Stokes v. Coweta Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
Decision Date | 07 May 2012 |
Docket Number | No. A11A2062.,A11A2062. |
Citation | 313 Ga.App. 505,12 FCDR 146,722 S.E.2d 118 |
Parties | STOKES v. COWETA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dennis, Corry, Porter & Smith, Harold W. Whiteman, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.
David Wayne Willis, Atlanta, for appellee.
In this workers' compensation action, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for the State Board of Workers' Compensation granted Vanessa Stokes' claim for benefits after finding that she sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. The Board's Appellate Division reversed the ALJ's decision and denied benefits. Stokes then appealed to the Superior Court of Coweta County, which affirmed the decision of the Board. Pursuant to a granted application for discretionary appeal, Stokes appeals, seeking reinstatement of the ALJ's award. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
Pursuant to OCGA § 34–9–103(a), “[a]ny party dissatisfied with a decision of an [ALJ] of the trial division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation may appeal that decision to the appellate division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation which shall have original appellate jurisdiction in all workers' compensation cases.” The Appellate Division is authorized “to weigh the evidence [of record] and assess the credibility of witnesses[.]” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Syntec Indus., Inc. v. Godfrey, 269 Ga. 170, 171(1), 496 S.E.2d 905 (1998). 1 If, after assessing the evidence of record, the Appellate Division determines that the findings of the ALJ were supported by a preponderance of the competent and credible evidence, the Appellate Division must accept the factual findings of the ALJ. Id. “But, if after assessing the evidence of record, the appellate division concludes that the award does not meet the statute's evidentiary standards, the appellate division may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an award accordingly.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id.
After a workers' compensation decision becomes final at the administrative level, the parties have a right of direct appeal to the superior court, pursuant to OCGA § 34–9–105(b). Ga. Mountain Excavation v. Dobbins, 309 Ga.App. 155, 156, 710 S.E.2d 205 (2011). As a reviewing court, the superior court applies an any-evidence standard of review to the Board's findings of fact, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the Board, and lacks authority to substitute itself as a factfinding body in lieu of the Board. Home Depot v. McCreary, 306 Ga.App. 805, 808–809(2), 703 S.E.2d 392 (2010); Lowndes County Bd. of Commrs. v. Connell, 305 Ga.App. 844, 844–845, 701 S.E.2d 227 (2010); Harris v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 296 Ga.App. 225, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009). 2 “[E]rroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law, [however,] are subject to the de novo standard of review” in the superior court. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Home Depot v. McCreary, 306 Ga.App. at 808–809(2), 703 S.E.2d 392. See also Amedisys Home Health v. Howard, 269 Ga.App. 656, 657, 605 S.E.2d 60 (2004) ( )(citation and punctuation omitted). “Where it affirmatively appears that the [Board's decision] is based upon an erroneous legal theory, and that for this reason the [B]oard has not considered all of the evidence in the light of correct and applicable legal principles, the case should be remanded to the [B]oard for further findings.” (Citation omitted.) Murph v. Maynard Fixturecraft, 252 Ga.App. 483, 486(2), 555 S.E.2d 845 (2001).
An appeal to this Court from a decision of a superior court reviewing a decision of the Board is not a matter of right but rather is discretionary. OCGA § 5–6–35(a)(1). Appeals to this Court are governed by the same standards of review as appeals to the superior court under OCGA § 34–9–105. Home Depot v. McCreary, 306 Ga.App. at 808–809(2), 703 S.E.2d 392; Goswick v. Murray County Bd. of Ed., 281 Ga.App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006); see also Harris v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 296 Ga.App. at 225–226, 674 S.E.2d 36 () (citation and punctuation omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the employer as the prevailing party, the record shows the following. Stokes was employed as head custodian at an elementary school, and one of her duties was to unlock and open the gates leading to the school parking lot before other employees arrived each morning. On May 3, 2010, Stokes drove up to the front gate at 5:45 a.m.; it was very dark and raining heavily. According to Stokes, she pulled her car as close to the gate as she could so that her headlights would shine on the lock. While she was unlocking the gate, her car began to roll downhill, away from the gate. Stokes ran toward the car in an attempt to stop it. She testified that trying to stop her car was not a decision but, “when [she] saw [her] car moving, [she] just went on instinct” and that she did not want to damage school property or her car. After taking just a few steps, Stokes tripped and fell. The car rolled over her left foot. The car stopped in a wooded area on school property. A few days after the accident, her foot had to be amputated.
To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee's accidental injury must arise both “out of” and “in the course of” his or her employment. OCGA § 34–9–1(4).3
The words “arising out of” mean that there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which she received. The causative danger must be incidental to the character of the employment, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. The accident must be one resulting from a risk reasonably incident to the employment.(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 296 Ga.App. at 227, 674 S.E.2d 36. See also Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 281 Ga. 853, 855, 642 S.E.2d 841 (2007) (accord); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga.App. 380, 382, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963) ( )(citations omitted); Pike v. Maryland Cas. Co., 107 Ga.App. 49, 51, 129 S.E.2d 78 (1962) ( ).
The words “in the course of the employment” relate to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place, and an accident arises in the course of the employment when it occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of [her] duties and while [she] is fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental thereto.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 281 Ga. at 854–855, 642 S.E.2d 841. “An injury to an employee occurring during working hours and on the employer's premises ordinarily and presumptively will be considered as arising out of and in the course of employment[.]” (Citations omitted.) Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga.App. 563, 564, 294 S.E.2d 734 (1982).4
Under the deviation rule, “[w]here [an] employee breaks the continuity of [her] employment for purposes of [her] own and is injured before [she] brings [herself] back into the line of employment, [her] injury does not arise out of or in the course of [her] employment[.]” (Citation omitted.) Gen. Accident, etc., Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga.App. 421, 423(1), 56 S.E.2d 137 (1949).5 Our courts have found such a deviation from employment when an employee leaves the employer's premises to go home or to a restaurant for a meal,6 runs a personal errand such as going to a shop, 7 or, while traveling on business, goes on an excursion solely for personal entertainment.8 An injury that occurs during a time when the employee is off duty and is free to do as he or she pleases and when the employee is not performing any job duties is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. ATC Healthcare Svc. v. Adams, 263 Ga.App. 792, 793–795, 589 S.E.2d 346 (2003); Blair v. Ga. Baptist, etc., Inc., 189 Ga.App. 579, 582(2), 377 S.E.2d 21 (1988); Aetna Cas., etc. v. Honea, 71 Ga.App. 569, 572(1), 31 S.E.2d 421 (1944).9
In reversing the ALJ's award of benefits in this case, the Board concluded that the accident did not arise out of Stokes' employment. The Board found that Stokes' job duties included opening the gate, unlocking the building, emptying trash cans, sweeping, and so on, but did not include “going after a moving vehicle.” When Stokes turned away from the gate, after putting her key in the gate's lock, and pursued her car, the Board found, she “ undertook a personal mission, in pursuit of [her] personal property, not connected to her duties with the [e]mployer.” In addition, the Board found that Stokes did not pursue the car in an attempt to prevent injury to herself or another employee or damage to the employer's property.
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that the Board's decision was based upon an erroneous theory regarding what conduct constitutes a deviation from employment that will bar compensation under the Act. It is undisputed that, at the instant Stokes' car began to roll, she was on duty (not on break); she was...
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