Stock v. Fife

• Decision Date: 25 January 1982
• Citation: 430 N.E.2d 845,13 Mass.App.Ct. 75
• Parties: John L. STOCK v. James R. FIFE et al.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 845

430 N.E.2d 845

13 Mass.App.Ct. 75

John L. STOCK v. James R. FIFE et al.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 15, 1981.

Decided Jan. 25, 1982.

Stewart T. Herrick, Boston, for plaintiff.

Pamela J. Aliapoulios, Wellesley (Arthur L. Johns, Wellesley, with her) for James C. Driscoll.

Before GREANEY, PERRETTA and KASS, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The plaintiff, John L. Stock, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a two-car collision in Framingham on October 10, 1977. Named as defendants were the driver of the other car, Thomas J. Fife, and the three passengers in his car, James C. Driscoll, Robert A. Fuller, and Steven C. Kretchman. ¹ The passengers were sued on the sole theory that they had engaged with the driver in a joint enterprise which made them equally responsible for the driver's negligence. One of the passengers, Driscoll, brought a motion for summary judgment, Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), which was allowed by a judge of the Superior Court. On motion by the plaintiff, the judge then certified that final judgment in the action against Driscoll was to enter forthwith. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974). ² The plaintiff's appeal followed. We affirm.

Taking the undisputed facts and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see O'Hanley v. Ninety-Nine, Inc., --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.App.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1136, 1140, 421 N.E.2d 1217, we examine the record ³ to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact which could properly be tried, or whether Driscoll was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See Community Natl. Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553-556, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976).

On October 9, 1977, at approximately 6:00 P.M., Thomas Fife spoke with the other three defendants by telephone, and they "made plans to go out." Driving his father's car (with permission to do so), Fife picked up each of his friends at their homes between 6:30 and 7:30 P.M. Fife had half a case of beer in the car, and the four "drove around" Needham for a while, drinking the beer. They "talked about where (they) wanted to go," and they "all decided" to drive to a nightclub called Timothy's Too in Framingham. Each of the defendants drank "two or three" beers on the way, and they arrived at the nightclub sometime after 8:00 P.M.

At Timothy's Too, each of the defendants bought at least one round of drinks. In this manner, they each drank four or five beers or mixed drinks, although Fife, the driver, drank only beer. The defendants left the nightclub sometime before midnight, and Fife drove back toward Needham to drop the others off at their homes. Kretchman was in the front seat, with Driscoll in the back seat on the passenger side, and Fuller in the back seat on the driver's side. At least Kretchman and Driscoll continued drinking beer in the car.

At about midnight, the defendants, travelling east on Route 9 in Framingham, reached an intersection with a traffic light. At that point, Fuller "dropped ... a bottle" in the back seat. Fife, hearing the bottle drop and fearing that beer had spilled in the car, turned around to his right to see what had happened. ⁴ When Fife turned back to the road, he saw the plaintiff's car entering the intersection from his right, and Kretchman warned him that the traffic light was red. He applied the brakes but could not stop, and the front of his car struck the driver's side of the plaintiff's car, injuring the plaintiff. It appears that Fife was subsequently convicted of failing to stop for a red light, and charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving to endanger were continued without a finding.

The plaintiff argues that the foregoing facts would warrant a jury in finding that the occupants of the Fife car were engaged in a joint enterprise, thereby requiring the denial of the passenger Driscoll's motion for summary judgment. We disagree.

As it exists in the law of tort, the doctrine of joint enterprise is narrowly defined and narrowly applied. ⁵ The black letter law does not permit a finding of joint enterprise in the use of an automobile unless the proof shows (1) an agreement, express or implied, (2) for a common purpose, (3) such that each member has an equal right to direct and control the operation of the automobile. See Prosser, Torts § 72, at 477 (4th ed. 1971); Harper & James, Law of Torts § 26.13, at 1414 (1956); 4D Frumer & Friedman, Personal Injury § 1.02(1), at 158-159 (1971). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 491, Comment c, at 548 (1965) (requiring that common purpose involve a "pecuniary interest"). Although a minority of jurisdictions holds that a joint enterprise may be found from mere association for a common purpose, "(s)uch decisions (are) condemned as in effect a restoration of discarded fictions of imputed contributory negligence ... since it is seldom that some element of common purpose cannot be found when two persons are travelling together in a private vehicle." Prosser, supra at 477. As a result this position is "now almost entirely discredited," id., and the overwhelming majority of courts which have considered the question require a showing of the element of control before a finding of joint enterprise can be made. Id. at 478; Harper & James, supra.

