Stockdale v. Baba

• Decision Date: 19 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02AP-402.,02AP-402.
• Citation: 153 Ohio App.3d 712,795 NE 2d 727
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Parties: STOCKDALE et al., Appellees, v. BABA, Appellant.

153 Ohio App.3d 712

2003-Ohio-4366

795 NE 2d 727

2003-Ohio-4366

STOCKDALE et al., Appellees, v.BABA, Appellant.

No. 02AP-402.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided August 19, 2003.

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Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Shawn J. Organ, for appellees.

Whiteside & Whiteside and Elizabeth Whiteside Whitman, for appellant.

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PETREE, Presiding Judge.

{¶ 1} On August 3, 2000, plaintiffs, Tera Stockdale and Anne Spurgeon, filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas alleging the following four causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) negligence and/or negligence per se; (3) breach of contract; and (4) depression, fraud, and malice.Defendant, John N. Baba, filed an answer and counterclaim.On May 10, 2001, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment, based upon a settlement agreement entered into previously between the plaintiffs and defendant on March 30, 1999, and on the basis of an absence of serious emotional distress arising out of any act defendant committed after the date of the March 30, 1999 release.Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment on May 10, 2001.Defendant then filed a motion to strike.By decision and entry dated June 21, 2001, the trial court denied defendant's motion to strike.The trial court also denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 2} On November 5, 2001, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the court to exclude evidence relating to defendant's behavior toward plaintiffs prior to the execution of the settlement agreement and also evidence of defendant's conviction for menacing by stalking.The trial court granted defendant's motion regarding the menacing-by-stalking conviction; however, the court stated that plaintiffs would be allowed to introduce evidence of defendant's criminal prosecution, evidence that he had been placed on probation, and evidence that defendant's probation officer had determined that he had violated the terms of his probation.The trial court also determined that plaintiffs would be permitted to introduce into evidence a limited number of the sexually graphic, violent, and abusive letters that defendant had sent to plaintiffs prior to March 30, 1999.

{¶ 3} The matter proceeded to trial before a jury on February 12, 2002.At the close of plaintiffs' case, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate emotional distress that was severe and debilitating as required.The court also directed a verdict in favor of defendant on plaintiffs' claims for negligence, fraud, depression, and malice.The trial court allowed the jury to consider plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract.The trial court further found that plaintiffs had demonstrated that defendant had committed the common-law tort of stalking and instructed the jury accordingly.The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees.Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, this motion was denied by the trial court.

{¶ 4} Thereafter, defendant filed a notice of appeal in this court asserting the following 17 assignments of error:

{¶ 5} "1.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law in failing to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 6} "2.The trial court erred and acted contrary to specific statutes, rules, and controlling authority by permitting plaintiffs to introduce evidence of misdemeanor criminal charges brought against defendant and his alleged conviction (which at the time was on appeal and was later reversed on appeal) and conditions of probation.

{¶ 7} "3.The trial court erred, acted contrary to law, and abused its discretion by permitting testimony by the supervisor of defendant's former probation officer and by permitting testimony of a city prosecutor who was not even involved in the criminal case relating to defendant.

{¶ 8} "4.The trial court erred, acted contrary to law, and abused its discretion by permitting plaintiffs to read and testify to, and introduce into evidence the contents of letters written to them by defendant when plaintiffs had settled their civil claim related to the letters and had executed a release.

{¶ 9} "5.The trial court erred, acted contrary to law, and abused its discretion by permitting plaintiffs to introduce into evidence of matters which had been settled by the parties and for which plaintiffs had released defendant from liability including evidence of the alleged conduct of defendant upon which the misdemeanor charges were based as to plaintiffs.

{¶ 10} "6.The trial court erred, acted contrary to law, and abused its discretion by permitting plaintiffs to introduce into evidence Internet public message board postings which defendant did not admit to writing when the sole foundation for relevancy of the postings was plaintiffs' testimony that they believed defendant wrote the postings.

{¶ 11} "7.The trial court erred, acted contrary to law, and abused its discretion by permitting improper opinions by lay witnesses that public message board postings posted under several different names were all written by defendant.

{¶ 12} "8.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award damages for plaintiffs' emotional distress on their breach of contract claim in the absence of any evidence of severe or debilitating emotional distress, the absence of which the trial court had previously correctly ruled precluded any recovery by plaintiffs on tortious infliction of emotional distress.

{¶ 13} "9.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award damages for plaintiffs' claimed emotional distress when plaintiffs introduced no expert testimony whatsoever related to their emotional distress.

{¶ 14} "10.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that as a matter of law the Settlement Agreement among the parties was a contract which the parties understood the breach of which was likely to result in psychological damage.

{¶ 15} "11.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages for plaintiffs' breach of contract claim when plaintiffs' prayer for relief did not include a request for such damages.

{¶ 16} "12.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by giving the jury an `eggshell skull' instruction that defendant was required to take plaintiffs as he found them, even though plaintiffs' alleged predisposition to emotional distress had been the subject of a previous settlement with defendant, and plaintiffs had released defendant from liability for that predeposition, necessarily including any `eggshell skull' resulting therefrom.

{¶ 17} "13.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award plaintiffs damages for a common law tort action of `stalking,' even though plaintiffs failed to plead such a tort in their complaint.

{¶ 18} "14.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award plaintiffs punitive damages for a common law tort action of `stalking,' when R.C. 2307.60 specifically prohibits such an award in a statutory civil action based upon violation of a criminal statute.

{¶ 19} "15.The trial court erred and acted contrary to law by instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages for mere, ordinary insult to plaintiffs.

{¶ 20} "16.The trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for directed verdict as to plaintiff Spurgoeon sic.

{¶ 21}"17.The trial court erred and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs' attorney without conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the reasonableness and amount of such fees."

{¶ 22} Although at trial counsel for defendant made every effort to confine the evidence submitted to the jury to events which took place after March 1999, it is impossible to review the case without taking into account those acts which occurred prior to March 1999.The trial court found and, as will become apparent, this court agrees, that the events which took place after March 1999 could not have been viewed by the jury and cannot be viewed by this court in isolation without considering the nature of the events which occurred prior to March 1999.

{¶ 23} The origin of plaintiffs' lawsuit dates back to 1996 when defendant began the course of action which ultimately led to defendant being charged with menacing by stalking.Over a period of two years, defendant sent approximately 100 letters to plaintiffs, the content of which was obscene, derogatory, violent, and pornographic.Many of the letters sent to plaintiffs contained sexually explicit, disturbing, and disgusting language.Other letters were violent and threatening in nature, such as one received by plaintiff Spurgeon stating that she should commit suicide and that he hoped she would be raped.During this time, defendant also telephoned plaintiff Stockdale frequently and even came to her home and knocked on the door.Eventually, plaintiffs learned defendant's identity and he was charged with menacing by stalking.Ultimately, defendant pled no contest to the charges, was placed on probation, and entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiffs whereby he paid them a total of $14,500 and agreed to end all contact with plaintiffs.Specifically, subparagraph (F) of the settlement agreement provides as follows:

{¶ 24}"Baba agrees to never contact either Stockdale or Spurgeon, by any method, either in person,...