Stockton v. Ford Motor Co., 2307.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1945
• Docket Number: No. 2307.,2307.
• Citation: 61 F. Supp. 261
• Parties: STOCKTON v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

61 F. Supp. 261

STOCKTON v. FORD MOTOR CO.

No. 2307.

District Court, D. Idaho, S. D.

June 18, 1945.

J. M. Lampert and J. B. Musser, both of Boise, Idaho, for plaintiff.

William W. Ray, of Salt Lake City, Utah, and Jess Hawley, of Boise, Idaho, for defendant.

CLARK, District Judge.

The question presented in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 501 et seq.

The plaintiff, on the 21st day of December, 1938, and for some time prior thereto and until the 26th day of August, 1942, was engaged in the business of selling Ford automobiles and accessories, and operating a general garage business at Emmett, Gem County, Idaho, under the style and name of Stockton Motor Sales.

On the 26th day of August, 1942, he joined the military service of the United States of America, and served until the 14th day of October, 1944, when he was honorably discharged.

On December 21, 1938, the defendant entered into an agreement with Stockton-Adams, Incorporated. This contract was later assigned to the plaintiff herein with the consent of the defendant and was in full force and effect between the plaintiff and defendant on the date of plaintiff's enlistment, — the 26th day of August, 1942.

This contract is very lengthy and, without setting it out in full, it is sufficient to say here that it gave the plaintiff the right to handle and deal in Ford passenger automobiles, commercial automobiles, parts and accessories, that is, the products of the Ford Motor Company. The contract contains the following provision:

"This agreement may be terminated at any time at the will of either party by written notice to the other party given either by registered mail or by personal delivery * * *

"That in case of termination by Company, notice of intention to so terminate shall be given to Dealer sixty (60) days prior to actual termination date, * * *"

Sometime prior to August 26, 1942, the operation of a business such as the business of the plaintiff was greatly curtailed through the Government's freezing order on the sale of automobiles and tires, and the rationing of gasoline. Although the importance of this is doubtful in the present case, considerable stress was laid on the fact that the plaintiff reduced his inventory of cars and parts in the handling of his business, which the defendant claims was not justified. Whatever reduction was made, however, was made after consultation between the plaintiff and defendant herein. At least the defendant advised the plaintiff to make such reduction as he felt that he should make in order to keep his finances in shape to tide him through the period of time when his business would be curtailed by reason of the war. The plaintiff reduced his investment to about $13,000.

Thereafter plaintiff felt that he should enter the armed service and so advised the defendant. The defendant congratulated him on his decision and assured the plaintiff that it would co-operate with him while he was in the armed service.

The plaintiff arranged for the handling of his affairs by having one man as financial manager and another man as manager of the business, and left for the service. Later both of these men were called to the service.

While he was in the service, without his being advised in any way by the defendant, negotiations were entered into between a competitor of the plaintiff doing business at Emmett, Idaho, and the defendant Ford Motor Company for the issuance of an agency contract to this competitor, which negotiations resulted in the competitor getting the business of the plaintiff during plaintiff's absence. After these negotiations were completed, orally, which was sometime in the fall of 1942, the defendant, on January 13, 1943, advised the plaintiff by mail that rather than serve formal notice on him to terminate the agency in accordance with the provisions of the contract, they wished his resignation, and if they did not receive it within a reasonable time they would proceed with formal termination. The plaintiff did not resign as requested and the defendant on January 21, 1943, served notice of intention to terminate the contract and on April 5, 1943, served notice of termination.

A great deal of evidence has been introduced in an attempt to justify the defendant in cancelling the contract, and the matter as submitted to the Court is:

First: Was the defendant justified in cancelling the contract in view of the understanding had with the plaintiff before he entered the service?

Second: Did the defendant have the legal right to terminate the contract under its provisions by giving the notice stipulated in the contract while the plaintiff was serving in the armed forces of the United States?

The second proposition would appear to be the controlling one. However, the Court is of the opinion that the first is equally important.

We have witnessed the young men of our nation, daily for over four years, entering the armed forces of our country. Radios, newspapers and orators have been praising these young men who were willing to leave for the battle fields and risk their lives for the preservation of this country. We have said to them how much we appreciated the sacrifice they were willing to make for us who stayed at home, just as the defendant in this case congratulated this plaintiff, and told him that while he was away on the battle field it would co-operate with him, and then, without advising the plaintiff, entered into negotiations to give his contract to a competitor.

The Court was very much impressed by the evidence offered as to the effort on the part of plaintiff's competitor to obtain this contract during plaintiff's absence in the armed service. No one should try to enrich himself at the expense of one who is away offering his life for his country; such action cannot be justified, nor can the defendant justify itself, — after cheering the plaintiff on his way and assuring him of its co-operation, — in entering into negotiations with his competitor to take from the plaintiff his contract and thereby destroy his business investment while he was in the service.

The plaintiff comes to this Court for relief; he is a soldier...