Massachusetts follows the majority rule. Under our law, the presence of an agreement and a "community of interest" are elements to be considered. Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. 588, 593, 139 N.E. 298 (1923); Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., 270 Mass. 340, 346, 170 N.E. 77 (1930). We view this as reflecting a recognition that the "relationship of joint (enterprise) is a serious matter" which should not be found "without some definite indication of (the parties') intention" to enter it. Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash.2d 347, 373, 95 P.2d 1043 (1939), quoting Lampe v. Tyrell, 200 Wash. 589, 605, 94 P.2d 193 (1939). See Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843 (1952) (holding that a joint business venture arises only when parties "intend to associate themselves as such"). These elements, however, alone are insufficient to prove a joint enterprise in this jurisdiction. Rather, it appears settled that a joint enterprise will only be established where the evidence warrants "a finding that the (passenger) had an equal right with the driver in respect of the control of the automobile; ... (i.e.,) a finding that he had power to control the means, or an equal right to direct the conduct of the undertaking." Barry v. Harding, supra, 244 Mass. at 592-593, 139 N.E. 298, quoted in Donoghue v. Holyoke St. Ry., 246 Mass. 485, 491, 141 N.E. 278 (1923); Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., supra; Thompson v. Sides, 275 Mass. 568, 570, 176 N.E. 623 (1931). See Dumas v. Ward, 251 Mass. 497, 502, 146 N.E. 709 (1925); Slowik v. Union St. Ry., 282 Mass. 249, 251-252, 184 N.E. 469 (1933); Adams v. Dunton, 284 Mass. 63, 67, 187 N.E. 90 (1933). See also Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 193 Mass. 309, 322-323, 79 N.E. 873 (1907). ⁶

The plaintiff correctly points out that the essence of the control requirement is not the actual exercise of control, but merely the right to control the operation of the vehicle. See Prosser, supra § 72, at 478-480. This case, however, involves none of the factors which have traditionally been considered sufficient to establish such a right of control. Here, the car was not owned by Driscoll or any other passenger, see Hutchings v. Vacca, 224 Mass. 269, 270, 112 N.E. 652 (1916); Thompson v. Sides, supra 275 Mass. at 569, 176 N.E. 623; see also Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 521, 52 N.E. 1068 (1899) (rental), but by the father of the driver, who was not present on the trip. The parties had no agreement with respect to the sharing of expenses, Beaucage v. Mercer, 206 Mass. 492, 497-498, 92 N.E. 774 (1910), the sharing of driving responsibilities, Isaacson v. Boston, Worcester & N. Y. St. Ry., 278 Mass. 378, 391, 180 N.E. 118 (1932); see Adams v. Swift, supra 172 Mass. at 522-523, 52 N.E. 1068, or the route to be taken on the trip; Jackson v. Queen, 257 Mass. 515, 517, 154 N.E. 78 (1926). The purpose of the trip was not business, Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., supra 270 Mass. at 347, 170 N.E. 77, but pleasure. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that any of the passengers had real authority to direct the manner in which the car was actually operated. Hutchings v. Vacca, 224 Mass. at 270, 112 N.E. 652; Jackson v. Queen, 257 Mass. at 517, 154 N.E. 78. See Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. at 523, 52 N.E. 1068. ⁷

In the absence of these or other factors manifesting a right to control, the plaintiff's case for a joint enterprise lacks substance. Essentially, it rests on four facts which considered alone or together are insufficient to establish a joint enterprise. First, there is the parties' agreement to go out for the evening, their later agreement to drive to the nightclub, and their understanding that Fife would ultimately drive them all home. Agreements for a common social purpose might be sufficient to establish a claim in a few jurisdictions, but they do not make out a joint enterprise in Massachusetts. Our cases have long specifically held that "(t)he fact that persons ride together in the relation of host and guest is not sufficient .... The common purpose of riding together for pleasure does not alone establish a joint enterprise." Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. at 593, 139 N.E. 298; Caron v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., 270 Mass. at 347, 170 N.E. 77; Thompson v. Sides, 275 Mass. at 570, 176 N.E. 623. See Boyd v. McKeever, 384 Mich. 501, 185 N.W.2d 344 (1971) (finding no joint enterprise where "five young people decided to go out together just to drive around," at 502, 185 N.W.2d 344, but relying on agency principles rather than control, at 508-509, 185 N.W.2d 344). ⁸

Second, there is the fact that the parties were drinking together...