Stokes v. Fair, 85-1990

• Decision Date: 16 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1990,85-1990
• Citation: 795 F.2d 235
• Parties: Ronald A.X. STOKES, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Michael V. FAIR, et al., Defendants, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 235

795 F.2d 235

Ronald A.X. STOKES, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Michael V. FAIR, et al., Defendants, Appellants.

No. 85-1990.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued May 7, 1986.

Decided July 16, 1986.

William D. Luzier, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., Frederick W. Riley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Criminal Bureau, and Barbara A.H. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Criminal Appellate Div., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendants, appellants.

Martin J. Newhouse, with whom John C. Bartenstein and Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.

Before COFFIN and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges, and MALETZ, ^* Senior Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

This case is before us on appeal from a summary judgment concluding that the "awaiting action status" detention regulations of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, 103 CMR 430.19 and 103 CMR 420.13(2)(b), create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was alleged that Stokes, an inmate in the Massachusetts prisons, had been confined in the segregated confinement status on several occasions, allegedly for unreasonably long periods of time without constitutionally adequate notice or review. The parties set forth the issue for resolution by the district court in an agreed statement of facts. The court found that the regulations in question are analogous to those discussed by the Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) and ruled that these regulations created a protected liberty interest. The court therefore granted summary judgment on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied same to the defendants.

The basis of the state's argument is that the Massachusetts regulations are distinguishable from those of Pennsylvania, which were analyzed in Hewitt. Appellants contend that the elements which the Supreme Court found crucial are lacking here. We disagree.

The Supreme Court in Hewitt found that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage. Prisoners retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. Therefore, administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates can reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration and it accordingly does not involve any interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause. The state, however, may create a protected liberty interest through the enactment of certain statutory or regulatory measures.

In analyzing the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations, ¹ the Court articulates two criteria which it believes separate regulations that create such interest from simple procedural guidelines: 1) the use of language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures "shall," "will," or "must" be employed; and 2) the fact that the administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates--viz., "the need for control," or "the threat of a serious disturbance." Id. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871-72. As the Court succinctly stated:

"[T]he repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest."

Id. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871.

Our review of the Massachusetts regulations in light of the Supreme Court analysis, and in comparison to the Pennsylvania regulations in Hewitt, leads us to affirm the decision of the district court. 103 CMR 430.19 provides as follows:

"(1) The superintendent or his designee may authorize the placement of an inmate in detention in awaiting action status pending:

(a) A hearing on a disciplinary offense by the inmate

(b) An investigation of a possible disciplinary offense by the inmate

(c) A transfer or a reclassification of the inmate to a higher custody status, or

(d) Imposition of isolation time sanction on the inmate when the inmate's continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to persons, property, or the security of the institution.

(2) The superintendent shall designate such person or persons as he deems appropriate to review the status of inmates housed in detention in awaiting action on a weekly basis. An inmate shall be released from detention when the reasons for his initial placement cease to exist or when his return to general population no longer poses a serious threat to persons, property, or the security of the institution or when he is no longer in the status specified in any one of 103 CMR 430.19(1)(a) through 430.19(1)(d)."

103 CMR 420.13(2)(b) governing the transfer of inmates to a higher custody status provides that:

"Where the Deputy Commissioner for Classification and Treatment or the Superintendent or his designee determines at any time prior to or during [a proceeding for reclassification to a higher custody status] that there is an immediate threat to the health or safety of the...