Stokes v. State

Decision Date18 February 2004
Docket NumberNo. 47,47
Citation379 Md. 618,843 A.2d 64
PartiesDontee STOKES v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Lisa J. Sansone (Law Office of Lisa Sansone of the Law Office of Lisa J. Sansone, Warren A Brown of Warren A. Brown, P.A. of Baltimore), on brief for appellant.

Diane E. Keller, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. RAKER, Judge.

This criminal case presents issues relating to a defendant's right to a trial by a jury of twelve jurors and the treatment of alternate jurors in a case in which the defendant has entered a plea of not criminally responsible and requests a bifurcated trial. In the guilt/innocence stage of the trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City retained the four alternate jurors and permitted them to participate in the juror deliberations. Appellant's argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting sixteen jurors to enter the jury room and deliberate on the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. We agree with appellant that it was reversible error to permit the four alternate jurors to be present in the jury room during deliberations and shall reverse the convictions and order a new trial.

I.

Dontee Stokes, appellant, was indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore City with the offenses of attempted first degree murder; assault; reckless endangerment; use of a handgun in a crime of violence; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun; carrying or knowingly transporting a handgun in a vehicle; and discharging a firearm within city limits. He entered a plea of not guilty and not criminally responsible pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-242(a). The State alleged that appellant shot and wounded Maurice Blackwell, appellant's priest when appellant was a young boy. In his statement to the police, appellant admitted shooting Blackwell. At trial, appellant maintained that from the time he was thirteen years old until he was seventeen years old, Blackwell had repeatedly sexually abused him and that as a result, in addition to lacking criminal responsibility, appellant lacked the ability to form specific intent at the time of the shooting.

The trial commenced before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on December 10, 2002. Pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 4-314,1 appellant elected to proceed to trial in a bifurcated proceeding, and in accordance with the Rule, the court commenced with the guilt/innocence phase. In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel stated that "we will plead guilty on possession of the handgun and we'll take whatever wrath the judge imposes on us." As to the remaining charges, counsel asked the jury to find appellant not guilty.

At the conclusion of all the evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and following jury instructions and closing arguments, the court instructed the jurors as follows:

"Madam Forelady, ladies and gentlemen, under the Rule 4-314 that creates a bifurcated trial, at the present time, you are all jurors. You are not both jurors and alternates, even though we so designated you.
* * *
Now, when you have a verdict, Madam Forelady, make sure it is unanimous. Make sure that all sixteen of you agree with the verdict. Mark on the verdict sheet not guilty or guilty as to each of the nine counts. Be careful that everybody is unanimously on board, because once the verdict is announced, either side can ask for a poll. In the poll, the clerk will ask jurors two through sixteen, you've heard the verdict of your Forelady, is that your verdict?
If anybody says no or maybe, then you have to continue deliberations. It is only when all sixteen of you are prepared to publicly defend the same verdict do we have a judgment sufficient to end this phase of the case and begin the next phase of the case, whatever that next phase is."

Appellant's counsel objected to the alternate jurors being permitted to deliberate. The trial court overruled the objection, responding that, according to Rule 4-314, a bifurcated trial is a single continuous trial, in two stages, and the Rule requires that the alternate jurors must be retained throughout the trial. The sixteen person jury deliberated for about one half-hour that day. Following a weekend recess, the jury continued deliberating. After about two hours of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court with the question, "Do alternates count?"

The jury note regarding the role of alternate jurors, for the first time, sparked a discussion between the court and counsel of the role of alternate jurors in a bifurcated case under Rule 4-314. Focusing on the language of the Rule that "The court shall appoint at least four (sic) alternate jurors, who shall be retained throughout the trial," the court noted as follows:

"So, in what I believe to be a case of first impression in Maryland, because there is no annotation in the rule since the rule was passed in July 1989, that means that alternates deliberate on the criminal agency phase, and then are dismissed when it's time to deliberate for the not criminally responsible phase. Because (b)(5) says, `Trial issue of criminal responsibility, (A), except as otherwise provided in paragraph (B) or (C) of the subsection, the issue of criminal responsibility shall be tried before the same jury that tried the issue of guilt. Any juror who dies, becomes incapacitated, disqualified or is otherwise discharged before the jury begins to deliberate in the criminal responsibility phase shall be replaced by an alternate juror in the order of selection.' So, if they're there in the jury room while the deliberations are going on what do they do other than deliberate."

The court considered two choices: Should the alternate jurors stay in the jury room as non-participants so that they are aware of the deliberations in case they are needed as jurors in the insanity phase, or do they function and participate as jurors in the guilt/innocence phase? After an extended discussion, the court decided to instruct the jury that the alternates were to be mere observers. The court responded to the jury inquiry as to whether alternate jurors vote as follows:

"[W]e've decided after lengthy research and argument to do the following, to have the twelve jurors deliberate, and to have the four alternates in the jury room as observers so that they'll know what went on for the next phase of the case, where they might actually become jurors if someone can't complete it. So the best that we can tell from what the discussion before the Rules Committee was and from the wording of the Rule, is that alternates are not to be discharged because they're needed for the next phase if there's going to be a next phase. But by the same token, it might be safer not to have the alternates deliberate or vote. So Mister and Madams Alternate, I know that kind of puts a burden on you to kind of sit there and wait to find out whether you get to play a role or not, but it's better for you to be in there knowing what's going on, than out and not knowing what's going on. So we're going to ask you to perform that function. So with that—it has to be a unanimous decision of the twelve of you, and when we poll the jury it'll be the poll of the twelve of you. The alternates are basically just in a holding pattern as observers so that they know what went on in case one or more of them becomes a juror if we reach the next phase. So with that you may now retire to resume your deliberations with those guidelines. Thank you."

Defense counsel reiterated his objection to the presence of alternates in the jury room.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. The jury convicted appellant of three counts: wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun; wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun in a vehicle; and discharging a firearm within the city limits.

The next day, appellant withdrew his plea of not criminally responsible in return for an agreement with the State that the State would recommend a sentence of three years incarceration, with all but eighteen months suspended, three years probation, and full credit against the sentence based on the time appellant spent in home detention pretrial. The court imposed a sentence in accord with the State's recommendation.

Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to consideration by that court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider the issues presented in Stokes' appeal. 376 Md. 543, 831 A.2d 3 (2003).

II.

The right to a trial by jury, of twelve persons, has been part of the common law for centuries, along with the requirement of unanimity. The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Maryland Rules, as well as the United States Constitution. See Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984)

. Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, "That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to ... trial by Jury...." Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, "That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty." Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides, "That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges ... or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty...

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  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 25, 2022
    ...has long been the rule in Maryland, without any deviation, that a juror may not impeach his or her verdict." Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 637, 843 A.2d 64, 75 (2004) (citations omitted). See also Colvin-el v. State, 332 Md. 144, 184, 630 A.2d 725, 745 (1993), cert. denied sub nom. Colvin-E......
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    • United States
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    ...the parties stipulate at any time in writing or on the record that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12. In Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 843 A.2d 64 (2004), the Court of Appeals reiterated that "[t]he right to a trial by jury, of twelve persons, has been part of the common law......
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    ...is unquestioned.") (citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 394 Md. 479, 906 A.2d 943 (2006). In Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 638, 843 A.2d 64 (2004), the Court Jury deliberations are private and are to be conducted in secret. The rule prohibiting verdict impeachment is strin......
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    ...Assistance of Trial CounselNewton argues that his trial counsel was deficient because he was ignorant of Stokes v. State , 379 Md. 618, 843 A.2d 64 (2004), in which this Court held that it was reversible error for the court to send an alternate juror into deliberations over defense counsel'......
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