Stokes v. Bonin, Civ. A. No. 73-439.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-439.
• Citation: 366 F. Supp. 485
• Parties: Nellie STOKES, Plaintiff, v. Garland L. BONIN, Director of the Division of Income Maintenance, Individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

366 F. Supp. 485

Nellie STOKES, Plaintiff, v. Garland L. BONIN, Director of the Division of Income Maintenance, Individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 73-439.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana, Section "E".

September 1, 1973.

Anne Pardee Buxton, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff Terry F. Hessick, Dept. of Public Welfare, Baton Rouge, La., Michael Winn, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for defendants.

CASSIBRY, District Judge:

In this class action, plaintiff has challenged two policies of the Louisiana Division of Income Maintenance: (1) the termination of food stamp benefits on the ground of "failure to prove management," and (2) the failure to provide a fair hearing prior to termination or reduction of food stamp benefits.¹ With respect to the former issue, a dispute has developed between the plaintiff and the state defendants on the question of the obligation of the state defendants to identify the persons who were terminated after January 1, 1972 for "failure to prove management."² Because the subclass identification information sought by the plaintiff relates to relief and not to liability, and because a finding of liability on this issue would bear directly on the defendants' obligation to provide information which is indispensable to affording any relief to the subclass, plaintiff has now moved for partial summary judgment, as to liability, on the "failure to prove management" issue.³ The defendants raise a number of procedural and substantive objections to that motion, as detailed below.

I. CLASS ACTION ISSUES

One whole constellation of difficulties centers on the fact that this suit has not yet been certified as appropriate for class action treatment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1). Moreover, since the time this suit was filed, plaintiff has changed the definition of the affected class, a matter to which the federal defendant takes exception. Next, since the plaintiff has received much of the relief she sought, it is alleged that she is not a proper representative of the class. Finally, the plaintiff seeks to vindicate the rights of both public assistance (PA) and nonpublic assistance (NPA) households with respect to the "failure to prove management" policies of the Division,⁴ although she herself is a PA case only. This, both the state and federal defendants argue, is not permissible, since there is no case or controversy as to NPA households on the present record.

These matters, I believe, are not so substantial as to make a ruling on the plaintiff's motion inappropriate at this time, although additional rulings on some of the class issues are required. I find that the plaintiff's restriction of the class to those who were initially denied or subsequently terminated from food stamp benefits for failure to prove management after January 1, 1972 is perfectly proper; and that group appears to constitute a well-defined class of persons adversely affected by an identical regulatory provision, in excess of thirty thousand persons. Under such circumstances, all the requirements of Rule 23(a) appear to be satisfied; and the only question with regards to Rule 23(b) comes in connection with whether common questions of law or fact "predominate" as required by Rule 23(b)(3). I do not see how the appropriateness of declaratory or injunctive relief under the provisions of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(2) can seriously be disputed. Likewise, I do not believe that the Government's suggestion that plaintiff is not an adequate class representative of PA households has merit. The cases are legion to the effect that the fact that she personally has been afforded relief neither moots the claims of the class nor disqualifies her from asserting them.⁵ On the other hand, the position that she can not vindicate the interests of NPA households seems well taken: the policy as applied to such persons does not affect her, and a decision as to its legality with respect to such households would at this stage be no more than an advisory opinion. In summary then, ex proprio motu, I hereby certify this suit as a proper class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(2) on behalf of all public assistance households which were terminated from or denied food stamps on or after January 1, 1972 for "failure to prove management." Although it is possible that the non-public assistance households will be provided a suitable champion in the very near future since a motion to intervene an NPA plaintiff in this action is now pending before me, as of this point in time, I shall confine my ruling on the legality of the policy in question to public assistance households, to the extent that I can.⁶

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The food stamp program was intended by Congress to supplement the budgets of low-income households in order to permit them "to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade." See 7 U.S.C. § 2011. The eligibility schedules promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reflect a determination that a household whose income falls below the maximum listed for a family of its size is unable to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. Household eligibility having been established, a recipient provides information about her expenses so that the state agency can determine the purchase price to be paid for the stamps by the recipient. See 7 CFR § 271.3(c)(1)(ii). The value of the food stamps issued to the recipient is the amount determined by the Secretary to be the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet for a family the size of the recipient's. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a). In other words, the amount the recipient pays for the stamps is based in part on the family's expenses, and the amount of stamps received by the household is based on what the family needs to purchase an adequate diet.

The logic of the system breaks down, however, because in most poor families expenses are not met on a regular basis and there is a constant picking and choosing between what bills to pay now and what bills to wait on. Operating so close to the margin of solvency, the plaintiff asserts, makes it impossible as a practical matter for many food stamp recipients to state what expenses are paid regularly. The form on which a recipient reports expenses does not specify that expenses are to be reported only if paid. Much confusion develops because the state defendants apparently assume in at least some cases that the expenses listed by the recipient are in fact paid on a regular basis.

Under the terms of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, the only relevant criteria for eligibility are "household income and other financial resources." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b). The state's "failure to prove management" regulation, plaintiff claims, effectively adds to these criteria by requiring that in addition to the foregoing, the recipient be able to demonstrate specifically how she is able to meet expenses — where expenses exceed reported income. Plaintiff alleges that the insertion of this additional criterion violates the Food Stamp Act.

The state defendants dispute the interpretation that plaintiff places on their regulation, and denies that in practice it is applied in the manner alleged by plaintiff. The Division argues that the eligibility criteria for public assistance cases allows it to refuse certification to households where reported expenses exceed reported income; and that since the eligibility of such households for food stamps is derivative from their eligibility for public assistance, it may deny them food stamps as well. The Division now states that in the future it will treat all "failure to prove management" cases as violative of applicable public assistance regulations rather than treat them directly under the food stamp guidelines.

The utilization of the "failure to prove management" criterion in public assistance cases by the Division, in this indirect fashion is justified by the following argument:

The USDA food stamp regulations, at 7 CFR § 271.3(b) provides that:

Households in which all members are included in a federally aided public assistance or general assistance grant shall, if otherwise eligible under this subchapter, be determined to be eligible to participate in the program while receiving such grants without regard to the income and resources of the household members.

Even though the above regulation establishes that all public assistance and general assistance households are entitled to food stamps, the Division argues that the regulation does not stand for the proposition that income and resources are to be ignored in determining the amount of the grant and the purchase price requirement. It bases this assertion on 7 CFR § 271.4(a)(1) which provides that:

The State agency shall provide for the certification of households in which all members are included in a federally aided public assistance or general assistance grant, solely on the basis of information contained in an affidavit and the assistance case file. emphasis added.

The affidavit and assistance case file will, in accordance with both Social Security and Food Stamp regulations, contain all information on both income and resources, and on income deductions and expenses, necessary to calculate the amount of the food stamp grant and the purchase requirement, which are computed in the same manner for both public assistance and non-public assistance households. If income or income deduction information appearing in the assistance case record and/or the affidavit is incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent, then the worker must seek substantiation or verification in order to clarify the situation. Such procedure is required by Social Security regulations:

(3) When under the simplified method, statements of the applicant or recipient are incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent, or where other circumstances in the particular case indicate to a prudent person that further inquiry should be

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