Stockwell v. Williams

• Decision Date: 27 July 1894
• Citation: 41 A. 973,68 N.H. 75
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: STOCKWELL v. WILLIAMS.

41 A. 973

68 N.H. 75

STOCKWELL

v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Sullivan.

July 27, 1894.

Writ of entry by Charles H. Stockwell against Elizabeth Williams. Facts found by the court. Judgment for defendant.

January 12, 1893, the defendant executed a warranty deed to the plaintiff of the demanded premises, and acknowledged it before John McCrillis, with whom it was deposited under a verbal agreement between the parties that he should retain it in his possession until the 1st day of April, 1893, and on or after that day should deliver it to the plaintiff upon his paying to McCrillis, for her, $1, 189. The price of the land was $2,200, which was the consideration named in the deed, and the difference between $1, 189 and $2,200 was represented by a mortgage on the premises, whieh the plaintiff was to pay or assume. Insurance of the buildings was to be transferred to the plaiutiff when the deed was delivered to him, and thereafter the defendant was to have the rooms she then occupied, so long as the plaintiff owned the place, at a rental of $10 a month. The plaintiff claimed that at the time of the agreement he paid the defendant $11 on account of the purchase money. The defendant claimed that the $11 was a loan to her. The defendant understood that she could rescind the agreement and recall the deed at any time before April 1st. The plaintiff understood she could not. Before April 1st the defendant requested McCrillis to return the deed, and upon his refusal obtained an injunction forbidding him to deliver it to the plaintiff. April 1st the plaintiff tendered McCrillis $1, 189, and demanded the deed. It was not delivered, and remains in McCrillis' possession.

Albert S. Walt and George R. Brown, for plaintiff.

Ira Colby and S. L. Bowers, for defendant.

WALLACE, J. The deed was not intended by the parties to, and did not, take effect upon its execution as the present deed of the defendant to the plaintiff. The facts that the insurance was not transferred at that time, but was to be transferred when the deed was to be delivered, on or after April 1st, and that before the delivery of the deed the defendant was not to pay rent for the room she occupied in the premises, but was to pay rent after the deed was delivered, show conclusively that the parties themselves understood that the deed did not take effect upon its execution, and was not to do so until after its delivery. The minds of the parties did not meet in an understanding that the defendant, in delivering the deed to the depositary, parted with the power of control over it On the contrary, the understanding and intention of the...