Stocker v. Green, Tweed & Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-4503
Decision Date | 31 July 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-4503 |
Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) |
Parties | EMMANUEL F. STOCKER and LEONETTE STOCKER v. GREEN, TWEED & CO., INC. |
Plaintiffs have brought this employment discrimination action against Emmanuel Stocker's ("Stocker") former employer, Green, Tweed & Co. ("GTC"). Stocker asserts claims against GTC pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1210 et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Plaintiff Leonette Stocker ("Mrs. Stocker") asserts a state law loss of consortium claim against GTC. GTC has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking summary judgment as to all counts of the Complaint. For the reasons that follow, we grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.
Stocker is an African American man who was employed by GTC from 2000 until his employment was terminated by GTC on March 7, 2017. (Concise Statement of Stipulated Material Facts ("SF") ¶¶ 1, 12-13.) At the time of his termination, Stocker worked as a production machinist for GTC. (Id. ¶ 12.) Stocker was represented by a union while he worked at GTC. (Id. ¶ 14.)
George Landes became Stocker's direct supervisor in January 2016 and was his direct supervisor at the time of his termination. (Id. ¶ 15.) David Brooks was Stocker's direct supervisor prior to January 2016. (Id. ¶ 16.) Aaron Holmes, who is African American, is a vice president of the union to which Stocker belonged at GTC. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Holmes is employed at GTC as a CNC machinist. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Stocker was approved for, and took, short term disability/FMLA leave from June 6, 2016 through October 31, 2016. (Id. ¶ 42.) Liberty Mutual administers GTC's leave and short-term disability programs. (Id. ¶ 43.) Stocker and/or his doctors communicated with Liberty Mutual about his applications for short-term disability and/or medical leave. (Id. ¶ 44.)
Stocker was disciplined several times over the years while he was employed at GTC. He was disciplined for failure to follow work instructions in 2003; for careless operation of a machine in 2007; for failure to meet production and/or quality standards in 2013; and for attendance violations between 2010-15. (Id. ¶¶ 23-29.) After Landes became Stocker's supervisor in January 2016, Stocker was disciplined with increasing frequency, leading to his termination in March 2017. He was disciplined seven times during that period:
Pursuant to its progressive discipline policy, GTC combined the written/verbal warning for February 28, 2017 with the written/verbal warnings on May 31, 2016 and December 9, 2016 to make a Level One offense. It combined this Level One offense with the April 7, 2016 Level One offense to make a Level Two offense with a one-day suspension. (Id. ¶ 37.) Under GTC's policy, three one-day suspensions within a 12-month period are cause for termination. (Id. ¶ 38.) The verbal warning for March 1, 2017 could also have led to the same penalty as the written/verbal warning for February 28, 2017. (Id. ¶ 39.) GTC terminated Stocker's employment on March 7, 2017. (Id. ¶ 41.)
Stocker filed a grievance over his termination and pursued the grievance through binding arbitration. (Id. ¶ 45.) On April 17, 2017, Stocker was offered a "Last Chance Agreement" that would rescind his termination, but he chose not to accept it. (Id. ¶ 46.) The arbitrator concluded that GTC had "demonstrated that the discharge of the grievant, Emmanuel Stocker, was for just cause" and denied Stocker's grievance. (Arb. Decision at 12 (Docket No. 35 at 201 of 214).)
Stocker filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on December 27, 2017. (SF ¶ 47.) In his Charge, Stocker alleged that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and disability and that he had been retaliated against. (Id.)
The Complaint asserts claims on behalf of Stocker for race discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I); disability discrimination in violation of the ADA (Count II); retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADA (Count III); retaliation in violation of the FMLA (Count IV); and discrimination and retaliation in violation of the PHRA (Count V). The Complaint also asserts a claim of loss of consortium on behalf of Leonette Stocker (Count VI). Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, front pay, back pay, and interest for Stocker and compensatory damages for Leonette Stocker.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the movant's initial Celotex burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court" that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party's response "must support the assertion [that a fact is genuinely disputed] by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials [that the moving party has] cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to respond with a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, we consider "the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to . . . the party who oppose[s] summary judgment." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)).
GTC argues that all of Stocker's claims that he was discriminated and retaliated against are time barred under Title VII, the ADA and the PHRA, except for his Title VII and ADA claims relating to his termination. Title VII and the ADA provide that the maximum limitations period for filing a charge of discrimination is "three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). However, the limitations period for filing a claim under the PHRA is 180 days. See 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 959(h) ().
Stocker filed a Charge of Discrimination against GTC with the...
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