Stockton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1909
• Citation: 170 F. 627
• Parties: STOCKTON v. OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

170 F. 627

STOCKTON v. OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, D. Idaho.

April 29, 1909

A. A Sessions, for plaintiff.

P. L Williams and D. Worth Clark, for defendant.

DIETRICH District Judge.

This action was commenced in the state district court, and, upon petition of the defendant, was removed to this court. Here the defendant filed a demurrer challenging the jurisdiction of the court, and also the sufficiency of the complaint to entitle the plaintiff to any relief. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff filed a motion to remand, upon the broad ground that this court has no jurisdiction. Certain general questions are thought to control both the demurrer and the motion, and they have been submitted, and will be considered together.

The plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of Idaho, and that the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Utah; 'that for ten years or more last past the said plaintiff has been, and now is, the owner, seised in fee, and entitled to the possession of, certain pieces parcels, or tracts of land, situate in the village of Parma, Canyon county, state of Idaho,' the lands being particularly described. It is further alleged that the defendant 'claims ownership of said described lands, and an estate or interest in said pieces, parcels, or tracts of land, adverse to said plaintiff, which said claim is without right; that the said defendant has no estate, right, title, or interest in and to said lands. ' It is further alleged that, by reason of the adverse and unlawful claims of the defendant, plaintiff is damaged in the sum of $1,950, 'that being the value of said lands. ' Plaintiff prays that defendant be required to set forth the nature of its claims, and that by the decree of the court it be adjudged that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises, and that the defendant has no estate or interest therein; and that the defendant be forever barred from asserting any claim thereto. There is also a prayer for general relief.

In its petition for removal, the defendant sets up the requisite diversity of citizenship, and also shows that the value of the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000. Assuming that it is a suit in equity, the defendant, on demurrer, makes the point that the plaintiff has not alleged his possession of the premises, and that, therefore he does not exhibit facts sufficient to entitle him to equitable relief, reference being made to the general rule in equity that a complainant in a suit to quiet title must be in possession of the premises in controversy. The point made upon motion to remand is that, assuming the defendant's construction of the complaint to be correct, the bill should not be dismissed, but the cause should be remanded to the state court, where, under the Code, there is but one form of civil proceeding, and where, therefore, the complaint states a cause of action of which the court has jurisdiction. The complaint is said to have been drawn with reference to section 4538 of the Revised Codes of Idaho, which provides that:

'An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.' The position of the plaintiff seems to be that this statute confers upon a plaintiff rights which cannot be administered in a federal court, and that, therefore, an action brought thereunder in a state court is not removable. Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451, 13 Sup.Ct. 883, 977, 37 L.Ed. 804; Gombert v. Lyon (C.C.) 80 F. 305. In maintaining the position here, plaintiff assumes the facts to be that he is not, and the defendant is, in possession of the premises; and that, in the state court, this was a suit in equity. There is, however, in the record no direct averment of possession. In the complaint it is alleged that the plaintiff 'has been and now is the owner, seised in fee, and entitled to the possession,' of the premises. By implication this language is to be deemed to be an assertion of the plaintiff's possession. Gage v. Kaufman, 133 U.S. 471, 10 Sup.Ct. 406, 33 L.Ed. 725; Simmons Creek Coal Company v. Doran, 142 U.S. 449, 12 Sup.Ct. 239, 35 L.Ed. 1063. So construed, the complaint states facts sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in equity, under a well-settled rule of the federal courts. Lawson v. United States Mining Company, 207 U.S. 1, 28 Sup.Ct. 15, 52 L.Ed. 65.

But taking a less liberal view of the complaint, if it be held that it does not disclose possession in the plaintiff, it must be conceded that the possession is not shown in either party; neither positively nor inferentially does it appear that defendant has possession. Upon such a construction of the pleadings, the questions submitted are ruled by Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 3 Sup.Ct. 495, 28 L.Ed. 52. In either alternative, therefore, the complaint exhibits a case of equitable cognizance of which the federal courts have jurisdiction, and it follows that both the motion and the demurrer should be overruled.

In this view of the record, further discussion might properly be dispensed with, but the suggestion in the briefs of both parties that the actual facts in relation to the possession of the premises are not fairly disclosed by the complaint leads me to submit some observations upon the general question of the effect of the Idaho statute above quoted upon the jurisdiction of this court. There is no need to enter upon an explanation of the conditions out of which this and similar enactments have grown, or of the general purpose and scope thereof; the admirable exposition of the entire subject by Justice Field in Holland v. Challen, supra, leaves nothing to be added. Whether the statute be considered as operating only upon the remedy or as creating a new cause of action, the substantial result is that parties are enabled to have adjudicated certain controversies of which, without the statute, the courts could not take cognizance. It is not doubted that the state courts may protect the rights thus conferred and afford proper relief. For what reason is a federal court incompetent to administer like relief, both in proceedings there originally commenced, and in causes removed from the state courts? By Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508), as amended, the Circuit Courts of the United States are given original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, 'of all suits of a civil nature,' at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000 in value, and where there is a controversy between citizens of different states.

Where such a suit is commenced in the state court against a nonresident, the statute confers upon him the right to remove the same into the proper Circuit Court of the United States. Admittedly, an action brought within the terms of the state statute is a 'suit of a civil nature,' and if the nonresident defendant who seeks the removal thereof is to be denied a right which the federal statutes, in the most general terms, seem to confer, it ought to be only for substantial reasons involving the inability of the court to administer the law and to do justice between the parties.

The reason assigned for the supposed impotency of the federal courts as compared with the state tribunals is that in the former there is retained the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, whereas in the state courts there is but one form of civil action. Section 1 of article 5 of the Constitution of Idaho provides that:

'The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are hereby prohibited, and there shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action.'

This provision, however, relates only to distinctions of form and differences of procedure; it does not purport to abolish or even to alter those fundamental principles of law and of equity which are recognized in all courts. As was said in Dewey v. Schreiber Implement Company, 12 Idaho, 280, 85 P. 921:

'We recognize the fact that the distinction between suits in equity and actions at law has been prohibited, and that in this state there is but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or redress of private wrongs, which is denominated as a 'civil action.' That, however, does not abolish the rules of law or rules of equity; they remain, although the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of such actions and suits, are prohibited by our Constitution.'

There is but a single kind of action; whatever be the nature of the relief sought, the form of the pleadings is the same; the complaint must contain a statement in ordinary and concise language of the facts constituting the cause of action; that is the only requisite. But it does not follow that the state courts, to any greater degree than the federal courts, are relieved from the necessity of determining whether the cause is essentially an action at law or a suit in equity. The inquiry may arise later in the state than in the federal court, but it is equally inevitable. Section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution of Idaho guarantees that 'the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate'; and in section 1 of article 5 it is provided that 'feigned issues are prohibited, and the fact at issue shall be tried by order of court before a jury.'

These constitutional provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court of the state, and it is held that they guarantee the right of trial by jury only in actions at law, and that they have no application to...