Stockus v. Boston Hous. Auth.

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RONAN
• Citation: Stockus v. Boston Hous. Auth., 304 Mass. 507, 24 N.E.2d 333 (Mass. 1939)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1939
• Parties: STOCKUS et al. v. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.

304 Mass. 507

24 N.E.2d 333

STOCKUS et al.

v.BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Dec. 15, 1939.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; J. W. Morton, Judge.

Proceeding by Baltramieus Stockus and others to restrain the Boston Housing Authority from enforcing its alleged order purporting to take plaintiffs' properties. On report from the superior court, following sustaining of defendant's demurrer.

Decree sustaining demurrer affirmed.

A. Lincoln, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

L. H. Weinstein, of Boston, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

The bill of complaint alleges that the plaintiffs Stockus own a parcel of land with a dwelling thereon in that portion of Boston known as South Boston, and that the plaintiff Tautvaisa is the owner of a similar parcel in the same locality; that the defendants, comprising the Boston Housing Authority (established by section 26L of the housing authority law, G.L. [Ter.Ed.] c. 121, §§ 26I-26II, inclusive, as amended by St. 1938, c. 484), have adopted an order taking a certain tract of land, including the parcels owned by the plaintiffs, having determined that the tract constituted a sub-standard area as defined by section 26J of said housing authority law, and have ordered the plaintiffs to vacate their premises. The plaintiffs do not admit that the said tract is a sub-standard area, but allege that the said law is unconstitutional. They seek a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the alleged order purporting to take their properties. The demurrer of the defendants was sustained in the Superior Court, and the judge reported the case to this court upon the ruling sustaining the demurrer.

Since the argument of this case, it has been decided that the housing authority law has two principal purposes-(1) the elimination of sub-standard areas or the abolition of slums, and (2) the furnishing of law-rent housing to families of low income; that the expenditure of public funds in a reasonable manner to rid a community of slums could not be said not to be for a public purpose; that the clearance of slums could be found to promote the public safety, health and welfare; that the construction and maintenance of low-rent housing for families of low income would avert hardship to those whose homes have been razed and would prevent overcrowding into other slums; that construction of new low-rent dwellings is not to be undertaken on a larger scale than the number of existing tenements eliminated by the clearance of sub-standard areas; and that the furnishing of new low-rent housing facilities was the means adopted to accomplish the abolition of slums. The housing authority law was therefore held to be a valid enactment. Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, Mass., 23 N.E.2d 665.

The present bill cannot be sustained on the ground that the law is unconstitutional, and we must consider whether the bill sets forth a case where the defendants have exceeded their authority in attempting to take the premises of the plaintiffs, as it is the only remaining ground upon which the bill purports to be based.

The plaintiffs aver that the tract of land that the defendants have purported to take ‘is not in fact an area wherein dwellings predominate which, by reason of delapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to safety, health or morals.’ They say on information and belief that the dwellings in this area are in good repair and condition, with reasonable provisions for ventilation, light and sanitation; that there is no overcrowding of tenants; that the dwellings are not detrimental to safety, health and morals; that there is an adequate supply of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings in Boston; that the contemplated construction of new dwellings will require a rental beyond the financial reach of families of low income and will increase the burden of taxation on property owners; and that there is no public exigency requiring the clearance of the area in question.

The allegations concerning the characteristics of the area as enumerated in the bill seek to avoid the classification of the locus as a sub-standard area by negativing verbatim the various elements included in section 26J in defining a sub-standard area. While it is true that the specific characteristics enumerated in the bill, some being alleged to be absent and others to be present in the area in question, are in the main physical objects whose presence or absence is a matter of fact, yet it is equally true that the extent that these various elements enter into and form the predominating and distinctive traits of a neighborhood is frequently and largely a matter of opinion and whether such characteristics or some of them, considered all together or in any combination, present a housing situation that in its final analysis may reasonably and fairly be said to be injurious to the public safety, health or morals, is to a great degree a matter of practical judgment, common sense and sound discretion. There are, undoubtedly, instances where men of training and experience in special subjects related to construction, sanitation, fire prevention, zoning, public health, social service and other subjects might honestly differ in determining whether a certain district was a slum area. If the question is a debatable one, we have no right to substitute our judgment for that of the defendants acting as the local housing authority, upon whom the Legislature conferred the power ‘To determine what areas within its jurisdiction constitute sub-standard areas.’ Section 26R(b). Miller v. Fitchburg, 180 Mass. 32, 61 N.E. 277;Burke v. Metropolitan District Commission, 262 Mass. 70, 159 N.E. 739;Sheldon v. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230, 177 N.E. 94. The specific negation of the presence of each of the elements included within the statutory definition of a sub-standard area, section 26J, adds nothing to the bill. See Bradley v. Zoning Adjustment Board of Boston, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N.E. 892;Prusik v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 262 Mass. 451, 458, 160 N.E. 312.

The allegation that the dwellings in this area are in good repair and condition is not an allegation that the defendants may not reasonably adjudge otherwise. The overcrowding of tenements in a congested area well might be a matter upon which opinions may very within wide limits. The averment that the buildings are of good arrangement and design for buildings of their class is not the equivalent of an averment of freedom from faulty arrangement or design for dwellings in general and without reference to any classification. That the buildings have ‘reasonable provision for ventilation, light and sanitation facilities' as alleged, does not show that there is no ‘lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities.’ Alleging that there is a reasonable provision for such facilitiesfalls short of alleging that the dwellings in the area are in fact equipped with such facilities or that there is such ventilation, light and sanitation as is consistent with the preservation of safety, healty or morals. The fact that the dwellings of the plaintiffs have such facilities is immaterial, for the test is the area as a unit and not two dwellings located in the area. Moreover, what the plaintiffs may consider a reasonable provision is no more than a mere opinion on the debatable question as to the extent that the buildings have ventilation, light and sanitation facilities. The allegation that the buildings comply with various statutes and requlations is not admitted by a demurrer. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 10 S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426;Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 55 S.Ct. 428, 79 L.Ed. 907, 95 A.L.R. 1346. The conclusion that the ‘buildings are not...