Stojetz v. Ishee, 2:04-CV-263.

Decision Date30 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2:04-CV-263.,2:04-CV-263.
Citation389 F.Supp.2d 858
PartiesJohn C. STOJETZ, Petitioner, v. Todd ISHEE, Warden, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Mark R. Devan, Berkman Gordon Murray & Devan, Michael J. Benza, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioner.

Charles L. Wille, Assistant Attorney General, Henry G. Appel, Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

FROST, District Judge.

Petitioner, a prisoner sentenced to death by the State of Ohio, has pending before this Court a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court upon respondent's motion to dismiss procedurally defaulted claims, (Doc.# 23), petitioner's memorandum in opposition, (Doc.# 34), and respondent's reply, (Doc.# 35).

I. Factual History

The facts and procedural history of this case were set forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329 (1999):

On April 25, 1996, appellant, John C. Stojetz, Jr., along with five other adult inmates, ran across the prison yard of Madison Correctional Institution and toward the Adams Alpha Unit ("Adams A"), which houses many of the state's juvenile offenders who had been tried as adults and convicted of criminal offenses. Appellant and the other five inmates were each armed with knives commonly known as "shanks." Appellant and the others entered the Adams A unit, circled the control desk, and held corrections officer Michael C. Browning at knifepoint. Appellant then placed a shank to Browning's throat and ordered him to give appellant the keys that opened the cell doors of the Adams A unit. Browning threw the keys down and was allowed to flee the unit.

Corrections officers immediately responded to Browning's "man down" alarm and converged on Adams A. Officers were able to observe appellant and the other five inmates carrying shanks. The corrections officers, armed only with pepper mace, attempted to enter Adams A. However, appellant and the other inmates, wielding shanks, prevented the officers from entering.

Once inside Adams A, appellant and his accomplices proceeded to cell number 144, the cell of Damico Watkins, a seventeen-year-old juvenile inmate. Using the keys taken from Browning, appellant unlocked Watkins's cell and appellant and the other adult inmates entered the cell and began attacking Watkins. After eluding the initial attack and escaping from his cell, Watkins was pursued throughout the Adams A unit and repeatedly stabbed by appellant and the other shank-wielding inmates. Watkins was able to escape his attackers several times only to be again cornered and subjected to repeated stabbings. Eventually, Watkins was cornered by appellant on the second floor of the Adams A unit. As Watkins pleaded for his life, appellant and inmate Bishop repeatedly stabbed Watkins and left him for dead.

During the attack on Watkins, correction officers had surrounded the exterior of the Adams A unit. Deputy Warden Mark Saunders arrived on the scene and began conversing with the inmates who had taken over Adams A. During this conversation, inmate Lovejoy stated that "they [the inmates who had taken over Adams A] would not cell with black inmates." Also during the conversation, appellant stated, "we took care of things because you [prison officials] wouldn't." Subsequently, the inmates were ordered to surrender. The prison yard was cleared and appellant and the five perpetrators passed their shanks through a window in the foyer of Adams A. Once prison officials retrieved the weapons, appellant and the other adult inmates exited the Adams A unit and surrendered to prison authorities.

After prison authorities regained control of Adams A unit, the coroner arrived at the scene and declared Watkins dead.

In October 1996, appellant was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for the aggravated murder of Watkins. The single-count indictment charged appellant with purposely causing the death of Watkins with prior calculation and design in violation of R.C. 2903.01([A]). The count also charged appellant with a (R.C. 2929.04[A][4]) death penalty specification of committing aggravated murder while a prisoner in a detention facility.

Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charges in the indictment, and the case proceeded to a trial by jury. Evidence submitted at trial indicated that appellant was known to be the head of the "Aryan Brotherhood" gang at the Madison Correctional Institution. Other evidence at trial indicated that appellant and other members of the Aryan Brotherhood did not want to be housed in the same cells as black inmates. Further testimony indicated that appellant and members of the Aryan Brotherhood wanted to be transferred from Madison Correctional to other penal institutions. In fact, following the murder, prison authorities conducted a search of appellant's cell as well as the cells of his accomplices. During the search it was found that appellant and four of the other five inmates who had participated in the attack on Watkins had already packed their personal belongings.

At the conclusion of the trial, and after deliberation, the jury found appellant guilty of the charge and specification in the indictment. Following a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Watkins. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the sentence of death.

Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d at 452-54, 705 N.E.2d at 333-35.

II. State Court History

A. Direct Appeal

On October 10, 1996, petitioner was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated murder in violation of Ohio Rev.Code § 2903.01(B), and with a death penalty specification under Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(A)(4), i.e., that petitioner committed the aggravated murder offense while petitioner was a prisoner in a detention facility. Attorneys James Doughty and Jon Doughty were appointed on October 17, 1996. The trial phase commenced on April 1, 1997 with voir dire, and concluded on April 8, 1997 when the jury found petitioner guilty as charged. The mitigation phase began on April 16, 1997, and, on April 17, 1997, the jury recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death. On April 18, 1997, the trial court issued a decision and entry sentencing petitioner to death.

Represented by attorneys Joseph Wilhelm and Kelly Culshaw of the Ohio Public Defender's Office, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. In a merit brief filed on December 23, 1997, petitioner raised the following propositions of law:

Proposition of Law No. I: During jury selection in a capital case, the trial court must ask each prospective sentencing juror whether the juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the juror's ability to consider a life sentence if the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder and the aggravating circumstance. Life qualification of each prospective juror is required whenever the trial court death qualifies the jurors by asking them if their views on the death penalty would prevent of substantially impair their ability to consider the death penalty in the case before them.

Proposition of Law No. II: John Stojetz's death sentence is inappropriate. Damico Watkins' death resulted from his own threats against Stojetz and Stojetz's post-traumatic stress disorder.

Proposition of Law No. III: When trial counsel fail to conduct an adequate voir dire, fail to object to inadmissible evidence, fail to request a separation of witnesses, fail to conduct an adequate investigation of the case, fail to object to victim impact evidence, present a confusing explanation of the mitigation weighing process, fail to adequately present evidence of a capital defendant's post-traumatic stress disorder, and fail to adequately prepare defendant's mitigation expert, a capital defendant is deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

Proposition of Law No. IV: A capital defendant is denied his rights to a jury verdict, to a fair trial, to due process, to the effective assistance of counsel, and to a reliable and nonarbitrary death sentence when the jury returns a general verdict of guilty for aggravated murder without a unanimous finding that the defendant was either the principal offender or an aider and abettor. U.S. Const. Amend. VI, VIII, XIV; Ohio Const. Art. I, §§ 5, 9, 10, 16.

Proposition of Law No. V: The defendant who is death-eligible as either a principal offender or aider and abettor must have access to the grand jury's testimony when there are five co-defendants and the defendant shows a particularized need for their testimony. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Ohio Const. Art. I, § 16.

Proposition of Law No. VI: A defendant's right to a fair and impartial sentencing jury is denied when the trial court overrules a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who is biased in favor of capital punishment.

Proposition of Law No. VII: When improper identification evidence is presented during a defendant's capital trial the defendant's due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution are violated.

Proposition of Law No. VIII: Appellant's right to due process is violated when the trial court admits improper testimony in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.

Proposition of Law No. IX: Appellant's due process and confrontation rights are violated when the trial...

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