Stokes. v. DeMatteis, Civ. No. 21-144-CFC

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Delaware)
• Writing for the Court: CONNOLLY, Chief Judge
• Parties: TERRANCE J.M. STOKES, Plaintiff, v. CLAIR DEMATTEIS, et al., Defendants.
• Decision Date: 30 July 2021
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 21-144-CFC

TERRANCE J.M. STOKES, Plaintiff,
v.
CLAIR DEMATTEIS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 21-144-CFC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

July 30, 2021

Terrance J.M. Stokes, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

July 30, 2021
Wilmington, Delaware

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CONNOLLY, Chief Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Terrance J. M. Stokes, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 10801, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. (D.I. 2) Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 5, 7) The Court proceeds to review and screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(a).

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for screening purposes. See Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff names two defendants - Delaware Department of Correction Commissioner Clare DeMatteis and Centurion Health, the contract medical provider for the DOC.

Plaintiff alleges that the DOC does not adhere to its policies with regard to inmates and mental health care, and it does not provide human interaction and "reasonably frequent mental health care" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (D.I. 2 at 4-5, 7-10) He also alleges that the DOC fails to consider an inmate's mental health status before placing the inmate in a restrictive housing unit or extreme isolation. (Id. at 6, 7-10)

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date he was in serious pain, vomiting, throwing up, and had rectal bleeding. (Id. at 2) He was taken to an infirmary and treated and, although he continued to vomit and bleed, he was returned to his housing unit where he remained ill and passed out. (Id.) An officer told Plaintiff to submit a sick call slip and, as of January 21, 2021, he had not heard from medical. (Id.)

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Plaintiff states that he also submitted a grievance and has yet to hear anything. (Id.) He remains ill. (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages. (Id. at 12)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

A complaint is not automatically frivolous because it fails to state a claim. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d. 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 331 (1989)); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112 (3d Cir. 2002). "Rather, a claim is frivolous only where it depends 'on an "indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual

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scenario.'" Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d at 374 (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (2003) and Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v...