Stogner v. Stogner

• Decision Date: 07 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-C-3044.,98-C-3044.
• Citation: 739 So.2d 762
• Parties: Robert STOGNER v. Benita STOGNER.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

739 So.2d 762

Robert STOGNER v. Benita STOGNER.

No. 98-C-3044.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 7, 1999.

C. Jerome D'Aquila, New Roads, Counsel for Applicant.

Charles Eugene Griffin, II, St. Francisville, Counsel for Respondent.

KNOLL, Justice.¹

This modification for child support matter concerns a stipulated (consent) judgment and the applicable standard required for a change of circumstances in requesting a modification. The adequacy of the stipulated child support judgment raises the issues to what extent, if any, are the guidelines applicable and the function of the trial judge as gatekeeper to assure adequacy and consistency in child support awards.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Benita and Robert Stogner were married in Washington Parish on June 26, 1981. They had two children, Jeremy born on September 20, 1987, and Timothy born on July 14, 1990. Benita and Robert separated on January 15, 1994. On April 6, 1994, the trial court, by stipulation of the parties, awarded joint custody of the two minor children to the Stogners, with Benita being the domiciliary parent and Robert paying $400 per month for the support of the children.² Subsequently, on June 29, 1994, the trial court granted a judgment of divorce, finding Benita at fault in the termination of the marriage, and incorporated the provisions of the April 6, 1994, judgment which pertained to custody, visitation, and support.

Thereafter, on October 28, 1996, approximately two years later, Benita filed a rule nisi for increase of child support. In her petition, Benita alleged that a change of circumstances had occurred and that the child support set initially in 1994 was established without regard for the child support guidelines.³ The testimony at this hearing showed that at the time of the consent judgment Benita earned $6.81 per hour and Robert had a yearly salary of $63,234.97. In contrast, at the time of Benita's motion, her hourly wage had increased to $10.50 per hour and Robert's annual salary had decreased to $61,183.22. In its ruling, the trial court held that although the original child support was set in complete disregard of the guidelines, it was done pursuant to the agreement between the parties, and that Benita agreed to this amount with the benefit of legal representation. It further held that this amount would remain unless it could be shown that a change of circumstances had occurred. Accordingly, finding no proof of a change of circumstances, the trial court denied Benita's motion for an increase.

Later, on a motion for new trial, Benita urged that according to La. R.S. 9:315.1(D) the trial court should have considered the guidelines even though the parties had proposed an amount of child support to which both agreed. In its denial of the motion for new trial, the trial court held that a review of the proposed stipulation pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.1(D) was discretionary with the trial court, and was intended to occur at the time of the agreement, not when judicial examination was urged years later.

In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found that no proof of a substantial change of circumstances had been established. It further concluded that the trial court had not erred when it did not exercise its option to review the proposed stipulation in light of the statutory guidelines as provided in La. R.S. 9:315.1(D).⁴ In its analysis it factually distinguished Guillory v. Guillory, 602 So.2d 769 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992), a Third Circuit case that remanded for reconsideration and application of the statutory guidelines, on two grounds: (1) the stipulated amount of child support in the present case was not below the lowest level specified in the guidelines; and (2) an attorney represented Benita when she stipulated to the amount of child support. Stogner v. Stogner, 97-2492 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 728 So.2d 29.

We granted Benita's writ application to consider the lower courts' rulings regarding the discretion of the trial court under La. R.S. 9:315.1(D) and the change that must be shown in a modification action. 98-C-3044 (La.3/19/99), 739 So.2d 214. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court, finding that the trial court based its ruling on the stipulated judgment of June 29, 1994, which it then approved without the trial court first considering the guidelines in reviewing the adequacy of the stipulated amount, La. R.S. 9:315.1(A) and (D), and without giving specific oral or written reasons warranting a deviation from the guidelines, La. R.S. 9:315.1(B), all of which rendered this judgment an abridgment of the legislative intent in the enactment of the statutory guidelines, and an error of law. We further find that the appellate court erred as a matter of law in requiring Benita to show a heightened burden of substantial change of circumstances, instead of simply showing a change of circumstances as provided in La.Civ.Code art. 142 and La. R.S. 9:311.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

STIPULATED JUDGMENTS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GUIDELINES

The lower courts relied upon the stipulated judgment of June 29, 1994, in denying Benita a modification of child support. Therefore, we must determine if the adequacy of that stipulated judgment was properly decided and warranted the downward deviation, in assessing the correctness of the denial of the modification.⁵

In assessing the modification of child support, the lower courts, focusing only on Paragraph (D) of La.R.S. 9:315.1, found that there was no duty on the part of the trial court to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount in the initial judgment. After considering Paragraph (D) in light of the entirety of La.R.S. 9:315.1 and reflecting on the legislative intent in that enactment, we find that the trial court's role in instances where child support has been stipulated is greater than that assigned in the lower courts heretofore.⁶

When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La.Civ.Code art. 9; La.R.S. 1:4. However, when a law is susceptible of different meanings, "it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law." La.Civ.Code art. 10.

Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation, and rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute. State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817 (La.1992). It is likewise presumed that it is the intention of the legislative branch to achieve a consistent body of law. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Sec. 23.09 (Sands 5 th ed.1993). The meaning and intent of a law is determined by consideration of the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter, and a construction should be placed on the provision in question which is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the lawmaker in enacting it. Hayden v. Richland Parish School Bd., 554 So.2d 164, 167 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 124 (La.1990).

La.Civ.Code art. 227 provides that parents, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their children. The obligation to support their children is conjoint upon the parents and each must contribute in proportion to his or her resources. Hogan v. Hogan, 549 So.2d 267 (La.1989). As a complement to that obligation, La.R.S. 9:315-315.15 provides a detailed set of guidelines that the courts are mandated to follow in setting the amount of child support in "any proceeding to establish or modify child support filed on or after October 1, 1989." La.R.S. 9:315.1(A); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 626 So.2d 578 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993). These child support guidelines were enacted in 1989 for a twofold purpose: to address the inconsistency in the amounts of child support awards and as an appropriate solution to the inadequacy of the amounts of these awards. Nations, Louisiana's Child Support Guideline: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 La.L.R. 1057, 1058 (1990); see also The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). Under this system of guidelines, the Legislature adopted an income shares approach which combines the adjusted monthly gross income of both parties in arriving at the amount of support owed. BLAKESLY, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW, § 16.09.1 at 16-19 (Michie 1996). As stated in La.R.S. 9:315.1(A) the amount determined by the guideline formula is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Percle v. Noll, 93-1272 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94), 634 So.2d 498. Moreover, the parental obligation to pay child support must be implemented within the body of law contained in the Louisiana Child Support Guidelines. La.Civ.Code arts. 227-231; La.R.S. 9:315, et seq.; State in Interest of Travers, 28,022 (La. App. 2 Cir.12/6/95), 665 So.2d 625; BLAKESLY, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW, § 16.09.1 at 16-19 (Michie 1996). As such, the guidelines are intended to fairly apportion between the parents the mutual financial obligation they owe their children, in an efficient, consistent, and adequate manner. State in Interest of Travers, 665 So.2d 625.

It is likewise provided in the legislation that there may be deviation from the guidelines if the application of the guidelines would not be in the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties. La.R.S. 9:315.1(B). In this instance, it is incumbent upon the trial court to "give specific oral or written reasons for the deviation, including a finding as to the amount of support that would have been required under a mechanical application of the guidelines and the particular facts and circumstances that warranted a deviation from the guidelines." Id. As such, the function of the guidelines to provide adequacy and consistency in child support awards is...