Attorney, and E. P. Hammond, for the State.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The indictment upon which the appellant was convicted charges him with the crime of arson, and charges, also, that the crime was committed for the purpose of defrauding the Phenix Insurance Company, which had issued a policy of insurance upon the building burned.

The State was permitted to give in evidence a claim made by the appellant for property destroyed by the fire, and to prove that he put a value upon the property beyond its real worth. We regard this evidence as competent. We do not, however, agree with the counsel for the State, that it was competent for the purpose of impeaching the character of the accused; on the contrary, we regard the theory of the counsel for the State upon this point as radically erroneous. Character can not be impeached by evidence of specific acts. This familiar principle shatters the theory of the State. In proceeding upon this theory counsel were led into serious error in their argument to the jury, and the court followed them to the manifest injury of the appellant.

We put our ruling on the ground that the evidence was competent, as tending to show a motive to commit the crime. If an accused has a policy of insurance on his property, and claims from the insurer more than the property is worth, it supplies some evidence of a wicked motive. If a man should claim, under oath, one thousand dollars for property of no greater value than one hundred dollars, that fact would supply some evidence tending to establish a motive for setting fire to the building in which it was situated. It would, however, be a mere circumstance to be considered in connection with other facts. Of itself, it would not be of great weight, but it would nevertheless be some evidence of a criminating character. The law recognizes the principle that men are impelled to commit crimes from some motive. There are, indeed, few motiveless crimes, and among the motives impelling men to crime is that of gain. In a thoughtful and philosophical treatise it is said: "As there must pre-exist a motive to every voluntary action of a rational being, it is proper to comprise in the class of moral indications such particulars of external relation as are usually observed to operate as inducements to crime," and among the motives that influence human conduct this author classes that of gain. Wills Circ. Ev. 39.

Another author says: "In looking at the motives which instigate human conduct, we ascend to the very origin of crime." Burrill Circ. Ev. 281. At another place this author says: "The motive of gain, in the stricter sense of the term, may be excited by two different classes of objects; first, by something visible and tangible, which the party meditating the crime desires to possess; and, secondly, by some substantial benefit which is expected to accrue as the result of the contemplated act." Ibid. 285.

The case of State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179, supplies an illustration of the practical application of these principles. In that case the appellant was charged with arson, and it was held that evidence of over-large insurance upon his goods was competent "to show a possible or probable motive, such motive being a material link in the chain of circumstances." In the course of the opinion in that case it was said: "Now, it is not a natural thing for a man to fire his own premises: presumptively appellant was innocent. What then is the logical and natural course of human thought at such a juncture? Is it not to inquire what motive, if any, existed which could have influenced a sane person to do such an act? Such was the course pursued by the prosecution; the motive was sought; and by it claimed to be found in the fact of an undue insurance; not only a perfectly proper proceeding, but indeed the only one open." The same principle is declared in Commonwealth v Hudson, 97 Mass. 565, and in Shepherd v. People, 19 N.Y. 537. In this last case Denio, J., speaking for the court, said: "The prisoner's house had been burned and he was charged, upon circumstantial evidence, with having set it on fire. Prima facie he had no motive for the act, but a strong pecuniary one against it. But if he had a contract of indemnity, and especially if under it he might probably obtain more than the value of the property, the case would...