Stockton Morris Plan Co. v. Mariposa County

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: VAN DYKE; ADAMS, P. J., and PEEK
• Citation: Stockton Morris Plan Co. v. Mariposa County, 99 Cal.App.2d 210, 221 P.2d 232 (Cal. App. 1950)
• Decision Date: 25 August 1950
• Parties: STOCKTON MORRIS PLAN CO. v. MARIPOSA COUNTY et al. (two cases). Civ. 7755, 7789.

Page 232

221 P.2d 232

99 Cal.App.2d 210

STOCKTON MORRIS PLAN CO. v. MARIPOSA COUNTY et al. (two cases).

Civ. 7755, 7789.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Aug. 25, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1950.

Hearing Denied Oct. 23, 1950.

Lafayette J. Smallpage, Harold J. Willis, Stockton, for appellant.

Robert Owen Curran, District Attorney, Mariposa, for respondents.

VAN DYKE, Justice.

The Stockton Morris Plan Company, plaintiff and appellant here, brought suit against Mariposa County and one S. A. Milton to recover possession of a piece of road equipment called a maintainer. The complaint alleges the corporate status of plaintiff, the political status of Mariposa County, and concerning Milton, that at the time of the execution of a certain contract referred to in the pleading he was doing business under the fictitious name and style of 'Mariposa County District No. 5'. Further it is alleged that on March 31, 1947, California Tractor and Equipment Company by a conditional sale contract containing the usual reservation of title in itself sold and delivered the maintainer to Milton for a price of something over $7,000, upon which a balance remained unpaid; that on the same day California Tractor and Equipment Company transferred to plaintiff all its title to the maintainer and all its rights arising under the conditional contract of sale; that the contract provided that if Milton failed to pay the required installments upon the unpaid balance of the purchase price the plaintiff, as such assignee, could take immediate possession of the property; that no payments had been made and that plaintiff had elected to take such possession. Further, as to Mariposa County, it was alleged that it was in possession of the maintainer and, written demand therefor having been made, had refused and still refused to deliver it to plaintiff, detaining the same from plaintiff's possession without right, to plaintiff's damage; that the property had not been taken for taxes, assessment or fine, pursuant to a statute, or seized under execution or an attachment against plaintiff's property and that plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession. The prayer was for judgment against the two defendants for the recovery of the maintainer, or if that could not be had then for the market value thereof.

When the case was called for trial defendant Mariposa County moved the court for judgment on the pleadings as to it. No such motion was made by Milton. The trial court did not immediately rule upon the motion and certain stipulations of fact were entered into and the parties having thus progressed as far as they could by agreement, several witnesses were sworn and their testimony taken. The matter was then submitted and the trial court issued an order granting the county's motion for judgment on the pleadings and thereafter caused such judgment to be entered, decreeing that plaintiff take nothing as against the county. As to Milton the court made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law and gave judgment that plaintiff take nothing as to him. Plaintiff has appealed from both judgments. The parties have presented their contentions upon a single record on appeal and we shall render but one opinion.

Treating first the appeal from the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent Mariposa County, it must be said at the outset that the sole question is whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action. As the Supreme Court said in Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal.2d 149, 151, 157 P.2d 1, 2:

'In considering whether the judgment on the pleadings was properly granted, it is but necessary to determine the sufficiency of the complaint upon the same principle as though it had been attacked by general demurrer. In other words, it is only where there is an entire absence of some essential allegation that a moion for judgment on the pleadings may be properly granted.'

See also Bates v. Escondido Union High School District, 133 Cal.App. 725, 727, 24 P.2d 884, 885, in which the court, after stating the foregoing principle, said: 'This court cannot consider anything outside of the complaint itself and must disregard any defect that might be reached by a special demurrer.'

Applying the foregoing rule, we must, therefore, disregard the stipulation of facts and the testimony appearing in the record, for nothing contained therein can be looked to in support of the judgment on the pleadings. If that judgment cannot stand solely upon deficiencies in the complaint, the proper course would have been the determination of the cause upon the merits. Nor are issues raised by the answer to be considered, nor the validity of any theory of defense to the action which may be therein set forth.

We think it is apparent from our statement of the allegations contained in the complaint that the action as against the county at least was the simple one of replevin, since the complaint contains all the essential allegations in such a suit and nothing in addition thereto, which in any wise could change the character of the proceeding. Summarized, the complaint alleges title in plaintiff to the property demanded; right to possession thereof when the action was begun, actual possession of the property by the county, demand for...